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This dissertation examines the rhetoric employed by Wollstonecraft, 
Cugoano, and Godwin who devise a top-down/bottom-up dialectic of social-
justice writing which can be read as grassroots advocacy. The authors write with 
two constant goals in mind: from the top down, they decry systemic forms of 
injustice; and from the bottom up, they make the experiences of victims visible. 
Scholarship on A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Thoughts and Sentiments on the 
Evil of Slavery, and Things as They are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams, has 
often focused on assessing the degree to which each text concerns itself with 
democratic equal rights. By contrast, this project explicates how the writers 
collectively define social injustice for the late eighteenth century. The writers 
simultaneously voice their indignation against those moral and socio-economic 
wrongs; deconstruct assumptions of natural inferiority and social disrespect; 
demand extensive change to social foundations; assert the humanity of women, 
workers, and slaves; and empathize with other oppressed populations across 
their traditionally conceived genres of vindication, slave narrative, and novel.  
 v 
Ultimately, my work incorporates a lexicon of political philosophy, political 
theory, and grassroots advocacy into literary studies to show how 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin not only recognize corresponding 
patterns of oppression but also utilize strikingly similar literary devices and 
rhetorical strategies by which to combat injustice.   All three authors share the 
same fundamental aim— to transform the dismal existence of the oppressed 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
READING FOR GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE AND CRITICAL CONTEXTS 
Eighteenth-century transatlantic British culture offers no shortage of 
subtle to bold, non-violent to violent, spontaneous to organized, real and literary 
responses to social injustice—sex strike, silence, suicide, sabotage, song, 
storytelling, hunger strike, arson, abortion, insurrection, indolence, infanticide, 
impertinence, denunciation, disobedience, damage, dance, desertion, poison, 
picketing, pilferage, public speech, piracy, pamphlet, petitioning, flight, fake 
illness, false identity, faith, education, escape, boycott, massacre, march, mutiny, 
murder, riot, revolt, revolution, and writing.  The authors I study collectively 
represent a form of rebellious literature intensely concerned with articulating on 
the page the spirit of urgent, outraged protest so frequently exhibited by the 
masses of oppressed British subjects at home and by the multitudes of 
persecuted peoples in British colonies.   
Scholarship on my primary texts, Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman (1792), Quobna Ottobah Cugoano’s Thoughts and Sentiments 
on the Evil of Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species (1787), and William 
Godwin’s Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794), has 
principally stayed within particularized fields of identity politics, which 
highlight each writer’s specific concerns of slavery, women’s rights, and class 
struggles without fully attending to the writers’ broader insights about how 
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power subordinates masses of people in corresponding, systemic patterns.  My 
dissertation, therefore, contributes to studies in British Romanticism by showing 
how Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin can be read as a broad grassroots 
coalition representing marginalized people.  Specifically, I find that all three 
writers employ a comparative methodology to measure cultural ideals against 
the actual lived conditions of oppressed groups; they devise plans for 
reformation, targeting the same social institutions that enforce “manifest 
injustice” (Sen 7); they demand the recognition of marginalized people as equal 
moral agents; they call for a redistribution of resources and rights; and they 
formulate tactics by which the subjugated can resist coercion even from within 
constricted circumstances.   It is this complex of features combined with their 
balance between cultural analysis and direct advice for resistance by oppressed 
persons that makes all three of my primary texts dialectical social justice 
statements.  
Scholars working from within feminist, postcolonial, race- and class-based 
literary theories have been invaluable for bringing the political relevance of these 
texts into critical view as they also revised the traditional literary canon to 
include literature by female, multiethnic, laboring, and peripheral authors.  Most 
notable has been the work of Keith A. Sandiford on Cugoano, Virginia Sapiro on 
Wollstonecraft, and Gary Kelly on Godwin; their statements are still the 
unrivaled, breakthrough political interpretations of each author. All three of 
these landmark readings came during the influx of political and cultural theories 
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that bombarded the field of eighteenth-century literary studies between the 1970s 
and the 1990s.   However, recent work over the past couple of decades has done 
little to continue the substantive conversations founded by these earlier critics.  
For example, feminist scholars still highlight Wollstonecraft’s themes of 
motherhood, sexuality, and sensibility. Postcolonial critics still define, sometimes 
all too tentatively, the parameters of Cugoano’s attack on racism and slavery. 
Caleb Williams scholarship remains splintered between debates about the 
influence of the author’s technical innovations in genre and character and 
debates about the two endings.  In short, critical conversation on these authors 
has stagnated.  Cugoano scholarship has barely begun; a conflicted 
Wollstonecraft scholarship reflects the often contentious politics within academic 
feminism itself; and Godwin scholarship has never attended to the significance of 
the author’s many marginalized characters.   
Most work on Wollstonecraft and Cugoano has concentrated 
understandably on what Nancy Fraser refers to as the “politics of recognition” 
(3).  Fraser, as a political theorist, does not write about these literary figures.  
However, her definition of the "politics of recognition” relates to the scholarship 
on both authors. Most work on these two figures has consisted of critics fighting 
to make these authors legitimate subjects of study through which to understand 
eighteenth-century culture—to include a fuller spectrum of the diverse attitudes 
and experiences expressed via the written word (3).   To a lesser extent, and 
perhaps in a subtler manner, the same problem has influenced Godwin criticism.  
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Many of his early critics apologized for bringing Caleb Williams forward for 
literary study, given the author’s radical politics and the residue of character 
defamation that became associated with Godwin in the later decades of his life.  
Scholars argued that the novel stood on its own merit as a crucial text for studies 
of the novel despite the author's personal reputation. This reliance on genre 
studies, however, obscured the political content of the novel.  Despite Godwin’s 
assertion that his novel was directed toward the lower-class reader not likely to 
read his political treatise, no major study has focused primarily, or even 
substantively, on the array of humble characters in the novel as exemplary of the 
common-place suffering with which the lower-class reader would identify.   
I argue that the heart of Godwin’s, Wollstonecraft’s, and Cugoano’s social 
justice stances must be found in their representations of the disenfranchised, 
displaced, and diasporic figures, real and imagined, who live lives injured by 
injustice.  All three authors work through representations of specific individuals 
and marginalized groups; they discover recurrent patterns of injustice across 
identity categories; and they work through a comparative strategy to discover 
systemic patterns of social injustice that extend beyond the initial concentration 
on women, workers, or slaves. Cugoano unprecedentedly ascertains a shared 
history of genocide between African peoples and Native Americans (from South 
to North America).  He confronts the British demonization of Spanish colonial 
conquests when he reveals the millions of native peoples enslaved or slain in 
similar manner by the British.  He thus defies the self-deceptive British myth of 
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their supposedly more humane colonial practices. His vision extends beyond the 
boundaries of European nation-states to perceive the international conspiracy 
inherent in colonization and the slave trade. Wollstonecraft, meanwhile, 
compares the political and economic disenfranchisement of European women in 
France and Britain to the state of slavery suffered by Africans.  While differing in 
degree of corporeal violence, she argues that women endure a parallel form of 
slavery, similar victims to laws that render them “cyphers;” forbidden from 
political participation, economic independence, and educational equality, all of 
these obstacles reduce women to a state of lesser humanity in the same manner 
that plantation slavery dehumanizes its victims (Wollstonecraft 90).   
Godwin’s parallel plots illustrate the repeated patterns of conspiracy, 
surveillance, cruelty, and corruption that cut across the experiences of the 
orphaned and landless domestic servant, the industrious tenant farmer, and the 
impoverished but genteel female dependent.  Like Wollstonecraft, he invokes the 
language of a new eighteenth-century genre, the slave narrative, in his allusions 
to hunted prey and repeated diasporic figures to connect all of these domestic 
village incidents to the condition of slavery.  All three authors balance the 
specific identity concerns of women, workers, and slaves with unstinting 
empathy for other oppressed populations and impulses to transform the entire 
social milieu that they critique.  It is this crucial balance that I hope to articulate 
in this project. I incorporate a lexicon of social justice theory in my 
interpretations of these three texts because it accommodates each author’s 
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balance between contemplating specific devalued identities and considering how 
social injustice threatens the entire moral fabric of eighteenth-century British 
society.  
In the few studies that have moved beyond canon revision to examine the 
political arguments of my primary texts, one priority has been articulating 
whether or not the writers align themselves with 20th- and 21st-century political 
theories, whether socialist, democratic, republican, or utopian—retroactively 
attempting to categorize the writers’ ideas using doctrines that did not fully exist 
in the late eighteenth century.  An alternate approach by race, class, and feminist 
scholars has been to examine the texts as personal expressions of lived 
prejudices.  Implicit in this second mode of inquiry for all identity-based 
scholarship, though it is most famously the mantra of second-wave feminists, is 
the idea that the personal is political, that sharing personal suffering denounces 
group persecution, and that communal storytelling solidifies a collective, 
political consciousness.  Critics have indeed performed poignant readings by 
attending to the emotional, biographical, and psychological registers of my 
primary texts. However, they have also been disappointed to discover a lack of 
formal group organization or a clear sense of group consciousness for 
eighteenth-century women, Afro-Britons, or workers reflected by or in these 
three texts.   
Amid their search for essential group consciousness or formal 
sociopolitical movements, however, literary critics have not fully recognized how 
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my authors use writing similarly to other daily acts of on-the-ground, in-the-
moment political protest and social resistance.  An aura of disappointment has 
often hovered over Wollstonecraft and Godwin, while an absence of research 
demonstrates a lack of academic appreciation of Cugoano.  But this actually 
reveals the datedness of interpretations of each author and text.  The most 
substantive political readings were done somewhat before greater 
interdisciplinary inclusion of historical and sociological scholarship into literary 
studies, and also prior to an growing body of work that has increasingly 
acknowledged tactical social resistance, such as acts of avoidance or flight, 
spontaneous riots, or temporary allegiances (like those between slaves, 
indentured servants, and Native Americans), as decipherable protests against 
social injustice and expressions of the grassroots demands of disenfranchised 
populations.  Indeed, historians note how many of these incidents have only 
survived through criminal records, legal documents, and advertisements for 
runaway wives, servants, and slaves, written from the skewed perspectives of 
socio-political overseers.   
Recent scholarship from radical historians1 studying the transformation of 
British society over the long eighteenth century and across colonial contexts 
                                                
1 For work on Black Atlantic history and strategic alliances between Africans, 
indentured servants, and Native Americans, see Franklin & Schweninger, Taylor, Ford, 
Walvin, and Myers.  For working class history, the development of working class social 
movements, and the recognition of the riot as social protest see the work of Edward P. 
Thompson, Adrian Randall, George Rudé, and John E. Archer.  For more about how 
women navigated patriarchal laws against wage-earning for themselves, property 
ownership, marital disputes, and domestic violence see work by Bernard Capp, Amy 
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suggests that group identifications may have been more tactical and discernible 
than literary critics have yet acknowledged in their interpretations of my authors.  
I understand the work of Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin as translating 
the actions of daily discontent and often spontaneous expressions of resistance to 
injustice into the more formal, public sphere of writing to inspire exactly the kind 
of group consciousness for oppressed populations that earlier scholarship found 
disappointingly lacking. I also contend that Wollstonecraft’s association of 
wifehood to slavery; Godwin’s language of pursuit that echoes the figurative 
language of the slave narrative; and Cugoano’s parallel between African and 
Native American colonial violence reveal each author’s comprehensive 
perception of the similar ways in which mechanisms of social injustice affect each 
of their represented populations.   
The next three sections review the major political criticism on each author 
while also suggesting the historical backdrop against which we should 
understand these texts as translating into writing the discontent inherent to 
revolts, riots, and revolutions into a non-violent, written rhetoric of resistance. I 
call Cugoano the forgotten abolitionist since he worked closely with other 
abolitionists, black and white Britons alike and through The Society for Effecting 
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, but criticism on this author has never placed 
him in comprehensive dialogue with his fellow activists, tending to study him in 
                                                                                                                                            
Louise Erikson, Nancy Locklin, Christine Wilson, Hannah Barker & Karen Harvey, 
Denise Fowler, Joanne Bailey, and Sara Mendelson. 
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isolation.  Next, I review Wollstonecraft scholarship, whose reputation and 
politics have always been rife with conflict.  Shortly following her death, 
eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century witnessed a backlash politics against 
this and other politically engaged female authors for their publications 
supporting women’s equality.  Even as feminist politics ushered in a new era of 
canon revision, however, Wollstonecraft scholarship remained contentious and, 
for this reason, has stymied today.  Lastly, I turn to review Godwin scholarship, 
which displays a splintered tradition between reading the novel for its political 
content versus the author’s innovativeness in psychological depth of 
characterization.  This either/or understanding of Caleb Williams needs merging 
to understand how psychology of the servant protagonist and politics are 
intertwined. 
Cugoano criticism has been limited. However, a growing body of 
historical work about slave resistance allows me to recognize this author’s 
writing as another mode of confrontation that resists Western violence against 
Africans alongside these other, more direct actions by slaves themselves.  
Archival research over the past three decades has made visible the erased history 
of African resistance, revolt, and rebellion against the slave trade and plantation 
slavery.  In The Zong (2011), James Walvin entitles his sixth chapter “An Open 
Secret” to indicate how “massacres” and “African sufferings on slave ships were 
unexceptional, and killings on slave ships were commonplace … Men who had 
worked on the African coast and on the Atlantic slave routes wrote about their 
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lives and adventures, describing African sufferings in very great detail” (104, 
115).  For much of the eighteenth century, the British public appears to have been 
little concerned with the “brutalities of slave trading,” information routinely 
available in public insurance claims, newspaper announcements, and sailor’s 
travel narratives.  
The public was little concerned, that is, until the sensational Zong 
massacre (1781), in which 132 Africans were thrown overboard to their deaths so 
owners and investors could collect lost-cargo insurance (Walvin, The Zong 103).  
Captives were murdered by the hundreds when too sick to sell or too rebellious 
to maintain safety, but they were more often tortured into compliance as best 
practice for maximum profit.  In Crossings (2013), Walvin again notes the lack of 
“secrecy about the violence on slave ships,” since there was no hiding the “huge 
volumes of equipment designed to quell and control the slaves” like “‘leg irons,” 
“‘handcuffs’” “iron collars,” and “thumbscrews,” produced by the “iron 
industries in Britain which turned out this equipment by the ton” almost 
exclusively for the massive transatlantic slave trade (103).  Eric Taylor similarly 
examines shipboard revolt in If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of 
the Atlantic Slave Trade (2006).  He describes another “sensational case,” this time 
in an American context, in August of 1764 aboard the Hope, in which sailors who 
murdered their captain concealed their deed with the “plausible” explanation 
that “rebellious slaves” were to blame (2).  The very plausibility of their defense 
indicates how common was the knowledge of slave resistance: “Africans did not 
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succumb to a life of enslavement without a struggle, and this struggle had been 
well documented for generations” (2). 
British brutality and African resistance were recorded and publicized.  If 
various documents report the hundreds of Africans habitually murdered for 
insurance claims, then documentation also reveals the astounding number killed 
in revolts at sea and those who perished by hunger strike or suicide by 
drowning.  Human traffickers dismissively characterized such desperate acts of 
resistance as “‘sulky,’” as in one report of a hunger strike quoted by Walvin, to 
minimize African resoluteness and organization when engaging in “shipboard 
mutinies” and mass suicide (Crossings 103).  Despite the “volumes” of torture 
devices designed to force feed, imprison, or subdue captives by pain, African 
people rebelled by any means at their disposal.  Walvin has discovered, 
remarkably, “at least 120 slave upheavals which resulted in freedom for some of 
the Africans on board” while many other successful revolts against slave 
traffickers unfortunately came to a “miserable end” lost at sea (Crossings 120-
121).   
Moving from transatlantic ship to colonial plantation, Franklin and 
Schweninger concentrate the entirety of their book, Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the 
Plantation (1999), on the “‘day to day’ resistance of slaves” that “ranged from 
finding solace in a ‘black community’” to murdering overseers and owners (2).  
Slaves commonly sabotaged the machines and tools of their forced labor, burned 
crops or plantation houses, fled for freedom or formed maroon colonies, avoided 
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the involuntary reproduction and birth of children into perpetual chattel slavery, 
avoided work to preserve their own health and survival, or persevered in 
maintaining a cultural heritage independent of their captors through self-
education, song, oral history, faith, food, and dance (Franklin 2-4).2   Recorded by 
biased whites, black resistance against capture and enslavement nevertheless 
survives (Franklin 2).3    
The subject of survival and subsistence is the theme of Norma Meyers’s 
study, Reconstructing the Black Past: Blacks in Britain 1780-1830 (1996).  Meyers 
offers a rich and subtle interpretation of the Afro-British struggle to survive 
within a hostile British society during a time when the status of Blacks 
transitioned from unpaid slave, to paid domestic servant, to free but precarious 
laborers in “occupations of soldier, sailor, [and] crossing sweeper, and those who 
professionally begged” (56). Meyers traces during this transitional period the 
agency of Afro-British persons who protested their slave status and maltreatment 
                                                
2 See also Lacy K. Ford Deliver Us from Evil:  The Slavery Question in the Old South (2009), 
in which she investigates how skilled laboring slaves aided in “the Gabriel insurrection 
scare of 1800” which “lent a renewed sense of urgency to upper South whites’ search for 
answers to the slavery question, given the all too apparent dangers of living in a slave 
society” (18).  See also Albert J. Raboteau’s now classic study, Slave Religion:  The 
‘Invisible Institution’ in the Antebellum South (1978, 2004), in which he traces the 
transformation, hybridity, and “adaptability” of “African beliefs and customs” and other 
“elements of African folklore, music, language, and religion” that were “modified by a 
new environment” in “the New World:” “Adaptability, based upon respect for spiritual 
power wherever it originated, accounted for the openness of African religions to 
syncretism with other religious traditions and for the continuity of a distinctive African 
religious consciousness” (4-5). 
3 Franklin raises the problem of tracing the history of a silenced people through biased 
documents written by whites, and Taylor also raises the same point about the “inherent 
biases” of documents, be they court documents, company accounts, ship logs, or 
newspaper advertisements.  Both share a method of archival research combined with 
articulating “the voices of the millions of Africans who crossed the Atlantic … by 
looking at their actions” (11). 
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by “‘vot[ing] with their feet’ in a self-emancipation of flight from their owners … 
by running away black servant-slaves contributed to their own emancipation in a 
period predating agitation by abolitionists and the termination of the slave trade 
and slavery itself” (57).  Once self-emancipated, survival became even more 
challenging as blacks could scarcely compete for unskilled jobs against their 
white counterparts in a racist society (57).  However, Meyers argues that Afro-
British maintained “supportive networks,” clubs, and philanthropic 
collaborations for each other, with other ethnic groups in Britain, and with 
whites for socioeconomic survival and political exchange.  Meyers’s evidence 
suggests the existence of communities of Blacks and strategic sociopolitical 
communities along class lines rather than strict “colour lines” since “black and 
white were both oppressed in England” (131).   
In Middle Passage mutinies, plantation uprisings, maroon wars, and 
successful full-scale revolutions, African and British slaves not only organized 
themselves but also collaborated with indigenous Indians, indentured servants, 
colonial peasants, and working-class whites; these alliances were surprisingly 
common and well-documented in the public press, period journals, company 
logs, prison-visitation records, philanthropic donation receipts, parish marriage 
registers, riot news, employment files, and criminal records (Taylor 3, Meyers 
130-131).4   Since Thoughts and Sentiments is classified as a literary text, it receives 
                                                
4 See also Richard Price’s classic study, Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the 
Americas (1978, 1996), that dispels the notion of the “‘docile slave’” and retraces “more 
than four centuries” of runaway slave communities that “dotted the fringes of plantation 
America, from Brazil to the southwestern United States, from Peru to the American 
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only a brief mention by Walvin in The Zong.  However, Thoughts and Sentiments 
must be acknowledged as negotiating these multiple paradigms of resistance 
across Black Atlantic contexts in which African persons, some enslaved and some 
occupying less abject but still liminal socioeconomic positions, resisted coercion 
by all means at their disposal, including cooperative strategies with other ethnic 
and racial groups, to survive hostile foreign contexts.   
Wollstonecraft and Godwin treat oppression of women and workers that 
originates from within the same society and whose modes of coercion and 
violence resemble those of plantation slavery.  Despite the unabashedly 
misogynistic culture from within which Wollstonecraft wrote, scholarship led by 
academic feminists has often been unforgiving and suspicious of the author.  
This peculiar atmosphere of suspicion has targeted different aspects of the 
author’s life and work according to the shifting politics of academic feminism.  
Scholars have criticized the author’s sexual choices and familial relationships, 
intellectual gifts and writing skills, political viewpoints and reform agenda.  I 
discuss all of this in greater detail in the literature review that follows.  Here I 
highlight one potentially promising, but ultimately disappointing, moment in the 
context of the self-critical gaze that feminism turned on itself in the early 1990s. 
As second-wave feminism gave way to third-wave feminism, the transition was 
rife with protestations by lesbian feminists and feminists of color who criticized 
                                                                                                                                            
Southwest” and which “ranged from tiny bands that survived less than a year to 
powerful states encompassing thousands of members and surviving for generations or 
even centuries” (1-2).   
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the heterosexual bias of second-wave feminism, excluding the diverse 
experiences and needs of queer and non-white women.   
Moira Ferguson’s essay, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Problem of 
Slavery” (1992), exemplifies this era of feminist analysis. Ferguson argues that 
Wollstonecraft's metaphoric conflation of the state of womanhood and marriage 
with the state of slavery in Rights of Woman was misguided. Unlike any critic 
before or since, Ferguson astutely notes Wollstonecraft's numerous references to 
slavery, representing “white, middle-class women” as "slaves" (82), and attempts 
to unpack their significance.  On one hand, she observes that describing 
eighteenth-century European women’s socioeconomic and legal limitations as a 
sort of enslaved state was unoriginal: it was a common analogy deployed by 
“conservative and radical women alike [who] railed against marriage, love, and 
education as forms of slavery perpetuated upon women by men and by the 
conventions of society at large” (83).  On the other hand, Ferguson correctly 
contextualizes Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman against the backdrop of the 
“national campaign against the slave trade.” She cites Thomas Clarkson’s 
renowned anti-slavery pamphlet, A Summary View of the Slave-Trade, and of the 
Probable Consequences of Its Abolition (1787), which Wollstonecraft likely read as a 
reviewer for the Analytical Review, established in the same year by her mentor, 
radical publisher Joseph Johnson.   
Ferguson likewise points to the onset of the French Revolution with the 
storming of the Bastille (1789), Catherine Macaulay Graham’s Letters on Education 
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(1790), and the slave revolt in the French colony of San Domingo (now Haiti) 
(1791) as influences on Wollstonecraft’s reconceptualization of the marriage-as-
slavery analogy. “The composition of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman started 
in the midst of these tumultuous events, its political ingredients indicating 
Wollstonecraft's involvement in all these issues.  Indeed, Mary Wollstonecraft 
seems to have been the first writer to raise issues of colonial and gender relations 
so tellingly in tandem” (87).  She innovatively engages “a discourse on slavery 
that highlighted female subjugation” across a range of categories, such as 
“sensation, pleasure, fashion, marriage and patriarchal subjugation,” and 
increasingly recognizes the parallel experiences of European women and colonial 
slaves as social and sexual victims of legally sanctioned, “humanly constructed” 
forms of “institutionalized slavery” in violation of their “inherent rights” (82-84, 
86, 87).   
Unfortunately, Ferguson’s logic becomes skewed by her mode of 
interpretation, heavily influenced by a Feminist-Marxist5 methodology, as 
evidenced by her examination of “gaps and incompletions,” textual fissures, 
“slippages,” logical contradictions, and “loaded silences” within Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s variable usages of the woman-as-slave analogy (98, 95).  Like 
other scholarship on Wollstonecraft from within this mode of feminist analysis, 
Ferguson rather disjointedly arrives at the foregone conclusion that the author 
                                                
5 A small body of criticism claims Wollstonecraft pre-figures utopian socialist 
tendencies, such as in Edward and Eleanor Marx-Aveling’s essay, “Shelley and 
Socialism,” (To-Day, April 1888); Emma Rauschenbusch-Clough’s book A Study of Mary 
Wollstonecraft and the Rights of Woman (1898), and Barbara Taylor’s more recent book, 
Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination (2003) 
 17  
could not escape the mentality characteristic of patriarchal, bourgeois ideology.  
Ferguson finds that Wollstonecraft approaches a vision of collective identity for 
women, since “all women are opposed by all men in a general group identity” 
just as all slaves are oppressed by all masters (96).  Ultimately, though, the 
author’s alignment with the “independent or singular thought” that Ferguson 
calls a “cornerstone of bourgeois individualist ideology” (or “bourgeois 
individualism”) only permits her visualization of a female revolution vis-à-vis 
slave and mob rebellion in a covert and displaced manner (90, 96). Her own class 
alignment occludes the possibility of extending her intellectual vision to imagine 
women collectively rebelling on the same scale as witnessed by the events in 
France or San Domingo. If Wollstonecraft sympathizes with the resistance of 
slaves, her occasionally demeaning views of them undermine her occasional 
sympathy due to “her social conditioning.”  
My work fundamentally disagrees with Ferguson’s conclusion regarding 
Wollstonecraft’s shortsighted vision.  I suggest that Ferguson finds 
contradictions in Rights of Woman because her own methodology assumes 
authorial political and class affiliations that are in fact anachronistic to the late 
eighteenth century.  A better approach, I contend, is to view the text as a 
negotiation of possibilities.  My work agrees with Amartya Sen’s view of 
Wollstonecraft as comparative philosopher, a perspective that fundamentally 
understands her approach to social justice as negotiating a space between social 
ideals and a pragmatic examination of real-world circumstances. Wollstonecraft 
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looks to the slave rebellion or working-class mob for inspiration, but then asks 
whether similar strategies for resistance are actually possible for European 
women. She finds troubling contextual differences that render a full-scale female 
rebellion unlikely. Marital obligations and the dangers inherent to pregnancy; 
economic survival and relative comfort for many; relegation to the domestic 
sphere and geographic separation—these are some of the practical realities that 
affect European women, in contrast to the more miserable, but more collectively 
motivating, conditions of plantation slavery.  Wollstonecraft does not perform 
racialist appropriation, as feminists of color accused second-wave academic 
feminists of doing, but implicitly compares and contrasts the similarities and 
differences between chattel slavery (whose character was just being fully 
exposed) and the disenfranchisement of women.  I suggest that Wollstonecraft 
subsequently imagines less violent means for social resistance, like self-education 
and more authentic self-expression, as pragmatic responses to the less violent 
form of servitude forced upon middle-class women.   
Furthermore, if Wollstonecraft’s focus is on the middle-class female, then 
this decision is, once again, a pragmatic decision to ground her work within her 
own realm of direct experience. She was a woman from a disintegrating genteel 
family, scarred by domestic violence, that relegated her and her sisters to 
impoverished survival and stigmatized them from engaging in lower-class labor 
even while they attempted to support their younger male siblings.  A body of 
historical work on the daily lives of eighteenth-century women across all social 
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ranks has developed since the 1990s that offers a more vivid portrait of the 
possibilities, pressures, and strategies by which women negotiated and 
circumvented their legal, economic, and political non-status in this period.  In 
contrast to legal codes and the idealized prescriptions passed down by masculine 
literatures, this work offers a revised, vivid portrait of the real and often legally 
non-compliant choices made by women. Unfortunately, this work has not had a 
significant impact on Wollstonecraft scholarship. Wollstonecraft’s life was one of 
constant negotiation between social prescription, survival, supporting her 
siblings, and scribing social justice strategies. Ferguson is absolutely correct to 
place Rights of Woman and abolitionist treatises alongside on-the-ground, 
revolutionary social protests like the storming of the Bastille, slave revolts, 
laborer riots, and smaller tactics of daily resistance.  It is perhaps ironic, then, 
that Ferguson fails to commend Wollstonecraft’s prescriptions for female 
independence, authenticity, and sexual autonomy as strategies against social 
injustice achievable by largely geographically dispersed, domestically confined, 
and educationally limited middle-class women.   I recognize these facets of 
Wollstonecraft’s advocacy as unequivocal social justice interventionist work 
together with more dramatic, revolutionary action. 
I apply this same attitude of possibility to Godwin’s novel, Things as They 
Are; or, the Adventures of Caleb Williams. A puzzling circumstance affects Godwin 
criticism.  Despite his declared intention to write Caleb Williams for the popular 
audience not likely to read philosophy, only one study has actually considered 
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how the novel may have been used by that humble target readership.  The 
direction of my work agrees with Casie Legette’s essay, “Remaking Caleb 
Williams in the Nineteenth Century” (2012), which traces the changing reception 
and readership of Caleb Williams as it was understood from the eighteenth to 
nineteenth centuries.  She bases her argument on book historians William St. 
Clair’s and Jonathon Rose’s understanding that working-class audiences 
probably read novels long after their original publication date—long after the 
topical politics concurrent to the author may have been rendered obsolete by the 
passage of time.  Later audiences, in particular the working-class Chartist 
movement of the early nineteenth century, continued to find Caleb Williams 
relevant for decades to come, despite the “depoliticizing” agenda that Legette 
discovers in early-nineteenth-century reviews (144).   
Legette notes that Caleb Williams was continuously in print from 1793 to 
1915. She cites St. Clair’s recognition that it was “a standard of the radical canon” 
and goes on to explore how “delayed access might not always disadvantage 
readers” (143).  She examines how reading contexts resulted in different 
responses to the novel across the 1820s, '30s, and '40s, varying responses that 
were always political. Legette thus departs from the standard view that Caleb 
Williams “was depoliticized by the 1830s,” an assumption within Godwin 
scholarship that uncritically duplicates and perpetuates the nineteenth-century 
conservative claim that this novel and its author were “forgotten” (144). Hazlitt’s 
famous analysis of Godwin in The Spirit of the Age (1825) was not one of 
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deliberate deflation.  Hazlitt in fact celebrated the “revolutionary excitement of 
the 1790s” alongside Godwin’s genius, moral vision, and “ambition,” a moral 
and philosophical ambition that the multitude, enchained by “prejudice” and 
seduced by intemperate “fashion,” miscarried in its “paradoxical” treatment of 
Godwin. Hazlitt portrays him at one moment “raised to heaven by the fury of the 
popular breath,” but later “almost dashed in pieces, and buried in the quicksands 
of ignorance” (29-33).   
For Legette, Hazlitt’s work is troubled by its own subtle paradox. He 
commemorates the revolutionary mood of Godwin and the 1790s, but “treats the 
public’s forgetting of Godwin as an active decision,” a “purposeful act,” and, 
astonishingly, refers to Godwin’s as a posthumous fame when the author was in 
fact very much still alive and well6 (Legette 144).  In 1839, George Croly similarly 
asserted the public’s deliberate disregard of Godwin, a notion repeated by 
Arnout O’Donnell the next year in the same conservative periodical, Blackwood’s 
Magazine.  Legette finds these assumptions of lapsed regard to be wishful 
thinking, since the novel never went out of publication. Its political usefulness 
culminated in the Chartist movement’s excerpted use of it in the Chartist Circular, 
restructured and interspersed alongside the Circular’s major topics under 
headings such as “Monarchy and Republicanism,” “Thoughts for the 
                                                
6 Godwin in fact died in 1836 at age 80, six years after Hazlitt who passed in 1830 at only 
age 52. They were born 22 years apart, so referring to the 1790s as a bygone era implies it 
was more generationally removed from Hazlitt than it actually was.  He was already a 
teenager and young man by the 1790s. Legette is rather vague but I believe she shrewdly 
observes a subtle act of distancing happening here in Hazlitt’s work; alternatively, she 
may be slightly misreading here, assuming Hazlitt refers to Godwin himself rather than 
the lost “spirit” itself.  
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Thoughtful, “The Complaints of the Poor,” “The Sprit of the Movement,” “A Few 
Plain Facts,” and “Effects of Class Legislation” (Chartist Circular No. 57 & No. 58, 
1840).7   This “first working-class mass movement in Britain” transformed Caleb 
from a “character into a political figure in his own right” (Legette 153).  Whether 
mourning the decline of his reputation or hoping for the decline of his influence, 
critics of the latter Romantic era underestimated how the novel continued to 
appeal to the common reader and a “mass, working-class audience” (Legette 
146).  Mass reading audiences did in fact deploy the text for lower-class political 
expression: Chartism identified with Caleb’s resistance against socioeconomic 
tyranny and his struggle for self-determination as the Chartist movement fought 
for voting rights, the secret ballot, equal representation and poor relief. 
Despite the literary and historical work that I have highlighted above, the 
situation remains largely unchanged for scholarship on my primary texts: critics 
tend to read either for political theory or for personal expressiveness and too 
often look for anachronistic politics by which to understand the arguments and 
strategic alignments made by Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin.  I contend 
that social justice theory offers a way to reframe and resituate the strategic 
alignments and rhetorical choices that all three writers deploy for their primary 
purpose of altering the moral trajectory of their society en masse.  
I argue that these texts represent a process of defining social injustice as 
much as they offer dialectical strategies for social justice.  Scholars have often 
                                                
7 Legette does not mention these headings or the content of the Chartist Circular in her 
essay, but such a reading would be a fruitful one for Godwin scholarship.  
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referred to each of these texts as concerned with justice, but have then been 
routinely disappointed to find that the texts fall short as full equal-rights 
statements. In fact, Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin willingly acquiesce to 
degrees of inequality in some significant instances.  This disappointment results 
from a misunderstanding about what social justice is and does, a misguided 
assumption that social justice simply means democracy or equal rights.  
Interestingly, academics tend to approach texts in much the same way as 
transcendental political philosophers approach theories of justice.  
Transcendental political philosophers ask, “What is justice?” implying, of course, 
what is perfect justice. Vittorio Bufacchi examines the problem of undefined 
injustice in his own field of political philosophy, discovering that amid 
numerous theories of justice, no scholar has paused to first define injustice.  He 
believes the entire discipline, including prolific work by John Rawls and 
Amartya Sen, has simply assumed that injustice is the absence of justice. Political 
philosophers and literary critics assume we already know what injustice is, but 
social injustice can be logically and reasonably defined in ways that we find 
exactly counter to projects against discrimination, violence, equal opportunity, 
liberty, universal suffrage, or even basic standards of human dignity.   
Bufacchi illustrates this logical flaw through a hypothetical example of 
aristocratic justice, in which a redistribution of rights or resources is unjust for 
violating a code of ethics that defines justice as noble birthright. If entitlements of 
birth found justice, then any interference with those entitlements becomes unjust.  
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Before understanding the authors’ aims, then, an initial analysis of how they 
define injustice is necessary for each body of scholarship. Bufacchi’s example 
serves as reminder that aristocratic social foundations had not yet given way by 
the late eighteenth century to what we today label as democracy (too often 
assumed to be the only possible model of justice).  But justice, as Bufacchi 
reminds, us is not tied to any one sociopolitical or economic system. Many 
scholars have presented Wollstonecraft’s and Godwin’s viewpoints as radical in 
contrast to Edmund Burke’s conservatism, which defends exactly the form of 
aristocratic system Bufacchi describes.  But even Burke opposed slavery, if not 
the entire colonial system; he also indicted Warren Hastings for crimes against 
humanity in India.  Wollstonecraft and Godwin represent a progressive politics 
of a sort that loosely intersects with later democratic values. Burke nevertheless 
shares their concern for preventing inhumane atrocities and unethical abuses of 
power.  Is he not then also concerned with social injustice?  My work 
understands injustice along a continuum. Burke primarily defines it in terms of 
acts of violence; my primary authors include a wider range of abuses to define 
“injustice as maldistribution,” “injustice as exclusion,” and “injustice as 
disempowerment” (Bufacchi 9-10).  A basic concern for human well-being is not 
necessarily negated by any particular socio-political arrangement. Therefore, 
these historical texts are better understood along a spectrum, as compassionate 
but divergent responses to social problems, responses that contribute to new 
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social arrangements by expressing through the medium of writing the tangible 
needs of people who did not have a formal voice. 
Social justice is not limited to or even primarily concerned with perfectly 
equal rights. The search for perfected programs of philosophical theory or for 
wholesale egalitarian reform is a misguided project anachronistically and 
ambiguously based on misconstrued or vague terminology.  These authors, in 
these texts, are less concerned with utopian perfection and more concerned with 
urgently ending social evils.  They voice indignation against social wrongs and 
urgently propose practical interventions to end gross injustices against specific 
groups of people, in Britain and across the Atlantic, for their historical present 
and across time for future generations.  In so doing, they define conditions of 
social injustice for the late eighteenth century.  Scholars have neglected to 
analyze how each writer defines social injustice before offering their instruction 
to correct it; my work seeks to fill this gap.   
No study has placed all three of these writers in dialogue together, and no 
study has ever approached the texts as definitions of and statements against 
social injustice prior to examining each writer’s recommendations for reform and 
social action.  I attend to their discussions of social injustice as resources denied 
to oppressed persons; the “grievous wrongs” and acts of violence imposed upon 
Africans, women, and workers; and how the writers demonstrate the “radical 
inequality” of social institutions supported by the state and enforced through 
daily behavior (Bufacchi 8).  As social activists whose medium is writing, 
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Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin are far more invested in asking, “Given 
the current state of society and through the work of writing, what immediate 
needs and targets for reform can help end gross injustice?”  They respond by 
arguing the humanity of women, Africans, and workers as they deconstruct 
assumptions of natural inferiority, demand extensive change to social 
foundations, and empathize with other oppressed populations across their 
traditionally conceived genres of vindication, slave narrative, and novel.   My 
work changes the fundamental question asked of my primary texts so that all the 
writers’ decisions of tone, genre, perspective along with their assessments of 
social evils and challenges to customary beliefs or practices all function as 
strategic, socially active choices deployable by readers rather than reflections of 
merely personal politics or private experiences.  
Ultimately, my work incorporates a lexicon of social justice philosophy, 
political theory, and activism into literary studies to show that Wollstonecraft, 
Cugoano, and Godwin not only recognize corresponding patterns of oppression 
but also utilize strikingly similar literary devices and rhetorical strategies by 
which to combat injustice.   All three authors share the same fundamental aim— 
to transform the dismal existence of the oppressed groups they represent. Their 
complementary methodology of cultural analysis combined with practical goals 
replicates the top-down, bottom-up dialectical methodology at the core of social 
activism.   When I refer to the top-down, bottom-up dialectical method, I 
specifically refer to the dialectical mode that has developed through the actual, 
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on-the-ground work of grassroots social activists.  Within this mode, activists 
target change in two directions simultaneously. From the top-down perspective, 
they want to dismantle social, political, and philosophical systems that sustain 
oppressive regimes with coercive power; they want to restructure socioeconomic 
institutions, like the law, economy, civic representation, religion, or education, so 
that more community members gain access to those valued resources.  Activists 
complement these top-down interventions with bottom-up strategies: adaptable 
and feasible acts of daily resistance able to be accomplished by oppressed people, 
such as those I catalogue at the beginning of this introductory chapter.   
Authorial rhetoric of resistance employs this bi-directional gaze and is 
thus dialectical social justice. The authors look in two directions: from the top 
down at the systemic causes and effects of different dimensions of injustice, and 
from the bottom up, from the perspective of its victims. Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, 
and Godwin often work through juxtaposition to sustain the dialectical tension 
between these counterpoints.  Perhaps this is one reason why some of their 
contemporaries and historical critics have considered Rights of Woman, Thoughts 
and Sentiments, and Caleb Williams to be disorganized, redundant, illogical, or 
even clumsy.  My review of scholarship on these three works suggests political 
motives behind the devaluation of these texts.  Nevertheless, I contend that the 
dialectical social justice model allows me to understand the rhetorical and 
literary choices of the authors as complementary, multi-directional strategies 
through which they craft a dynamic rhetoric of grassroots social advocacy.   
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Quobna Ottobah Cugoano: The Forgotten Abolitionist 
Any student of history may recognize in my opening list examples of 
resistance tactics used by slaves who sometimes sabotaged the machines and 
tools of their forced labor; burned crops or big houses; fled for freedom or 
formed maroon colonies of their own; avoided the involuntary reproduction and 
birth of children into perpetual chattel slavery; murdered their captors rather 
than be murdered themselves; avoided or slowed down work to preserve their 
own health and survival; or persevered in maintaining a cultural heritage 
independent of their captors through song, oral history, self-education, faith, 
food, and dance.  I have reviewed some of the scholarship documenting these 
tactics above.   
Cugoano avows the African’s birthright of liberty, recounting its 
meaningfulness for kidnapped African men, women, and children for whom 
“death was more preferable than life” (15).   As an abducted child, he joined his 
countrymen and women who collectively planned to “burn and blow up the 
ship, and to perish altogether in the flames” to avoid the chattel slavery to which 
they were sailing; with the adult men in chains, the women and children were to 
be the initiators of the rebellion (15).  Cugoano’s is one of few eyewitness 
accounts of the Middle Passage and West Indian slave auction written by a 
former captive of the slave system.  In contrast to his Sons of Africa colleague 
and fellow Afro-British abolitionist writer, Olaudah Equiano, Cugoano’s 
Thoughts and Sentiments offers few narrative elements.  But it does contain 
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substantive, if brief, description of the author’s own kidnapping at gunpoint as a 
child, the “factory” processing of captive Africans in the various European forts 
on African shores, being “chained and pent up in holes” aboard the slave ship, 
with slavers “stowing [Africans] in the holds of ships like goods of burden, with 
closeness and stench,” and routinely inflicting “cruel punishments” on 
enchained Africans to keep them too hurt, scared, and sick to fight.  Cugoano 
recounts his descent into chattel slavery, forced transatlantic migration, and the 
slave auction in the West Indies:  entire families were sold like “beasts,” 
“stripped naked,” in front of each other to be flogged, whipped, and lashed 
while hungry, naked and overcome with “shame and grief,” “hard labour, 
dejection, and despair,” a sad trade for their lost dignity, freedom, family, and 
country (74-75).   Recounting his direct experience as a victim of the slave system, 
Cugoano educates his British audience about the inhumane reality of the 
international slave system by which they actively and passively benefit.   
He also challenges every major argument supporting slavery and 
deconstructs racialist theories. Cugoano’s is the most radical abolitionist, anti-
racialist statement published in eighteenth-century Britain and the least written 
about by scholars today.   His editor, Vincent Carretta, explains this lack of 
scholarship by noting that "the least is known about [Cugoano's] life” (ix). 
Similar to the academic feminist project of recovery and recognition of women 
writers that began in the 1970s, postcolonial and race scholars these past three 
decades have sought to recover the writing, representation, and experience of 
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peoples of the African diaspora in what Paul Gilroy has called the Black Atlantic.  
While scholars have certainly brought issues of race, colonial identity, migration, 
diaspora, imperialism, cultural hybridity, and resistance theory to the forefront 
of literary and cultural studies today, very little has changed in the attention paid 
to Thoughts and Sentiments. 
I suggest that Cugoano’s hybrid jeremiad, slave narrative, abolitionist 
tract, and political treatise has been neglected because it does not lend itself 
readily to literary studies, despite its designation as a literary text.  George 
Boulukos’s book, The Grateful Slave:  The Emergence of Race in Eighteenth-Century 
British and American Culture identifies a recurrent trope simultaneously used by 
eighteenth-century apologists for slavery and abolitionists alike. The trope 
portrayed the African as grateful to his colonial master for rescuing him from 
poverty, ignorance, and heathenism in Africa and painted plantation labor as a 
gentle, pastoral existence. The trope of the grateful slave is most often associated 
with the abolitionist movement. Boulukos discovers the opposite to be true; the 
trope in any usage only underwrote white supremacy (2-3). Cugoano, “almost 
alone among abolitionists,” “refuse[s] to make distinctions between better and 
worse forms of slavery” (178). Thoughts and Sentiments deliberately disengages 
from identifiable tropes; it avoids the sentimental language of white supremacy 
and colonial fantasy.  In addition to educating the British reader about the hostile 
realities of the slave system, Cugoano deconstructs many of the same tropes that 
postcolonial and critical race theorists examine in current criticism today.  His 
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very refusal to deploy typical literary devices, its political directness, and its 
nonconformity to a standard genre all contribute to scholarly neglect.  In short, it 
perhaps makes too direct a statement to lend itself to the types of interpretation 
typical of literary studies.  
The most complete statements about Thoughts and Sentiments have come 
from scholars who relocate the text outside of the previously assigned genres of 
jeremiad or slave narrative.  My study will build upon work by Jeffrey Gunn, 
Keith A. Sandiford, and Anthony Bogues, who all understand Thoughts and 
Sentiments more broadly as a political treatise. Gunn identifies three veins of 
Cugoano’s political protest: analysis of scripture to prove slavery opposes 
Christian principles; description of the refined civil systems of African 
communities to show how freeborn Africans value “liberty, justice and equity;’” 
and a declaration that abducting Africans for enslavement betrays rights of 
property through criminal theft.  Slavery is theft because it forcibly removes 
persons from their own property, goods, and livelihoods, unjustifiably invades 
sovereign nations, and coerces labor (Gunn 642, 646). Bogues argues that 
Cugoano’s importance does not rest in his literariness, but rather in his “political 
discourse on natural liberty and natural rights” (26).  He documents ten major 
political ideas of Cugoano, elaborating on three: “Cugoano’s antislavery ideas, 
his conceptions of evil, and his views on the relationship between natural liberty 
and natural rights.”  In contrast to contemporaneous philosophers like Paine, 
Diderot, and Montesquieu, who argued that slavery betrayed a natural right to 
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liberty, Cugoano stands out for arguing that slavery also betrayed “reason” and 
“‘common humanity’” (Bogues 35, 38).   
Keith A. Sandiford’s Measuring the Moment: Strategies of Protest in 
Eighteenth-Century Afro-English Writing (1988) asserts that Thoughts and Sentiments 
is a “polemical and uncompromising . . . rebuttal” of proslavery rhetoric and a 
“vindication of the Black’s moral and intellectual authenticity” (10-11).   He 
examines how Cugoano deploys “a variety of voices,” debunks Biblical 
precedents for slavery, corrects slavery apologists' falsehoods about Africa, 
discredits theories that skin color indicated racial difference, and protests slavery 
in terms of “general secular philosophy” (10-11; 98; 101-102; 103).   Of greatest 
importance to my work is Sandiford’s identification of Cugoano’s “antislavery 
attack against the four great pillars of the British state: the law, the monarchy, 
Parliament, and the church” (106).  This attack on “institutional authority” was "a 
major landmark for such an early abolitionist work” (106).  My work reframes 
Cugoano’s treatment of the institutional basis of slavery as a model of dialectical 
social justice.  I show that Cugoano’s attention to institutions is indeed important 
as a top-down strategy for social justice in particular.  Moreover, I argue that this 
is just one aspect of Cugoano’s social justice methodology, which he 
complements with bottom-up interventions.   
William Godwin:  Splintered Tradition 
Any student of history may recognize slave resistance, but perhaps not 
every student would recognize in my opening catalogue the extent to which 
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women and workers within domestic Britain also resorted to many of those same 
forms of protest and resistance.   For example, laborers, tradespeople, and 
servants of both sexes in rural and urban Britain engaged in riots over food 
shortages, the enclosure acts, turnpike taxes, the dismantling of trades through 
mechanization, and in rejection of the hundreds of new “capital punishments for 
crimes against property” (Thompson 60).   Historians have reasoned that the 
lower orders across Britain staunchly resisted the transition of England from 
feudal agricultural to modern free-market economy and protested in a more 
organized manner than the word "riot" implies.8  Thompson, in particular, sees 
                                                
8 Edward P. Thompson The Making of the English Working Class (1963/1991) may now be 
a classic example of historical work on the changing class system in Britain during the 
eighteenth century and the previously neglected recognition of ways in which working 
class and impoverished British men and women demanded basic needs of sustenance 
and ethical work options; this book has had widespread influence across many academic 
disciplines, and it remains relevant as a basis for new scholarship.  I include it here 
precisely because of its historical status—it should have influenced Godwin scholarship 
decades ago but no scholar of Godwin has drawn the relationship between the actual 
forms of protest laborers engaged in and the forms of resistance in the novel.  Adrian 
Randall’s Before the Luddites: Custom, Community and Machinery in the English Woollen 
Industry, 1776-1809 (1991) examines how cloth-makers resisted and protested 
industrialization of their trade in attempts to preserve the greater autonomy of their 
craft which culminated in the Luddite riots between 1811-16, in which organized 
workers destroyed the machinery of the factories and mills.  Andrew Charlesworth 
offers three relevant titles all of which discuss or map labor protests across Britain: An 
Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain 1548-1900 (1983), An Atlas of Industrial Protest in Britain, 
1750-1990 (1996), and Markets, Market Culture and Popular Protest in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain and Ireland (1996). His collection of work covers unified protests and riots by 
workers across a range of locations and trades in responses to the Corn laws, tolls along 
trade roads, the Cider Tax, food scarcity, and famine.  George Rudé’s The Crowd in 
History: A Study of Popular Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (1965) 
recognizes the “‘aggressive mob’ or the ‘hostile outburst’” who engaged in “such 
activities as strikes, riots, rebellions, insurrections, and revolution” as legitimate 
instances of political demonstration during Britain’s and France’s transitional decades to 
“‘industrial’” societies (4). He also recognizes how the “‘lower orders’” were a hybrid 
group of workers and not merely “peasants” by this period, concerned with “a rough-
and-ready kind of natural justice’ by breaking windows, wrecking machinery, storming 
markets, burning their enemies of the moment in effigy, firing hayricks, and ‘pulling 
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laborers and servants in this more radical view, explaining that many supposed 
developments actually harmed the lower orders by taking from them traditional 
freedoms and entitlements that ensured their survival and independence, such as 
common grazing lands for livestock, water access, shares of the harvest, access to 
firewood, limited hunting rights, and participation in the regulation of local 
trade markets.  In addition to rioting (and like African slaves abroad), laboring 
communities established counter-cultures at “constant war with authority,” with 
entire villages “coining, poaching, [evading] taxes [or] smuggling” (Thompson 
61).  These illicit activities in addition to “petty theft” and “primitive forms of 
industrial rebellion—destroying a silk loom, throwing down fences when 
commons were enclosed, and firing corn ricks—were to be punished by death” 
(60).  Similar to their African counterparts in the colonies, laborers in England 
were coerced under threat of death, but they defied the law to meet their basic 
needs and to preserve their livelihoods.   
Several characters in Godwin’s The Adventures of Caleb Williams struggle to 
survive by resisting coercion, confinement, and domination.  Most of them die.  
They die through acts of betrayal by powerful gentry, betrayals manifestly 
protected by law and latently by social decorum.  Thus, the novel questions 
                                                                                                                                            
down’ their houses, farms, fences, mills, or pubs, but rarely by taking lives” (5-6).  See 
also related work Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (1962).  John E. 
Archer’s Social Unrest and Popular Protest in England, 1780-1840 (2000) picks up with 
Rudé’s work to make a stronger claim that riots (the Gordon Riots of 1780, Luddism, 
anti-enclosure riots, and anti-Poor Law riots) all have historical significance on par with 
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hereditary privilege and supporting social institutions like the law, economy, 
tradition, patriarchy, and customs of deference to rank.  Institutions are unjust 
because they serve the caprices of a few wealthy men, crushing noncompliant 
characters.  This novel, the most canonical of my primary texts, had an easily 
recognized, controversial political agenda for its contemporary reviewers.  
Godwin himself prefaced the novel by asserting his intention to distribute the 
principles of his political treatise, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its 
Influence on Morals and Happiness (1793), to a wider audience through the vehicle 
of fiction.  He reasoned that fiction would target lower-class readers not likely to 
read a political essay, and declared the novel an imaginative case study about the 
way “government intrudes itself into every rank of society” thus supporting 
“domestic and unrecorded despotism, by which man becomes the destroyer of 
man” (xx, 1831 edition).  Godwin apparently wrote his preface “on the day of 
Thomas Hardy’s arrest on charges of High Treason” (Christoph Bode 1988, 97).  
The preface was not, however, published in the first edition, owing to the 
tumultuous climate accompanying the Treason Trials of 1794 that held all radical 
individuals, groups, and their publications suspect for sedition. 
Godwin’s explanation for the novel came out in the next edition the 
following year, and critics have since contemplated whether or not it ought to be 
taken at face value.  Christoph Bode explains the prevalent suspicion that 
Godwin exaggerated the political content of the narrative: “The question in short 
is, whether Godwin in his preface did not overstate his case and make too much 
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of the political dimension of an adventure story” (97-98).  Many critics before and 
after Bode look to Godwin’s later preface in Fleetwood (1832), in which Godwin 
emphasized the psychological and “flight and pursuit” aspects of the narrative 
over his earlier political objectives (Bode 98).  The author appears to have 
contradicted himself, and some reviewers have implied he constructed a 
dishonest description of his method in order to sell more books in these later 
decades.  Gary Kelly is one sympathetic reader who takes a more diplomatic 
approach to Godwin’s apparent self-contradiction.  He notes the novel came to 
be known simply as Caleb Williams by the 1830s, so Godwin edited his title from 
the obvious political language of Things as They Are to the more character-
oriented Caleb Williams during this same period.  Kelly reasons that Godwin did 
so to coincide with the literary taste of Romantic Era readers who preferred 
“individual psychology” over socio-political moralism (Kelly, 1976, 180).    
Suspicion of the author has been as much a preoccupation for critics as has 
been the psychological conflict and complexity of his characters.  Some modern 
scholars have approached the text with expressions of embarrassment for 
Godwin’s misguided philosophy.  Apologetically appreciative Patrick Crutwell, 
in his essay “On Caleb Williams” (1958), famously sums up Godwin’s mid-
twentieth-century reputation. He was by then known as the “long discredited 
philosopher whom Wordsworth and Shelley—it is hard to see why—were taken 
in by; we know him as the husband of the Rights of Woman and the father of 
Frankenstein; we know him as Shelley’s comic-pathetic Micawber of a father-in-
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law” (87).  Crutwell is one of several mid-twentieth-century psychoanalytic 
literary critics responsible for ushering in a new era of Godwin criticism after 
decades of dubious acceptance as canonical author.  He acknowledges Godwin’s 
intention to show “how individuals are conditioned by education and society” 
(93), but actually argues against all dogmatic interpretation.  He believes the 
book is best understood in modern, psychoanalytic terms, with Falkland the 
“passionate narcissist,” violent Tyrell motivated by the “inferiority complex,” 
and Caleb stuck “between love and hate” (94).  Godwin misunderstand his own 
work: he was not displaying social conditions suffocating to individual morality; 
his characters’ psychological motives were more akin to the profound emotional 
forces of Greek tragedy (94).  Time proves Godwin’s philosophical ideas 
“shoddy,” but the emotional immediacy, “abnormal psychology,” thrill of 
“mystery,” and concern “for the persecuted rejects of society” makes Caleb 
Williams “a living work of the romantic imagination . . . in its crazy, violent, 
imperfect way” (95).  For Crutwell, the novel transcends its author’s political 
intentions and its historical interment.   
Rudolf F. Storch’s essay, “Metaphors of Private Guilt and Social Rebellion 
in Godwin’s Caleb Williams” (1966), agrees. Storch extends his critical view, also 
through the psychoanalytic lens, to label Caleb, Godwin, other late eighteenth-
century writers, and the entire epoch of the simultaneously revolutionary and 
reactionary 1790s all as neurotic due to “a great sensitivity to the lack of 
communal life which the eighteenth century had not brought into consciousness” 
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(206).  But it is exactly this supposed neurosis that makes Caleb Williams feel so 
modern, more modern than later Victorian novels or even Goethe’s Faust.  While 
not one of the great novels of history, the text resonates with readers for its 
“modern soul and exceptional intensity (and a dream-like clarity);” the guilt-
driven, anxiety-ridden narrative reflects for Storch the dominant emotions of 
modern Western Culture (188-189).  Godwin projects into the narrative his 
Calvinistic fear of divine persecution; Caleb reflects Godwin’s own irresolvable 
“mental conflict with its projections, defenses, disguises and subterfuges;” 
therefore Caleb and Godwin together reflect the anxious modern consciousness 
(203-204).  The novel is not about social abuses but is rather a “narrative of 
obsession” and “tragic destiny” (189).  Godwin was unable to see the significance 
of his own work, and no one else from the eighteenth century could have fully 
interpreted the “deeper truths,” “turbulent energies,” or “unresolved conflict of 
subterranean emotions” saturating Caleb Williams (195, 190).  Few but significant 
interpretations of Caleb Williams, like Crutwell’s and Storch’s work, resurrected 
this novel for a new generation of modern scholarship.  However, they did so by 
overlooking its political content, preferring to see it as an essential reflection of 
an irrational, modern consciousness.   
Understanding the text as expressive of an irrational modern 
consciousness conflicts with Godwin’s belief in social reform based on moral 
reason.  Consequently, Gary Kelly retraces the climate and heritage from which 
Things as They Are emerged in the landmark statement on Godwin:  The English 
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Jacobin Novel 1780-1805 (1976).  Kelly consistently refers to this novel by its 
original title, Things as They Are, to reclaim its original political intention.  It is 
Kelly who establishes the predominant, current understanding of Caleb Williams 
as belonging to an eighteenth-century genre of political fiction, the Jacobin novel.  
The British Jacobins were progressive writers and thinkers who sympathized 
with the French Revolution and who “believed that environment and education 
form character absolutely, that distinctions of wealth and social rank not based 
on service and virtue must always be artificial, oppressive, and vicious,” and that 
rational appeals would spark political reform (Gold 612).  Kelly argues that 
Godwin, Robert Bage, Elizabeth Inchbald, and Thomas Holcroft together 
adapted several major genres of fiction to craft a new mode of writing that had 
its own distinctive “unity of design” based on a principle of necessity (20).  A 
character’s thoughts and actions had to appear naturally and necessarily driven 
by the incidents of his or her imagined environment.  The Jacobin novelists 
sought to dramatize how the social environment determined the lives of 
characters, just as social and state institutions controlled individuals in the real 
world.   
Kelly reads Caleb Williams as a tripartite allegory linking Godwin’s 
philosophical treatise to both the English Civil War and the British government’s 
reactionary policies to the French Revolution.  Godwin thus metaphorically 
condenses more than a hundred years of “Dissenting history: the struggle for 
truth and for liberty, and the continual risk of incurring for that reason all the 
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horrors of intolerance, persecution, and civil strife” (Kelly 208).  Kelly weaves 
earlier threads of apolitical scholarship on genre and psychology into his political 
interpretation, agreeing that the novelist crafted new techniques in psychological 
realism and certainly experimented with genre.  Yet, the author always did so 
with a moral, reformist message in mind.  Godwin culled and combined 
elements of fiction from various eighteenth-century genres “suitable to his 
agenda;” that agenda was to expose social and political corruption, demonstrate 
the power dynamics and inevitable oppression of hierarchal social arrangements, 
express the pain of persecution for oppressed persons, and directly refute 
Edmund Burke’s arguments in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).  Kelly 
identifies an entirely new subgenre of eighteenth-century fiction, the Jacobin 
novel, and its unifying theme of personal experience inexorably bound by 
environmental circumstances.  
Kelly establishes the political landscape within which Godwin and his 
collaborators write and paves the way for a small body of criticism that examines 
the political import of Caleb Williams.  However, it would be an exaggeration to 
state that scholarship has continued Kelly’s project with the same vigor and 
focus.  The fact is, the field remains splintered.   The psychoanalytic criticism of 
Crutwell and Storch has given way to the new iteration of affect theory, which 
combines psychoanalytical interpretive strategies with cultural studies methods.  
In her article “William Godwin’s ‘Caleb Williams:’ The Tarnishing of the 
Sublime” (2001), Monika Fludernik approaches the novel with a deep concern for 
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many issues that could be considered social justice concerns, but she does not 
quite move her argument in this direction.  She extends earlier understandings of 
character psychology and behavior, the gothic narrative structure, the technique 
of character mirroring, and the relationship between two eighteenth-century 
psychosocial theories, Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759).  Literary and philosophy scholars generally consider Burke’s 
Sublime and Beautiful to be an aesthetic theory, but Fludernik shows how Godwin 
deploys it for its social implications:  Godwin uses the sublime-as-terror to figure 
ruinous social domination at the institutional level, while he uses the sublime-as-
ardour to figure human connection at the personal level.   Sometimes Burkean 
sublime and Smithian sympathy are in tension, but the novel makes its greatest 
statement when Godwin reconciles them.  For Fludernik, Godwin reconciles 
Burkean “ardour” and Smithian sympathy in the moment when Caleb and 
Falkland finally recognize each other’s “mutual humanity” (884); Godwin 
resituates Burkean sublimity away from authority, fear, and “power relations” 
and places it within a model of humanity and society founded on “sympathy, 
reason, justice, and true equality” (888-889).  Fludernik ‘s final paragraphs focus 
on concepts like empathy, equality, justice, and the fair “distribution of power 
and wealth” as personal ethics and public ideals shared between Caleb Williams 
and Political Justice (889).  Fludernik’s language of human rights, social 
cooperation, and redistribution of resources are concepts of Godwin’s 
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philosophical justice, her phrasing is also suggestive of current theories of justice 
which appear to inform her work, but these concepts are the critic’s end points 
rather than her sustained foci.   
Mary Wollstonecraft:  Oppositional Feminist Politics 
Many of the historians referred to above have shown that enslaved 
women across the Black Atlantic and women of the lower ranks in England 
participated in the same acts of defiance as their male counterparts far more than 
previously assumed—slave ship insurrections, plantation revolts and 
assassinations, industrial and agricultural sabotage, strikes and silence, guild 
marches and food riots—women were often integral not only marginal 
participants.  Along a similar line, historians have uncovered archival evidence 
that shows that significant portions of single, married, and widowed women of 
middle ranks independently maintained themselves in businesses, trades, and as 
heads of households.9  Bernard Capp, for instance, draws on the work of 
anthropologist James Scott to expound upon the subtle “strategies available to 
subordinate groups too weak to resist openly;” some of these subtle, “hidden 
forms of defiance or subversion” include “grumbling, subversive jokes, and 
unauthorized meetings which create times, spaces, and networks beyond the 
control and knowledge of the ruling elites” (24-25).  For Capp, women “in the 
                                                
9 Bernard Capp When Gossips Meet (2003), Amy Louise Erikson Women and Property in 
Early Modern England (1995), Nancy Locklin Women’s Work and Identity in Eighteenth-
Century Brittany (2007), Hannah Barker The Business of Women (2006), Christine Wiskin 
Chapter 5 “Urban Businesswomen in Eighteenth-Century England,” Joanne Bailey 
Unquiet Lives: Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-1800 (2003), and Jane 
Donawerth & Adele Seeff Crossing Boundaries (2000).  
 43  
middling and lower levels” bypassed the “patriarchal edifice” of early-modern 
society through gossip networks, female support networks, and parish-political 
networks “to influence their own domestic lives and the affairs of their 
neighborhood” (2).  What recent studies have begun to show more and more is 
that, despite the laws of coverture and primogeniture, despite the predominant 
ideal of confined female domesticity (at least for middle and upper class 
women), women at all social levels during the early modern period and 
throughout the long eighteenth century persistently found “ways to limit, evade, 
or accommodate male domination” even if there was no recognizable organized 
feminist movement per se (Capp 2).   
Whether of the ruling elite or of lower rank, all women of the eighteenth 
century were fatefully linked by their shared vulnerability to spousal abuse.  
Women of all social ranks commonly suffered legally sanctioned confinement 
and corporeal punishment at the hands of their husbands; sought “informal” 
means to stop violence against them by appealing to friends, family, and clergy 
before pursuing legal interventions; and, as Elizabeth Foyster explains, pursued 
formal legal recourse as a “last resort” to end spousal violence once informal 
attempts failed (16).  Despite their similar subjection to spousal violence, 
women’s legal recourse often depended on their financial resources, with women 
in lower social positions rarely able to pursue legal separation or full criminal 
charges against violent husbands.  Women of the lower ranks simply could not 
live without their husband’s financial support.  Even if he was cruel, a slow 
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death from starvation and illness was often the real alternative to a husband’s 
maltreatment.  The expense of legal separation could easily run far beyond even 
the financial means of more well-off women since a husband maintained total 
control of a wife’s property, assets, earnings, and children even if proven cruel 
enough to warrant a judgment of legal separation with financial maintenance.  
Ultimately, legal separation was difficult to obtain, and women faced profound 
economic and social hardships following separation (Foyster 17-19).  Even so, 
hundreds of women did pursue legal means to end their traumatic marriages, 
finding the risky alternatives preferable to suffering further physical, mental, or 
sexual violence.  Foyster thus demonstrates an important distinction between 
British law in fact and in practice: in fact, men had total legal control of their 
daughters and wives, but in practice this control was never unchallenged.   
Neither state nor ecclesiastical courts tried to end wife abuse altogether; as 
Russell P. Dobash and Emerson Dobash explain, the law attempted to regulate 
the form and degree of acceptable violence husbands might wield against their 
wives (1981).  Given the motive of courts to preserve marriages, the near 
impossibility of divorce, which required an act of Parliament, and the extreme 
difficulty of getting even a legal separation, some women resorted to running 
away.  Foyster explains that runaway wives were subject to criminal charges 
even when declaring physical cruelty against their spouses.  More men than 
women appear to have deserted their partners, but Foyster emphasizes that both 
men and women could sue a spouse for “‘restitution of conjugal rights,’” 
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pleading cruelty was no guarantee of court protection, and refusal to abide by a 
court order to resume “cohabitation” could, and did, result in imprisonment for 
men and women (16-17).  If a woman deserted, she was unable to take her 
children since custody always belonged to the husband; an abusive husband 
maintained his right of child custody regardless of the inherent harm of the 
household.   
However, desertion was not uncommon.   Historians such as Dobash and 
Dobash and Janice Haaken have situated eighteenth-century runaway wives 
within the history of the battered women’s movement in Britain.  In fact, 
Haaken’s, Hard Knocks:  Domestic Violence and the Psychology of Storytelling (2010) 
builds upon Dobash and Dobash’s earlier work in their book, Violence Against 
Wives (1979).   She refers to their method of including various forms of literature 
into their historical research, in which they look to folk stories, broadside ballads, 
and newspaper advertisements as public expressions of the social problem of 
wife abuse.  For example, Haaken refers to Dobash and Dobash’s reference to a 
1764 newspaper advertisement in which a husband publically “forbade any 
person from giving his runaway wife credit or harboring her” at the “risk of 
prosecution” (88).  Not only was the wife’s desertion potentially criminal, but so 
was helping her.  But women wrote back!  They wrote back detailing the violence 
that forced them to flee for their lives, they wrote to claim their right to credit in 
their own names, and they wrote to effectively make a private problem a public 
issue.  Foyster, Haaken, and Dobash and Dobash thus read women’s negotiations 
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of various legal routes and their desertions of violent marriages as acts of social 
protest and “active resistance to male violence” (Haaken 88).   
Mary Wollstonecraft was of course no stranger to male violence or 
patriarchal prejudice. She harbored and abetted her sister, Eliza Bishop, a 
runaway wife.  Her biographer Janet Todd characterizes her as prone to 
delusional fantasy, suggesting Wollstonecraft fancied herself a heroine for 
helping her sister flee her husband’s home.  Todd suggests Wollstonecraft was 
an overbearing influence on her depressed and anxious sister, perhaps added 
more tension to an already strained marriage, and showed a shocking lack of 
foresight when planning the escape.  She certainly succeeded in hiding their 
whereabouts, but thought little of how two “women unaccustomed to tiresome 
work could succeed” on their own with no trade, skill, or income to speak of 
(Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life 52).  Todd surmises Meredith Bishop 
must have felt astonished at Eliza’s disappearance, since he never assaulted, 
humiliated, threatened, or neglected her as other husbands did to other wives 
(50). Bishop was enough of the overbearing patriarch to remind Wollstonecraft of 
her despotic, drunk, moody, and abusive father; Todd points more to the 
psychology of Wollstonecraft than to the behavior of Bishop.  
By contrast, a much earlier biographer, Elizabeth Robins Pennell in Life of 
Mary Wollstonecraft (1884), has no qualms about placing considerably more blame 
on Meredith Bishop, describing Eliza and Meredith’s life as one of “daily 
quarrels and scenes of violence.” Pennell discovers Bishop to be Wollstonecraft’s 
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model for the “unprincipled sensualist, brute, and hypocrite” later crafted as the 
husband in Wrongs of Woman (37).  Pennell achieves a graceful interweaving of 
biographical narrative and literary analysis as she retraces the formative events 
of Wollstonecraft’s life.  Her biography describes Wollstonecraft’s exposure to 
several violent marriages, the constant migration forced upon the family by her 
intemperate and indolent father, her neglected education, her few but deeply 
formative friendships, her industrious self-motivated study, her constant 
poverty, and her witness to the “bestial squalor of the Irish peasantry” (79).  
Pennell’s reflections upon the marital abuses, drudgeries, illnesses, difficult 
pregnancies, and deaths suffered by Wollstonecraft, her sisters, and her best 
friend Fanny Blood collectively develop into a careful, elegant thematic 
argument meant to demonstrate Wollstonecraft’s motivation of pity, sense of 
moral righteousness, and inspiration toward justice and human rights advocacy.    
Todd’s and Pennell’s biographies highlight the same significant events in 
Wollstonecraft’s life, include the same surviving letters, and even understand her 
developmental years in a severe, authoritarian, and often abusive household as 
the foundation for her later life choices and political views.   However, 
juxtaposing the biographers’ approaches demonstrates two intertwined issues 
within Wollstonecraft scholarship.   First, no other writer in eighteenth-century 
literary studies has had a more volatile and changeable reputation at the hands 
of critics.  Second, critics have often been concerned more with the writer’s life 
than her writing.   
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Pennell’s sentimental style represents an era of late nineteenth-century 
redemption of the much-maligned Wollstonecraft.  Though the biographer is no 
professional scholar, she is well aware of the notoriety that her compassionate 
portrayal redresses:   
Few women have worked so faithfully for the cause of humanity as Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and few have been the objects of such bitter censure.  She 
devoted herself to the relief of her suffering fellow-beings with the ardor 
of Saint Vincent de Paul, and in return she was considered by them the 
moral scourge of God.  Because she had the courage to express opinions 
new to her generation, and the independence to live according to her own 
standard of right and wrong, she was denounced as another Messalina.  
The young were bidden not to read her books, and the more mature 
warned not to follow her example, the miseries she endured being 
declared the just retribution of her actions.                           1 
Pennell’s metaphors would be considered overwrought today, but her allusions 
directly reference conservative, misogynistic characterizations of Wollstonecraft 
that had repercussions for the author, her work, her contemporary female 
writers, and for later generations of feminists.  Satires such as Richard Polwhele’s 
“The Unsex’d Females” (1798) and Thomas James Mathias’s “The Shade of 
Alexander Pope on the Banks of the Thames” (1800) manipulated 
Wollstonecraft’s nonconformity to gender conventions, including her resistance 
to marriage and her bold political writing, to diminish the generally positive 
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view of her work and intimidate her women contemporaries from further 
political engagement.   Barbara Taylor describes how Wollstonecraft’s radical 
female colleagues, Mary Hays, Charlotte Smith, and Mary Robinson found 
themselves in a “delicate and troubling” predicament when the “chorus of 
condemnation” against Wollstonecraft tarnished their own public reputations as 
a result of their association with and defense of Wollstonecraft (247).   
The anti-Jacobin writer Richard Polwhele attacks the radical politics of 
French Revolution sympathizers, the rationality of women in general, and 
especially the involvement of any woman in any overt political sphere.  He does 
this through an extended metaphor of a war that pits radical, philosophically 
“democratic” women like Wollstonecraft, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Mary 
Robinson, Charlotte Smith, Helen Maria Williams, Ann Yearseley, Mary Hays, 
Angelica Kauffman, and Emma Crewe against the “modest Virtue” of another 
group of women writers, including Elizabeth Montague, Elizabeth Carter, Hester 
Chapone, Anna Seward, Hester Thrale Piozzi, Francis Burney, Ann Radcliffe, 
Diana Beauclerk, and Hannah More—the "obedient throng” deserving “the 
nation’s praise.” Polwhele blames unfeminine behavior for undermining the 
family and thus destabilizing the entire nation.   
Mathias proceeds similarly, but focuses on constructing a gender reversal 
between Wollstonecraft and her husband, William Godwin.  An emasculated 
Godwin and an unfeminine Wollstonecraft are linked to the breaking of 
religious, “moral,” and “political” “laws” that threaten to destroy the patriarchal 
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basis of the family and the nation (Mathias 51).   Both these conservative writers 
figure radical women as agitators, threatening British society with the chaotic 
violence of the French Revolution.  Polwhele, Mathias, and conservative 
magazines like the European Review yoke nascent feminism, revolutionary 
politics, and anti-British sentiment in their Anti-Jacobin agendas.  
Such conservative writers used information from Godwin’s overly candid 
portrayal of Wollstonecraft in his posthumous biography, Memoirs of the Author of 
a Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1798). Pennell, Susan Gubar, Barbara Taylor, 
Mitzi Myers, and Don Locke are just some of the many scholars who have 
discussed the backlash against Wollstonecraft following her death and the 
unfortunate role Godwin’s biography played.  As Andrew Cayton phrases it, 
“The initial assault on Wollstonecraft and Godwin was utterly merciless” (Love in 
the Time of Revolution 185). Taylor explains further: “The decade after her death 
saw the publication of dozens of works – some authored by women, including 
erstwhile admirers and associates – satirizing her as an addlebrained fanatic 
addicted to utopian system-mongering while abusing or neglecting everyone 
around her” (28).  Critics throughout the centuries have repeatedly held 
Godwin’s biography to blame for the injury to Wollstonecraft’s “intellectual 
reputation as well as her personal character” (Taylor 247), arguing that the injury 
done to Wollstonecraft deterred other women from more direct political 
engagement in their writing. Some have suggested that the brutal defamation 
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suffered by Wollstonecraft may have delayed the formal organization of the 
British women’s suffrage movement for decades.    
Pennell’s somewhat overwrought biography contends with a hundred 
years of defamation as her work initiates a gradual reaffirmation of 
Wollstonecraft’s intellectual contributions to political thought, feminist politics, 
and reform writing.   In truth, scholarship on Mary Wollstonecraft would not 
advance until academic feminists in the 1970s and early 1980s made it their 
project to challenge the traditional literary canon for its almost total exclusion of 
women writers.  However, feminist scholarship on this author in particular has 
shown an unprecedented preoccupation with redeeming her character through 
more than a dozen book-length biographies at the expense of more sustained 
engagement with her writing.  For Virginia Woolf, that redemption took the form 
of sentimental descriptions of a passionate, feminine woman with a “reformer’s 
love of humanity” (The Second Common Reader).  Wollstonecraft later became the 
“foremother” of modern feminism (Thomas H. Ford 189) before early third-wave 
Marxist-feminists held Wollstonecraft up as the epitome of internalized sexism, 
ultimately an inadequate intellect and dubious role model.  Despite more than a 
dozen book-length biographies, specific and sustained analysis of Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman (and her other work) remained elusive.   
The many biographical accounts show how critics past and present have 
long felt that Wollstonecraft incorporates her own lived experiences into her non-
fictional and fictional work.  A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is arguably 
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semi-autobiographical in its focus on women’s education, a field in which 
Wollstonecraft herself had worked as a governess, teacher, and author.  She uses 
the term "education" in the broadest eighteenth-century sense of the word, which 
includes childrearing, employment, domestic life, moral-ethical instruction, as 
well as the specific subjects, facts, and knowledge that men and women ought to 
master and to which they ought to have equal access.  In its own day, the work 
was by and large favorably reviewed, as Harriet Devine Jump describes: “Most 
reviewers took it to be a sensible treatise on female education and ignored those 
recommendations in the work that might unsettle the relations between the 
sexes.” The Analytical Review found the text to be an “‘elaborate treatise of female 
education’” even as it rather nebulously acknowledged the author’s larger 
political concern regarding how corrupted education debauched the nation 
(Mary Wollstonecraft and the Critics, 1788-2001, Volume 1352).  Jump astutely 
articulates a certain kind of political myopia within positive reviews of 
Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman, which often defined the work narrowly.   
By contrast, its detractors, such as Anti-Jacobin and Critical Review, 
acknowledged its political intention more fully, if only to ridicule its radical 
equal rights “doctrines” that logically allowed all men, “women or even children 
. . . to have an equal right to be governors and statesmen” (qtd. Jump 357).   Such 
responses were ironically correct in their perception of the profound political 
implications of Wollstonecraft's work, even if they mocked and rejected those 
principles through logical conflation.  It is also historically ironic that the equal 
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rights doctrine for which critics derided Wollstonecraft in the eighteenth century 
eventually came to be a contested subject within Wollstonecraft scholarship in 
the decades following the initial feminist recovery of her work. 
  Feminist literary scholars have been divided regarding the extent to 
which Wollstonecraft ought to be considered a radical or conservative writer.  
The division in scholarship reflects the division in academic feminism itself—a 
philosophical divide between liberal feminists and socialist feminists.  The most 
dominant voices from the socialist-feminist camp have all found Wollstonecraft 
to ultimately represent a repressed, un-liberated, self-hating sexuality that 
actually aligns her with more conservative contemporaries.10  They further 
contend that her feminist argument is limited at best and suspiciously aligned 
with bourgeois-democratic politics at worst.  Turning to her work, these critics 
find Wollstonecraft’s argument for women’s education lacking in originality; her 
political theory “merely derivative of bourgeois male thinking;” and her entire 
career and corpus reflective of an inescapable misogyny that restricted her 
concerns to motherhood, domesticity, and the nursery (Thomas H. Ford 191; 
Sapiro 260).   
The most notorious of these critical statements is Susan Gubar’s article, 
“Feminist Misogyny:  Mary Wollstonecraft and the Paradox of ‘It Takes One to 
Know One’” (1994). This influential piece was profoundly damaging to 
Wollstonecraft scholarship, despite its main purpose to address issues within the 
                                                
10 Cora Kaplan, Timothy Reiss, Janet Todd, Mary Poovey, Barbara Taylor, Mitzi Myers, 
and Susan Gubar  
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academy itself.  Gubar was in fact addressing 1990s criticism of academic 
feminists by African-American, queer, and Third-World feminists, labeling white 
academic feminists racist, homophobic, or neo-colonialist.  The result was that 
some scholars read into Wollstonecraft's work the same politics for which they 
were being called to account.  Such scholars wrongly held Wollstonecraft 
answerable for hundreds of years of socio-political developments and critiques 
that the author could never have been aware of during a time of only emergent 
liberal democratic theory; they also ignored significant ways in which she 
articulated doubts, for instance, about the professed ideals of the American 
Revolution belied by slavery11.   
My work primarily builds upon Virginia Sapiro’s landmark book, A 
Vindication of Political Virtue (1992), which still stands as the most sustained study 
of Wollstonecraft’s political theory.  Sapiro rebuts underestimations and gross 
misrepresentations of Wollstonecraft to defend the author’s work as indisputably 
radical; she especially challenges scholarship that claims Wollstonecraft neither 
perceived nor comprehended the larger social processes at work within her 
culture.  Sapiro instead demonstrates Wollstonecraft’s thorough analysis of 
several hierarchical systems of social organization aligned to create unnatural 
distinctions, differences of rank, wealth, race, and sex not inherent at birth but 
which influence the development of individuals beginning at birth. 
                                                
11 See Susan Gubar’s “Feminist Misogyny” (1994), Kora Kaplan’s Sea Changes (1986), 
Joan B. Landes’s Women and the Public Sphere (1988), Mitzi Myers’s “Reform or Ruin” 
(1982), and Mary Poovey’s The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer (1984). 
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“Wollstonecraft defined these different social relationships not simply as 
analogues but as systemically interrelated.  She described a sociopolitical system 
in which the institutionalized self-interest of the powerful corrupts the society as 
a whole, including all the relationships within it and its operating values” 
(Sapiro 82). The author perceives acculturation processes, sees how various 
stratifications interconnect and overlap, deconstructs how they do so, and 
proposes a widespread restructuring of all kinds of socioeconomic relationships 
and arrangements.   
Sapiro asserts that Wollstonecraft seeks to correct the disparities that 
undermine each individual’s physical and moral development to result in a 
dissolute society. The author, she argues, was never mystified by bourgeois 
liberalism.  Even if her political tendencies align with some liberal values, 
Wollstonecraft often criticizes liberal economic interests.  For instance, the 
author’s two Vindications reveal a sharp skepticism about the immoderate 
pursuit of wealth for its power to perpetuate those same debasing “unnatural 
distinctions” existent in the hereditary honors of property, primogeniture, and 
aristocratic entitlement (Wollstonecraft 44).  Sapiro thus articulates 
Wollstonecraft’s rejection of social hierarchies and their supporting legal and 
economic institutions that coerced obedience and servitude.  Even parental and 
familial relationships that enforce subjection are suspect as immoral and 
dangerous to humanity.  For Sapiro, Wollstonecraft extends the core discourse of 
individual rights much further than her fellow radical theorists, consistently 
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arguing for equality and liberty in terms of their moral necessity for both 
individual autonomy and national participation.  Sapiro thus contends that 
Wollstonecraft is important for “feminist history” and also for “debates over the 
development of democratic theory” (xxi).   
Connections and Chapter Overview 
The most radical of my texts, Cugoano’s Thoughts and Sentiments, occupies 
the most disregarded position in history—a clear reflection of the politics of the 
canon that affects scholarship even today as postcolonial and race scholars work 
to reaffirm the crucial need to study subaltern statements against Western, 
colonial aggression.  Wollstonecraft inhabits a moderately less neglected station, 
never fully forgotten but often remembered notoriously, held up as example for 
that which woman ought not endeavor—public engagement in socio-political 
civic debate.  Finally, Godwin, the writer whose identity is least marginal, only 
gained provisional canonical acceptance when his anarchist philosophy 
underlying Caleb Williams was expunged from critical view.  One recurrent 
theme emerges: marginalization.  My primary texts represent marginalized 
peoples; they have been marginalized from the traditional literary canon; and 
they remain isolated from each other, since current sub-disciplines within the 
field of literary studies do not place them in dialogue together. 
 While the interpretations reviewed above understand that each author is 
concerned with social transformation on behalf of the most oppressed 
populations of the late eighteenth century, the notion of social justice is always 
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assumed, never defined.  Repeatedly, scholarly analyses conflate social justice 
with political ideologies.  Some critics equate democratic values to social justice, 
reading for evidence that the writer supported majority rule against the rule of 
an aristocratic elite, pushing for legal equality, if not class equality, and free 
elections held so the people can limit government power.  Meanwhile, 
republican ideals inform critics’ searches for values like constitutionally 
protected rights for the individual against majority rule and individual rights to 
liberty, religion, and property.  Scholars tracing capitalist principles look for 
evidence supporting private business ownership for profit, free trade without 
government interference, merit-based and class mobility that is color-blind and 
gender-blind, and statements in support of the autonomous economic choices of 
the individual.  Meanwhile, those tracing socialist values investigate how the 
writers support the fairer distribution of wealth, support collective and 
communal property, argue for more egalitarian class or rank arrangements, find 
religion suspect, demand equal and universal access to basic sustenance, and 
likewise petition for equal, or at least reasonable, access to all the valued goods of 
society—education, voting, government seats and other abstract items through 
which any social member develops self-worth and participates in sociopolitical 
decisions.   
 Scholarship on these three authors collectively, convincingly, and often 
inadvertently demonstrates that each writer’s political alignments actually cut 
across all of these organized sets of principles.  Some critics have found this 
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hybridity to be a mark of failure, but the best scholarship, by Sandiford, Kelly, 
and Sapiro, recognizes this hybridity as evidence of the complexity of late 
eighteenth-century politics and interventionist work.  Unfortunately, no study 
has ever defined exactly what constitutes either social injustice or social justice.  I 
draw on multiple disciplines concerned with justice and injustice to devise an 
applied method of literary analysis for texts of the eighteenth century. I view a 
dialectical form of social justice activism as a corrective to the confusion and 
schism inherent to generally political readings.  I argue that each writer is less 
concerned with pushing any single political ideology or economic system. 
Rather, their similar hybridity is motivated by correctives to injustice; in other 
words, they address injustice first and foremost, and political leanings occur 
incidentally or secondarily.  
The notion of hybridity characterizes these texts in both political and 
literary domains.  Clifford Siskin’s The Work of Writing (1998) allows me to 
understand how hybridity became a political issue in and of itself in this period.   
Siskin’s book is not about social justice; rather, it tracks the transformation of 
writing from a new technology in the early decades of eighteenth century to its 
configuration as a professional discipline by the Romantic period.  He examines 
the relationship between eighteenth-century technological changes in print 
culture that made the unprecedented mass production of writing possible; the 
ensuing cultural anxieties provoked by the volume, variety, and diversity of 
writers and readers; and the subsequent reactions that led to “disciplinarity.”  
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This term designates the manner in which the hitherto “Dunciad-like excess” of 
“new generic combinations” came to coalesce into narrower fields of knowledge 
coded by distinct methodologies and conventions in order to control the 
"proliferation of writing” that “threatened eighteenth-century Britain” (17-19).  
Siskin finds generic, disciplinary, and professional distinctions emerging into our 
recognizably modern form by the 1830s (14).  Accompanying the 
compartmentalization of diverse writing into distinct disciplines were the 
connected developments of professionalization and education that authorized 
and authenticated experts, as managers, for each discipline.  Within a few 
decades, between 1780 and 1830, this process of constriction excluded some of 
those diverse voices and hybrid texts from what came to be understood as the 
literary (14).   
Siskin’s research is not about social justice. However, what he articulates 
is a process of conjoint literary and political injustice as what Nancy Fraser calls  
“nonrecognition”: a silencing of writers whose identities, opinions, and works 
defied the new and narrower limits of the literary text as a non-critical, 
generically conventional, and professionally rendered work of art (Fraser 6).  
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin write at the beginning of Siskin’s time 
frame.  They write at a peculiar moment in literary history when what we would 
call “interdisciplinary” writing flourishes and is available to the female advocate, 
the abolitionist African, and the anarchist novelist.  Their work combines 
political criticism and literary artistry for the purpose of social intervention.  
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They view their writing as potentially socio-politically transformative to unjust 
social structures and for the victims of injustice they represent.  Activist writing 
wants to make visible daily acts of injury, the immorality of social actors who 
inflict that injury, and the systemic and structural causes that create the 
conditions by which injurious behavior can occur in the first place.  
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin are agitators in an agitated historical 
moment.  From the viewpoint of anti-abolitionists, anti-Jacobins, and 
antifeminists, each author wields “the potentially disruptive power of the 
technology of writing” and therefore becomes one of those “strange, mad, … or 
suicidal,” “supposedly disruptive personalities” threatening to social order 
(Siskin 15).  Siskin compellingly declares that the project of disciplinarity wanted 
to make writing “safe,” and the “exclusion of women” was just one way it did so. 
My review of previous scholarship on these three figures reveals how the same 
process of exclusion also silenced Cugoano and scorned Godwin (26).  Silencing 
their champions implicitly silences, or at least attempts to silence, the oppressed 
multitude on the level of visible, cultural representation.    
In keeping with the theme of hybridity, my work is fundamentally 
interdisciplinary. I organize my chapters thematically, and I study each text 
comparatively.  My decisions here are primarily driven by the texts themselves, 
but I am indebted to Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) for my insight about 
how the eighteenth-century rhetorical technique of “plural grounding” coincides 
with my activist concept of dialectical social justice.  The comparative elements of 
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my work always center on the similar literary themes, techniques, tones, and 
metaphors through which the writers address injustice via specifically literary 
devices.  But Sen’s work helps be understand the writers’ comparative 
methodology for assessing actual social problems. Sen posits a reality-based 
mode of applied philosophy that concerns itself with current cultural conditions 
and social issues, which he calls comparative justice.  Like John Rawls in his 
landmark book, A Theory of Justice (1971), Sen founds his work on that of 
historical figures from the eighteenth century, such as Adam Smith, Jeremey 
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Mary Wollstonecraft, philosophers from the 
comparative tradition who make it their task to assess the actual societies in 
which they live, or as Godwin would put it, “things as they are” (7).    They seek 
to rectify “manifest injustice” by articulating wrongs and proposing “feasible” 
solutions to those wrongs by addressing the “actual behavior of people” and 
“actual institutions” (Sen 7).  Sen notably includes Wollstonecraft in this 
tradition; I extend his categorization to include Godwin’s Things as They Are and 
Cugoano’s Thoughts and Sentiments.  Sen’s disposition helps orient my three 
primary texts as comparative rather than transcendent, reality-based rather than 
solely theoretical, feasible rather than abstract. 
 Wollstonecraft, Cugoano and Godwin display, describe, or demand 
practical and achievable solutions to urgent social problems through “pluralistic” 
means (Sen 2).  I call their methodology dialectical for engaging top-down and 
bottom-up interventions. Sen’s definition of “plural grounding” establishes how 
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eighteenth-century rhetorical strategy indeed lends itself to dialectical analysis.  
The method of plural grounding uses “a number of different lines of 
condemnation, without seeking an agreement on their relative merits” (2).  
Sen refers to this rhetorical technique in the context of Edmund Burke’s wide-
ranging reasons for impeaching Warren Hastings for crimes against humanity in 
his colonial governance of India, which scholars have sometimes found to be 
logically contradictory.  Burke’s pluralistic indictments against Hastings 
demonstrate for Sen the statesman’s discernment of the multifarious ways in 
which social injustice violates people through many processes and institutions 
and utilizes any line of reasoning needed to justify its motives and actions.   
The only fitting response is a similar pluralistic argumentation that attacks 
manifold injustice in the same manner—by any and all available means.  As Sen 
explains, “What is important to note here, as central to the idea of justice, is that 
we can have a strong sense of injustice on many different grounds, and yet not 
agree on any one particular ground as the dominant reason for the diagnosis of 
injustice” (2).  Sen finds inspiration for his work in eighteenth-century debates on 
colonial crime and women’s rights, in the activism of Burke and the political 
philosophy of Wollstonecraft.  As I lift terminology from Sen’s work to explain 
the historical basis of my own, it is imperative to remember that he has 
appropriated eighteenth-century methods.  He, like Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, 
and Godwin before him, emphasizes social injustice as the bottom-up entry point 
for working upward toward just solutions; like the authors, he represents diverse 
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viewpoints rather than overarching theory; and like the authors, he embraces the 
pluralistic mode of argumentation needed to combat plural injustice.  Plural 
grounding becomes dialectical when the writers and Sen combat social injustice 
through the manifold and interconnected ways in which injustice operates 
against its victims by oppressing them in systemic ways and by devaluing their 
identities.  In other words, social injustice dialectically attacks victims through 
macro-level systems like economy, religion, government, class, and the law as 
well as through micro-level interactions, those everyday, face-to-face instances in 
which individuals or small groups are routinely disrespected, devalued, 
threatened, or abused.  Perhaps it is the shared history of violence framed within 
a dialectical methodology that allows each writer the capacity to attend to the 
specific contexts and concerns of women, Africans, or workers, while also 
positing similar interventions for wider social change that empathically reach 
across narrower group identifications. 
While Sen is invaluable for identifying fundamental rhetorical approaches 
of the writers and for orienting my own work, I structure my chapters on the 
domains of social injustice identified by Bufacchi and then analyze their social 
justice interventions by applying political theorist Nancy Fraser’s descriptions of 
activist responses that she organizes under the terms “the politics of recognition” 
and “the politics of redistribution.” Like Sen, Fraser calls for a pluralistic mode of 
academic research that unites these two common domains for social and political 
action.  Her essay, “Social Injustice in the Age of Identity Politics:  Redistribution, 
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Recognition, and Participation” (1996), attempts to reconcile a disagreement 
within the discipline of political theory regarding the best practices for social 
change.  An older tradition of Marxist-inspired “egalitarian redistribution” with 
its focus on resources and economy has given way to identity politics.  Identity 
politics, of race or gender for instance, currently prevails in political philosophy 
and favors strategies of recognition that prioritize creating a “difference-friendly 
world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer 
the price of equal respect” (Fraser 3).  Academics are “polarized” between the 
politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution—between maintaining 
identity distinctions and attempting to foster horizontal equality valued on 
sameness.   
Fraser calls this polarization a “false antithesis” (4, 6).  She argues for a 
complementary process, a “‘bivalent’ conception of justice that can accommodate 
both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the 
recognition of difference” (4-5).  Through close reading, my work demonstrates 
how Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin each establish that women, workers, 
and slaves occupy bivalent “oppressed collectivities” which concurrently suffer 
from “both maldistribution and misrecognition” (22).  I divide my chapters 
according to these domains.  Chapter Two examines how the authors articulate 
the ways in which women, workers, and slaves have been unjustly maligned on 
the basis of who they are—what Bufacchi calls “injustice as exclusion” (10).  
Chapter Three shifts focus to examine how the writers grapple with injustice that 
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creates social subordination through the denial of social, economic, or political 
resources, or what Bufacchi calls “injustice as maldistribution” (9-10).  
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin once again display their plural, or 
dialectical, mode in their complementary methodology that attends to both 
exclusionary and maldistributive injustice and the relationship between these 
dimensions. 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin juxtapose the lived realities for 
women, workers, or slaves against eighteenth-century doctrines of social 
cooperation, like paternalism or patriarchalism, and their supporting institutions.  
Literary scholars have primarily approached each text by its relationship to 
current subdivisions within literary studies that align with particularized fields 
of identity politics.  Critical race critics attend to Cugoano’s protest against the 
slave trade through the theoretical frameworks of critical race theory and 
postcolonial studies.  Feminist scholars have focused on either the emotional, 
biographical elements in Wollstonecraft’s writing, or the political and rhetorical 
argumentation of her work. Godwin critics are similarly split between reading 
Caleb Williams in relation to the generic development of the novel, and a New 
Historicist understanding of the novel in relation to the late eighteenth century 
and the French Revolution.  Academic subdivisions have prevented these three 
texts from being brought together, and have consequently missed the writers’ 
broader insights about how authority subjugates masses of people in 
corresponding, systemic patterns.  Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin may 
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illustrate injustice by often attending to the specific contexts of women, workers, 
and slaves. However, they also move outside these identity concerns to compare 
the shared experiences of injustice across these diverse populations.  
The diverse sub-disciplines of academic feminism, critical race studies, 
Marxist criticism, postcolonial studies, and the now not so New Historicism are 
all concerned with how my primary texts emerge as socially engaged, politically 
progressive, and culturally interventionist literatures.  All of these fields, 
therefore, are implicitly interested in social justice.  However, there has never 
been an articulation of exactly what social justice is and does.  Bufacchi addresses 
a related problem within his field of political philosophy, which abounds with 
social justice formulations despite the almost total absence of work on social 
injustice.  For example, Bufacchi discovers a shared but embedded assumption 
between the work of Sen and Rawls.  Both prolific scholars have vaguely and 
circularly assumed social injustice to be the absence of justice: “if injustice is the 
shadow of justice, then our understanding of injustice depends entirely on one’s 
preferred conception of justice” (2).  He illustrates the logical problem and 
socioeconomic ramifications of contingent justice by pairing typical models of 
justice with their inverted concepts of injustice.  If justice is “to each the same 
thing,” then “arbitrary inequality” becomes unjust. If justice is “each according to 
their merit,” then “lack of meritocracy” becomes unjust. If justice is “each 
according to their needs,” then “disregard for poverty” becomes unjust (2).  It is 
easy to agree with each of these principles.  Indeed, progressive literary scholars, 
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political philosophers, and social activists have addressed social injustice 
through all of them, and so do Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin.   
What happens, however, when we approach injustice through 
frameworks with which we are less likely to agree, but which systematically 
informed societies of the past?  If justice is “each according to their race,” then 
“equality of opportunity” becomes unjust. If justice is “each according to their 
rank,” then “social mobility” becomes unjust (Bufacchi 2).  As it happens, 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin write at a time in which these latter 
concepts of justice are the dominant ones.  The formula of justice as “each 
according to their rank” has particular resonance here, since, as Roxann Wheeler 
has shown, race and rank have close parallels in the eighteenth century (The 
Complexion of Race, 2000).  Bufacchi, drawing upon the work of Chaim Perelman, 
explains how the principle of “each according to their rank” is in fact “an 
aristocratic formula of justice” that “divides society into “‘widely separated’” 
categories and does not regard the “‘intrinsic’” value of “‘the individual’” (3).  
Policies or proposals that “aim to improve social mobility or promote equality,” 
then become injustices according to the aristocratic viewpoint.  Wollstonecraft, 
Cugoano, and Godwin challenge aristocratic models of social organization that 
divide society according to strict hierarchical groupings of rank, sex, and race. 
 Bufacchi inverts the approach to social justice by arguing that social 
injustice must take “primary” attention (3).  My writers do the same.  They 
illustrate injustice by displaying the “grievous wrongs” inflicted upon women, 
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workers, and slaves made possible by existent social arrangements.  All three 
authors pursue social justice, but they have a peculiar method of arriving at their 
arguments for social reform.  They deploy the technology of writing to make 
visible daily acts of injustice inflicted upon specific subdivisions of the 
community but which recur in the interrelated patterns of maldistribution, 
exclusion, and violence (Siskin 17, Bufacchi 9-10).  Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and 
Godwin thus put the experience of the individuals at the center of their analyses 
and work through those experiences upward to systemic causes. To summarize, 
these three late-eighteenth-century writers engage similar rhetorical strategies 
within the dialectical mode when measuring ideals against realities; demanding 
recognition and redistribution; and devising resistance tactics that extend not 
only beyond typical literary areas, but also beyond the current disciplinary 
divisions of political philosophy, political theory, and social activism, even as all 
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CHAPTER II 
  DEFINING INJUSTICE AS EXCLUSION AND MORAL INDIGNITY 
The traditional canon has been just one way in which literature has been a 
means for cultural and social control, limiting the texts and authors deemed 
worthy of study, for instance by denying the aesthetic value of the popular 
novels and treatises written by women in the eighteenth century, as in 
Wollstonecraft’s case; or by rebuffing the political novels of the same period, as 
happened to Godwin and the other Jacobin novelists; or by altogether excluding 
from literary history the slave narratives and protest statements by Black Atlantic 
writers like Cugoano.  The very politics of canon has reflected the wider social 
prejudices against such writers as Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin to the 
extent that it excluded them from serious concern along with so many other 
diverse voices, thus omitting from historical understanding the actual range of 
writing and ways of knowing that could more fully and accurately embody 
eighteenth-century literature as an expression of culture and mode of political 
debate.  
One unifying pattern across the historical treatment of each author has 
been a shaming process centered on both the politics and the identities of each 
writer, expressed as backlash, regret, or omission.  That devaluation is social 
injustice as exclusion, or the denial of human worth which includes disrespecting 
intellectual contributions made by persons or groups designated as inferior.   
Injustice as exclusion includes the denigration of particularized identities and 
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social roles, the denial of human potential and capacity for persons occupying 
those social positions, and the silencing of the opinions and experiences of 
persons from those assigned, subordinate stations.  As I describe in more detail 
below, Bufacchi’s and Fraser’s descriptions of injustice as exclusion suggest that 
this form of social injustice often operates through cultural representation, by 
denying the human worthiness of certain populations by employing various 
bodies of knowledge simultaneously (i.e. religion, history, literature, visual art, 
pseudoscience) to construct that inferior status and normalize disrespectful, 
dehumanizing social behaviors that reinforce subordination.  
If exclusion must be understood as a form of social injustice, as Bufacchi 
suggests, then canonical omission must also be understood as a form of social 
injustice that stretches across the centuries, infiltrating the intellectual milieus 
that connect the past to the present.  For example, the problem of canonical 
exclusion was taken up by Felicity A. Nussbaum and Laura Brown, and the 
scholars included in their collection of polemical essays, The New Eighteenth 
Century:  Theory, Politics, and English Literature (1988).  They introduced their 
collection by arguing that eighteenth-century literary studies subsumed into 
critical practice the very same partialities of eighteenth-century literary and 
cultural politics.  They subsequently proposed a greater interdisciplinary and 
pluralistic approach to reading texts of this period, and they proposed more 
general acceptance of then new modes of reading through feminist, 
psychoanalytic, new-historicist, Marxist, and deconstructive theories to display 
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what a more pluralistic literary practice might look like.  Without a doubt, those 
approaches to reading, along with the more current practices of critical race 
theory and post-colonialism, have brought the work of Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, 
and Godwin into view.  Each separate body of literary scholarship has combated 
the different means by which Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, or Godwin has been 
marginalized from the canon.  In bringing these texts back into critical view, 
academics simultaneously combat the defamation of authorial identity and the 
devaluation of the populations the authors represent.  Scholarship focused on 
canon revision must therefore be understood as work for social justice within an 
intellectual and cultural sphere which has the reformist view to more accurately 
and empathically preserve the diverse voices and perspectives of the past.  
But the authors themselves did the same social justice work within their 
own lifetimes and writing careers.  By representing the problems and 
perspectives of women, workers, and slaves, Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and 
Godwin advocate the revaluation of demeaned groups.  They also knowingly 
combat the depreciation of their own identities.  Bufacchi adopts into his 
description of social injustice as exclusion the admirable work of Miranda 
Fricker.  He highlights her definition of exclusion as “epistemic injustice,” a focus 
that shifts scholars away from defining injustice solely in terms of “‘how’” 
resources are distributed to a focus on “‘to whom’” those resources are offered.  
For Fricker, epistemic injustice manifests, for example, as “testimonial injustice” 
in which “someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower.  When 
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a speaker or narrator receives less credibility than they otherwise would have, 
they are being wronged, to the extent that they are being undermined, insulted, 
and not treated with proper respect qua subject of knowledge” (13). 
Wollstonecraft’s supposed incapacity for balancing style with rhetoric; the 
suspicion that Cugoano, a black African, could actually write such a powerful 
abolitionist work on his own; and the view that Godwin could not comprehend 
his own narrative developments are all instances of belittling each author’s 
competence as a writer; and the pervasive embarrassment for each writer’s 
politics undermines each author as a knowledgeable speaker about his or her 
society.   
Deflections against each writer’s talent combined with the defamatory 
political backlashes that each suffered means that they all experienced, 
admittedly to varying degrees, testimonial injustice.  For Cugoano, an African, 
and Wollstonecraft, a woman, the claiming of public voice and assertion of 
cultural authority in nonfictional political prose are direct acts of protest that 
declare their right to public voice and proclaim their rational capacity through 
the formal, intellectual act of writing.  As a white male writer, Godwin’s act of 
writing is a more mediated protest action.  His giving complex and dynamic 
voice to a lower-class, first-person narrator, however, emulates the more direct 
demand for public and political expression found in the work of Wollstonecraft 
and Cugoano.  Through the voice of his narrator, Caleb Williams, Godwin 
recreates the public testimonial akin to the slave narrative that articulates a 
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personal history of lost innocence, capture, persecution, and unceasing 
oppression.  In short, each writer protests injustice as exclusion and attempts to 
revalue the maligned identities of women, workers, or slaves by working 
through their first-person perspectives which give public voice to a maligned 
identity.  They also confront other texts that misrepresent the inner attributes of 
women, workers, or slaves and denigrate the social roles and contributions of 
those groups.  
As suggested by the above reference to Fricker’s work, one way in which 
exclusionary injustice occurs is by invalidating the subject’s very capacity to 
“know.”  The writers challenge this supposed incapacity as it manifests in 
postulations of natural inferiority then results in subsequent demands by the 
socially dominant for inferiors to be relegated to less esteemed social roles.   
Perhaps most provocatively, each writer especially challenges “moral exclusion,” 
the belief that women, workers, and slaves lack full moral capacity as individual 
subjects (Susan Opotow “Moral Exclusion and Injustice:  An Introduction,” 1990; 
1).  Translating Susan Opotow’s notion of “moral exclusion” into eighteenth-
century philosophical terms like those expressed in Adam Smith’s The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759), moral exclusion can mean that women, workers, or 
slaves are thought to be unable to develop moral sentiment, or the crucial 
balance between reason and passion that is the hallmark of the fully developed 
and dignified human being.  This balance demarcates an eighteenth-century 
notion of human dignity because it distinguishes the human from the brute 
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which is neither able to reason or exhibit the finer emotional attitudes of personal 
reflection or sympathy.   
 Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin all write from the first-person 
perspective, and they display an emotional and analytical range considered 
atypical for the female, slave, or servant subject.  They similarly engage a 
redolent tone of indignation against daily incidents of mistreatment, they 
subsequently compose passages that exhibit moments of internal reflection, and 
then they complement these rhetorical movements with a display of rationality 
denoted by extensive cultural analysis and textual deconstruction.  In so doing, 
they forward an implicit claim for human dignity by presenting the point-of-
view of a woman, a slave, or a servant that appeals to an eighteenth-century 
ideal of moral sentiment.  Thus, one key supposition of this chapter is that the 
authors are always combating testimonial injustice in two ways.  First, when 
Wollstonecraft writes as a woman, Cugoano as a slave, and Godwin’s Caleb as a 
servant, they belie the intellectual devaluation characteristic of epistemic 
injustice and moral exclusion by broadcasting exactly those intellectual, moral, 
and emotional capacities supposedly unavailable to women, slaves, or workers.   
 Second, claiming public voice as a woman, as a slave, or as a servant 
rebels against the silencing characteristic of exclusionary injustice, silencing that 
attempts to delegitimize the perspectives of all women, slaves, or workers by 
suppressing public address or by expecting subordinates to allow their supposed 
betters to speak or act on their behalf instead of for themselves.  When the 
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authors choose the first-person perspective, they give voice to largely voiceless 
populations.  More importantly, the authors use the first-person perspective as a 
vehicle for bottom-up social critique, in effect overturning an otherwise devalued 
identity into a position of strength, a source of special knowledge based on direct 
experience.  Each author employs first-person perspective to craft the writing 
persona or narrator of his or her text into an insider-expert that effectively rejects 
authoritarian, outsider theories about the groups with which the authors, or 
narrator in Godwin’s case, identify.   
The next goal this chapter is to examine how the writers protest 
exclusionary injustice in the cultural domain through their interventions against 
derogatory portrayals of workers, slaves, and women in other novels, 
ethnographic description, and the conduct book.  Cugoano offers a point-by-
point rejection and correction of racialist ethnography and proslavery rhetoric.  
Wollstonecraft deconstructs the species logic of conduct literature that asks 
women to collude in the denial of their own human capacity.  Godwin defies the 
discriminatory generic convention of the simpleminded and suspect stock 
servant character.  Wollstonecraft and Cugoano directly confront and 
deconstruct the debasing arguments of specifically targeted texts; Godwin’s 
defiance of generic convention means that his novel works in a more implicit, 
intertextual manner.   
Although writing in different genres themselves and targeting different 
genres of texts for intervention, one core feature unites the authors’ goals and the 
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writings that they scrutinize.  The texts under my authors’ scrutiny attempt to 
define, or represent, the inferior character of the African, the woman, or the 
servant.  As Elaine M. McGirr expounds in her book Eighteenth-Century 
Characters: A Guide to the Literature of the Age (2007), the character sketch “was 
“something of a craze in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England . . . 
Characters also left the sketch book and found their way into sermons, 
periodicals, drama, novels, and poetry:  the character permeated eighteenth-
century literature” (3).  Writing that concentrated on describing the relationship 
between “external description and the inner man” and then prescribing 
appropriate social behavior “helped contemporary readers map appearances to 
essences, to correlate fiction and reality.  The ‘character’ taught readers how to 
interpret the world and what values to attach to different classes or types of 
people” (4).  Writing “taught contemporary readers what to think of their 
neighbours and themselves,” thus serving a didactic and social role off the page 
into the larger social environment by providing interpretive strategies and 
behavioral recommendations for daily interactions (2).  
McGirr asserts the power of writing to influence actual human behavior.  
Thus, eighteenth-century writing can be implicated in influencing day-to-day, 
social interactions.  This power does not bode well for those individuals or 
groups held in disdain, contempt, or ridicule.  Writing could encourage daily 
maltreatment, or “moral exclusion” in its second manifestation: “moral exclusion 
occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in 
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which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply.”  Not only are 
undermined groups perceived as lacking moral capacity internally, they are 
occluded from receiving the respect that is reserved for more privileged 
members of the same society. As Opotow further explains, “morally excluded” 
populations “are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or underserving,” 
therefore they suffer harm that is normalized, or deemed “appropriate” or 
“acceptable” (1).  Thus, moral exclusion as a specific manifestation of social 
injustice as exclusion operates in two directions: it first defines groups of people 
as essentially inferior, and it subsequently excuses, on that basis, harmful 
behaviors and cultural representations predicated on that preconceived 
disrespect. 
Opotow’s explanation coincides with Bufacchi’s description of 
exclusionary injustice that operates by creating the conditions that allow injustice 
to occur on the level of day-to-day interactions, in which one social actor fails to 
recognize the human value of another social actor;” on a wider scale, entire 
groups of excluded persons stand to receive fewer social “benefits” even while 
they carry considerable social “burdens” (11).  Oftentimes, as my writers will 
articulate, those very social roles and burdens are held in derision. Moral 
exclusion is one specific manifestation of how injustice as exclusion functions via 
a blaming-the-victim circular logic.  First exclusionary injustice posits erroneous 
notions of innate inferiority, for instance by positing the innate immorality of 
women, workers, or slaves, whose incapacities subsequently require greater 
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social regulation.  But moral exclusion also creates a broader, more pervasive 
social contempt for those misrepresented victims that damages them still further 
through the sanctioning of daily abuse.  The authors object to writing that 
characterizes the woman, the slave, or the worker as physically, culturally, or 
morally inept to devalue that identity, and they also object to writing that  
promotes cultural contempt to prescribe further maltreatment.  
My authors, like literary scholars today, recognize writing as a cultural 
battle ground for or against injustice that operates through symbolic 
representation.  To analyze their work, I apply Bufacchi’s description of 
exclusionary injustice as it intersects with Nancy Fraser’s concept of “the politics 
of recognition.”  I examine how the authors understand the ways in which 
women, workers, or slaves suffer injustice based on the devaluation of their 
identities through symbolic representation which translates into degrading day-
to-day interactions.  Bufacchi provides the descriptive theoretical framework for 
differentiating three domains of social injustice of which exclusion is just one 
domain particularly focused on identity.  But he makes ample use of Fraser’s 
work on social injustice that also studies the deprecation of identity and which 
falls under her rubric “the politics of recognition.”  Fraser’s term, “the politics of 
recognition,” reflects her practical interventionist focus on first labeling the 
specific forms injustice related to devalued identity can take and the subsequent, 
strategies combatants deploy against that devaluation. I use Bufacchi’s term 
“injustice as exclusion” as a broad theoretical category, while I engage Fraser’s 
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terms under “the politics of recognition” to pinpoint and label the specific form 
of exclusionary injustice that each writer challenges. 
Fraser’s specificity is especially apt to analyzing the rhetoric of historical 
texts as case studies.12   It is Fraser who most thoroughly articulates how 
exclusionary injustice operates through different forms of deleterious 
representation at the “cultural” level:  
The politics of recognition … targets injustices it understands as cultural, 
which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, 
interpretation, and communication.  Examples include cultural 
domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and 
communication that are associated with another culture and are alien 
and/or hostile to one’s own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via 
the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative 
practices of one’s culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or 
disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in 
everyday life interactions).               7    
Activists against social injustice as exclusion practice “the politics of recognition” 
through two basic strategies to contest these three forms of exclusionary 
                                                
12As political philosopher, Bufacchi mainly hopes to devise a descriptive theory for 
measuring social injustice—to isolate, define, describe, and formulate the core concepts 
of social injustice as philosophical theory, sifting out of his model historically entrenched 
biases and case studies as much as possible.  By contrast, Fraser, as political theorist, 
begins from the historically and culturally entrenched viewpoint, looking at specific case 
studies of forms of injustice and studying the effectiveness of actual corrective 
procedures.   
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injustice.  The first approach rejects essentialist theories and views social 
divisions as culturally created.  Fittingly, they seek to “deconstruct” the “binary 
oppositions” that create “hierarchical” valuations between social groups.  In the 
process of revealing the ways in which culture fabricates differences that are not 
inherent, activists using this intervention want to dismantle “the very terms” by 
which group devaluations “are currently elaborated.”  Meanwhile, some activists 
may accept that innate differences conjoin essential group identity.  However, 
they view the “variations” of humanity as intrinsically “benign.”  Like the first 
strategists, adherents of essentialism still locate devaluation of difference in 
culture.  Innocuous variances are “maliciously” abased to, once again, 
manufacture social “hierarchy” (10).  Activists from this perspective “seek to 
celebrate, not eliminate group differences” to create “a difference-friendly 
world” (10, 3).  I explore how each writer protests exclusionary injustice through 
these specific strategies, examining how they treat oppositional and often 
essentialist definitions of women, workers, or slaves and how they attempt to 
revalorize those group identities.  
Taking its name from Frederick Douglass’s original anti-slavery 
newspaper, the leftist-activist website, The North Star, recently published an 
article, “What’s Wrong with Identity Politics (and Intersectionality Theory)?  A 
Response to Mark Fisher’s ‘Exiting the Vampire Castle’ And Its Critics” 
(December 2, 2013), that attempts to explain some weaknesses of identity politics 
for effecting social change. Marxists disagree with identity politics for observing 
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“static,” unnaturally assigned categories that fail to liberate individuals or 
groups from those socioeconomically “alienated” identities; in seeking equality 
with privileged social groups, identity politics fails because it does not seek to 
escape the essentialism of identity itself.  Identity groups do so by too often 
defining the characteristics that regulate group inclusion in opposition to other 
social groups with which it competes, “continually falling back on difference in 
order to establish group identity and cohesion” (Michael Rectenwald).  Identity 
groups define the fundamental features for members included in the group and 
which attributes delineate those who must be excluded from membership.  
However, the socialism of the first half of the twentieth century was a “miserable 
failure” for also relying on its own “reductionist” “policing of the category of the 
working class” that led to “fragmentation” and “stagnation.”  He blames the 
failures of socialism for the current prevalence of identity politics today, which 
includes the unsuccessful experiment of intersectionality theory.   
The theories of injustice upon which I draw seek to rectify the error of 
either/or essentialism just as the writers themselves employ dialectical analytic 
strategies to examine “subjective experiences,” to “denaturalize identity 
categories,” and to interrogate the ways in which identities are assigned “from 
above.”  Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin by and large avoid the 
essentialist trap that Rectenwald suggests of more current identity and Marxist 
politics because these writers always perceive how identity is handed down from 
above.  They understand identity as a dynamic interplay between internal 
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subjectivity, cultural esteem, and social role, the definitions and assignations of 
which have largely if not wholly been wrested from the control of women, 
workers, or slaves.  I contend that their similar perspective translates into parallel 
protests against social injustice; protesting injustice strategically deflects the need 
to defend identity and, rather, allows each writer to interrogate and deconstruct 
how identity has come about by the suspect actions and motives of the 
oppressor.  Authorial interrogations of injustice empower them to go beyond 
merely “describing” identity to investigate how subjective experiences in and of 
the world reflect the “distribution and hierarchy” of their “social locations” and 
question how “different kinds of [social] construction” can alter identity (Linda 
Martin Alcoff, Michael Hames-García, Satya P. Mohanty, & Paula M. L. Moya, 
Identity Politics Reconsidered, 2006; 6).   
I transform Fraser’s examples into the guiding themes for each of my 
primary texts, pairing one writer to one form of exclusion.  In Thoughts and 
Sentiments, Cugoano challenges the injustice of African slavery by deconstructing 
the cultural domination communicated in British proslavery publications.  To 
combat the hostile interpretations of African peoples by the imperially dominant 
he corrects racialist misinformation posited in proslavery texts that claim African 
inferiority in terms of moral and emotional difference, such as the African’s 
supposed incapacity for reason or intellectual accomplishment and the African’s 
supposed lack of sentiment in the form of familial, kinship, or community 
attachments.  Cugoano also debunks proslavery rhetoric that claims cultural 
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difference located in claims of African underdevelopment in socioeconomic 
structures like government, trade, technology, or modern infrastructure.  He 
revalorizes African identity through his first-person persona, deploying his 
African birthright as a social location of cultural authority from which he derives 
insider knowledge about African peoples and cultures that white apologists for 
slavery cannot claim.  But, he also employs his hybrid identity as a former free 
African, former enslaved African “in the West but not of the West,” and as a free 
British subject now rewriting both the categories of African and European in 
terms of shared values that decompose oppositional definitions of either identity 
category (Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic:  Modernity and Double Consciousness 2).  
Next, I pair Wollstonecraft and exclusionary injustice as nonrecognition.  
This form of exclusion poses considerably greater challenges to reading since it 
is, by definition, a form of injustice based on invisibility.  Indeed, Wollstonecraft 
seems to perceive this very problem, apparent in her own linguistic choices that 
resonate with Fraser’s description of nonrecognition as “being rendered 
invisible” (7).  Wollstonecraft writes, “women, in particular, are rendered weak 
and wretched by a variety of concurring causes” to reflect how any essentialist 
claim about the capacity of woman is always erroneous given the limitless social, 
cultural, and economic structures that relegate woman to an inferior social 
position, all of which have been founded on the “hasty conclusion” of woman’s 
essential inferiority (71).  She thus astutely perceives the cyclic nature of injustice 
and famously “throws down her gauntlet” as challenge to those edifices (119). 
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She dares her male readers and the several authoritarian figures she directly 
addresses to reverse the order of things, to first prove woman’s essential 
difference by first evening out the odds stacked against her.  For Wollstonecraft, 
identity is inseparable from environment. Therefore, her work is always 
simultaneously speaking about injustice as exclusion and injustice as 
maldistribution, which is the topic of my next chapter.  Nevertheless, I highlight 
how she utilizes Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments in her comparative 
deconstruction of the socialization and educative processes for women.  
Wollstonecraft strategically adopts this model to contrast it to the ways in which 
girls are raised to show how women are deliberately occluded from developing 
those prized attributes of reason and moral conscience that define human dignity 
for her culture.     
Last, I examine Godwin’s challenge to exclusionary injustice as disrespect. 
I pick up Fraser’s notion of stereotyping as it intersects with the literary concept 
of the stock character, which is by very definition a stereotype as an oft-used, 
easily recognizable, literary and cultural archetype demarcated by flatness and 
predictable motivations.  The novel was the new genre of the eighteenth century, 
but many of the stock characters had already been established in the character 
sketch which had been a popular genre unto itself since the seventeenth century 
beginning with Joseph Hall’s Characters of Virtues and Vices, as McGirr explains 
(3).  The rake, the country maid, the fop, the noble highwayman, the coquette, 
the country gentleman, the bluestocking, the female wit, the cit (citizen of the 
 85  
world), and the noble savage, are just some of the popular stock character types 
from the eighteenth century that McGirr studies.  However, she notes that the 
popularity of character types changed over the course of the century, as did 
trends in authorial treatment of them.  Since character and culture share such a 
synergistic relationship, which stock type an author selects and how an author 
treats that stock character according to expectation or in defiance of it serves as 
“an index” to the cultural influence an author seeks to wield through the reading 
audience (4).  
I explore the ways in which Godwin’s portrayal of his protagonist, Caleb 
Williams, defies the generic convention of the stock servant character.  McGirr 
does not study representations of servants, but her work intersects with Julie 
Nash’s sustained study of the stock servant character and the derogatory 
stereotypes inherent to eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century 
representations of servants in her book, Servants and Paternalism in the Works of 
Maria Edgeworth and Elizabeth Gaskell (2013).  Nash explores how Edgeworth and 
Gaskell defy two conflicting, long-maintained “literary stereotypes” with the 
servant as either “blindly faithful domestic family retainer” or the servant as 
“selfishly scheming family destroyer” (4).  Common to both stereotypes is a stock 
servant character who inhabits a marginal place in the narrative and lacks a 
“private life” of human depth, psychological complexity, emotional range, and 
interior transformation.  Godwin makes Caleb Williams his protagonist and 
retrospective narrator, and the author centralizes the experience of the servant 
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decades prior to the publications of Edgeworth or Gaskell.  Long regarded as one 
of the most psychologically complex novels of the eighteenth-century, the 
psychological complexity of Caleb Williams resides in the titular protagonist, 
defies literary convention, and disputes the interrelated literary and cultural 
stereotype of the servant or lower-class worker.  Godwin makes this clear 
through just one of his many parallels with variation for Caleb is unlike his foil 
and fellow servant of the Falkland household, Mr. Collins.  Collins adheres to the 
stereotype of the unquestioning and devoted domestic.  It is my task to explore 
how the similarities and differences between Mr. Collins and Caleb confronts 
stereotypes about servants and the lower-orders of society to inspire the popular 
reader to interrogate the disrespect to which he may be routinely subjected.   
Cugoano and Cultural Domination 
Cugoano holds slavery to be a violation of both human reason and 
humane sensibility which ought to be the governing bonds of human dignity 
across all civilizations.  One of the absorbing features of Thoughts and Sentiments 
is how the author interrogates the ideals of sensibility and reason across the 
oppositional identity categories of African or European.  He does not solely lay 
claim to African capacity to revalorize the oppressed group.  Rather, his 
orientation on injustice empowers his argumentative strategy to decenter the 
debate on slavery away from misrepresented African capacity and to powerfully 
re-center the debate on slavery on the inhumane, insensible, and unreasonable 
behavior of Europeans and their “fashionable way of getting riches.”  In so 
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doing, he displays the hypocrisy of European claims to moral superiority in 
contrast to their “brutish, base, but fashionable way of traffic[ing]” men, women, 
and children: “the slave-holders are meaner and baser than the African slaves, 
for while they subject and reduce them to a degree with brutes, they seduce 
themselves to a degree with devils” (22).  As an abolitionist treatise, the priority 
of Thoughts and Sentiments is to formally, comprehensively, and systematically 
denounce slavery, the slave trade, and those European devils.  Primarily, 
Thoughts and Sentiments dissects proslavery rhetoric.  But, Cugoano includes his 
own personal narrative of capture and bears witness to experiences of violence 
that he and his fellow Africans routinely suffer. He thus makes strategic use of 
narrative, a narrative of misery and brutality, to consistently center his rejection 
of slavery on an act of human suffering inflicted by the “hands of barbarous” 
British subjects in collusion with their European neighbors (16).  Unlike his white 
abolitionist contemporaries, Cugoano’s African identity empowers his speech as 
an agent for his own case and for “the similar cases of thousands, which suffer by 
this infernal traffic” and who “cry for justice” and who have been “long crying 
for vengeance” (15, 21, 90).  
For Cugoano, injustice as exclusion is one of direct brutality to persons as 
animals, a theme I pick up more in the next chapter, and a more insidious 
discursive one through pro-slavery, racist publications, which Thoughts and 
Sentiments seeks to debunk.  According to Roxann Wheeler in her landmark 
book, The Complexion of Race:  Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British 
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Culture (2000), eighteenth-century Britons had multiple “paradigms to account 
for human difference, paradigms that could be mutually reinforcing or at odds” 
many of which did not “automatically” signify race as “skin color” as the word 
“race” does now (37, 2).  She describes the various types of physical, social, and 
cultural differences used to signify inferiority in the eighteenth century.  These 
include lack of agriculture, commerce, infrastructure, layered clothing, literary 
achievement, and Christianity.  Proslavery discourse makes use of these multiple 
paradigms to support the forced bondage of Africans. The multiplicity and even 
contradictoriness of these paradigms does not mean they are less formidable; 
instead, any number or even a single paradigm could suffice to justify the slave 
economy.  
Cugoano alludes to at least three major proslavery works that contain just 
the sort of multiple paradigms of racism which Wheeler describes, although the 
proslavery texts are oriented somewhat differently.  The first of these is Edward 
Long’s infamous three-volume History of Jamaica (1774).  Long’s essay focuses on 
describing the inferior character and cultural achievements of the African and 
arrives at a time before the growing momentum of the abolitionist movement.  It 
is often considered the most influential and specifically racialist text of the later 
eighteenth century.  Long begins his section on “Negroes” by asserting that 
Africans “differ most essentially from the Whites,” then he offers a catalogue of 
contrasts between black and white physiologies.  He cites the “black colour of 
their skins … which does not alter by transportation into other climates, and 
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which they never lose;” the “bestial fleece” of “wool” “instead of hair;” the 
“black colour of the lice which infest their bodies” which marks them as different 
“animals” than “the white lice” typical of the European; and “Their bestial or 
fetid smell, which they all have in a greater or less degree” (3-5).  Next, Long 
denigrates Africans by compounding mental and cultural inadequacies.  He 
addresses the “disparity” of their “faculties of the mind,” which renders the 
African “incapable of making any progress in civility of science” and manifests 
itself in “Their barbarity to their children [which] debases their nature even 
below that of brutes” (5-8).  He soon describes the lack of invention in the form of 
roads, architecture, and agriculture on the entire African continent.  For Long, 
the African is “deceitful, thievish … incestuous, savage,” and cannibalistic.  He 
uniformly rejects the African from the same human species as the European (8).  
The “Negroe race,” according to Long, more appropriately relates to the “oran-
outang” than to “white men” (10).  Long consistently figures a supposed African 
trait in subhuman terms; he figures black Africans as essentially different than 
white Europeans using dehumanizing and specific animal comparisons, like lice 
or the orangutan, and more general subhuman terminology, like barbaric, 
beastly or brutish.  
The take the second two proslavery works to which Cugoano alludes in 
tandem, since these works defend slavery and the slave trade in direct response 
to antislavery publications:  James Tobin’s Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. 
Ramsay’s Essay…” (1785) and Gordon Turnbull’s An Apology for Negro Slavery or 
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the West-India Planters Vindicated from the Charges of Inhumanity, 2nd Edition (1786). 
Peter J. Kitson notes that the organized abolitionist movement becomes official in 
1787 with the formation of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade, but Christopher Leslie Brown’s book, Moral Capital:  Foundations of British 
Abolitionism (2006), demonstrates how antislavery sentiment had already been 
gaining momentum and cultural respect for at least two decades prior to the 
establishment of the formal abolitionist organization.  Turnbull first defends 
slavery by historical, global, and Biblical precedent: “Slavery has existed in all 
ages, and at this moment exists in three quarters of the globe,” and it is 
“permitted, perhaps, like other unequal and contracted ranks in society … by the 
omnipotent Creator.” He then rejects antislavery arguments of human equality, 
turning to climate theory as a causal basis for human difference, referring to “the 
depravity, or cowardice of the people of hot climates” (7-8). Africans are not 
constituted for liberty.  Next, he defends slavery as a humane practice.  Before 
European trade-encounters with Africans, they were “immersed in the grossest 
ignorance, idolatry, and barbarism;” they even “sacrificed [wives and children] 
to the monstrous objects of their worship” (10).  Therefore, the slave trade is 
compatible with “justice and humanity” because it “saves” already enslaved 
prisoners of war from “horrid deaths” by “‘hacking, piercing, [and] 
tormenting,’” as Turnbull quotes from Captain Willem Bosman’s “On the Slave 
Trade in Guinea” (1721). Turnbull goes on to describe the more humane 
treatment European slaveowners provide for Africans, which begins upon 
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arrival in the colonies with “fresh provisions [of] fruit and vegetables of all 
kinds;” leisure time to happily consort and “dance” with their “dear relations” 
and “many natives of their own country” and in their native “language” (21-22).  
Planters clothe, feed, and “comfortably lodge” all “negroes,” who are not even 
asked to work until a year after arrival, by which time many have “married … 
and have houses, gardens, hogs, and poultry of their own” in a condition that the 
slaves themselves find superior to their former lives in Africa (24-26). Turnbull 
paints a portrait of Christian benevolence. 
Tobin, meanwhile, offers a rather lengthy character defamation followed 
by a point-by-point response of Reverend James Ramsay’s antislavery tract, An 
Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies 
(1784).  Tobin primarily defends slavery according to its national legality and 
thorough colonial regulation. He refers to colonial laws that govern the humane 
treatment of slaves by ordering clothing allowances, land allotments 
proportionate to the numbers and needs of slaves, provisions provided for 
criminal slaves in custody, maternity “respite” from work for female slaves, 
religious tutelage to convert slaves to Christianity, the observance of Christian 
days of rest on Sundays and Holy days, the “liberty” of slaves to plant and sell 
their own crops and meats independent from of the larger plantation economy, 
the enforcement of penalties for “maimed, or mutilated” slaves, and the capital 
punishment law for “persons killing slaves, wantonly, or inhumanly…for the 
second offence” (25-27).  He thus defends the practice by citing British humanity 
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toward slaves which is governed as a matter of law, and which contrasts the 
French.  Tobin goes on to indict the abolitionists as inhumane and unreasonable.  
Immediate abolition would be economically impossible and negligently 
inhumane because it would set “loose” hundreds of thousands of slaves who are 
otherwise cared for and who would be either unable or unwilling to “earn an 
honest” living (147). 
Slavery, as Cugoano perceives, is predicated on a capacious version of 
moral exclusion—defining the Black African as inferior by numerous arguments 
and constructing the European trader and planter as morally superior.  That 
superiority comes in the claims of humane and Christian stewardship of the 
European for the saved Africans.  But it takes a specifically British mien when 
Turnbull and Tobin also claim that British slavery is much milder than the slave 
practices of other nations. Because justifications for slavery take on so many 
forms, Cugoano’s writing against the injustice of slavery is not solely focused on 
the racialist defenses; he addresses cultural misrepresentation and racial 
misrepresentation.  Here, he sums up the culturally-based fabrications of Long 
and Turnbull: “Some pretend that the Africans, in general, are a set of ignorant, 
dispersed, unsociable people; and they think it no crime to sell one another, and 
even their own wives and children; therefore they [slave-holders] bring them 
away to a situation where many of them may arrive to a better state than ever 
they should obtain in their own native country.”  This passage mimics 
proslavery rhetoric, which positions the African in opposition to the supposed 
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values of familial love, liberty, and civil society of Enlightened Europe.  But 
Cugoano argues that Africans have “hierarchal systems of government that 
proves they are not merely savages and barbarians but have reached a state of 
civility.”  Legal codes of justice “are ‘absolutely maintained by their free 
subjects;’” and Africans are born with an innate sense of nation, “‘freedom and 
liberty’” which is “‘as great … as the sons and daughters of fair Britain’” (Jeffrey 
Gunn 643).  By establishing the African’s sense of nation, liberty, and property, 
Cugoano examines slavery as a violation of human rights.  Enlightenment and 
Christian principles are interchangeable moral codes, slavery is a violation of 
both, and European violations of their own cultural values mark them as 
hypocrites.  Also of importance here, is Cugoano’s positive comparison of the 
shared values of social cohesion, order, individual agency, and national 
autonomy.  Whereas proslavery rhetoric figures inferiority through essential 
difference, Cugoano appeals to the British reader by asserting the essential 
similarity between African and British ideals and social structures.  
Next, Cugoano targets the nationalistic excuse for slavery—that other 
countries were engaged in the traffic and they treated Africans far worse.  For 
one, Cugoano addresses the claim that Africans themselves engage in slavery, a 
claim that preys on the public’s ignorance about the sheer vastness and variety of 
the African continent and its peoples in contrast to England’s geographical 
insularity and relative homogeny.  Cugoano reminds the reader of the 
“vast…extent” that is Africa, concedes that some “bad practices” may exist 
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among its “numerous inhabitants,” but those practices can only be limited to the 
specific “boundaries,” “kingdoms and principalities” of the many “divided” 
“nations,” “very few” of which practice any form of legalized, government-
sanctioned slavery, and none practicing any form of slavery so abject as the 
chattel slavery of European invention (25-26).  His emphasis on various 
territories and social hierarchies debunks the proslavery view of Africa as an 
unwritten landscape that existed in a pre-civilized state without recognizable 
national geographies or sovereignties before European intervention. Cugoano 
then applies a comparative analogy of a random act of murder to whittle down 
this whopping national pretense to its basic, perverse, and astonishingly childish 
reasoning—that others were doing it first.  Malicious homicide motivated by 
degenerate pleasure could have no just excuse when transpiring between the 
murderous actor and his victim; likewise, no national gain can morally justify the 
perverted rationale undergirding international genocide. The behavior of the 
European who engages in the calculated violence of modern chattel slavery 
makes him a criminal; those who try to validate the system through “specious” 
reasoning are lunatics (22).  All participants need to be held accountable: 
unpremeditated murder deserves the madhouse; calculated genocide demands 
retribution.   
Thoughts and Sentiments likewise addresses the legal argument for slavery 
made by Tobin, in which Tobin claims abolition would violate the property 
rights of slave owners, undermine the British economy, and inhumanely 
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abandon the hitherto nurtured slaves.  Cugoano reflects upon this fraudulent 
claim to injury that ignores the thousands of African victims with indignant 
disapprobation, echoing several key phrases and passages of Tobin in order to 
re-right and re-write moral order.   For example, Tobin compares Ramsay’s 
proposals to hold slaveholders accountable as criminals for their cruel treatment 
of slaves to the popular print, “The World Turned Upside Down.”  For Tobin, 
slavery as an institution and its forms of corporal discipline of slaves are within 
legal right, and prosecution for legally protected behavior would be a bizarre 
overturning of justice.  Just as Tobin calls Ramsay’s arguments “virulent” 
character “invectives,” so Cugoano calls Tobin’s use of the image of the foolishly 
inverted world “a ludicrous invective comparison” because human law can only 
be folly when it protects “robbers, thieves and vagabonds” instead of the 
innocent (19).   
Cugoano’s use of the word “virulent” also comes in the phrase “virulent 
craftsmen” (18-19), which opens an extended Biblical metaphor that associates 
Tobin and other defenders of slavery to Demetrius, Biblical “silversmith” of 
idolatrous shrines.  Slavers idolatrize money and profit at the expense of social 
order and Christian morality through the joint circulation of human cargo and 
circulation of misrepresenting literature. It is they, not Ramsay, who take 
advantage of a misinformed public.  Just as the silversmiths in the passage from 
Acts refuse to surrender their economy in idolatry, so do slaveholders and their 
defenders refuse to relinquish evil to restore moral right.  Cugoano seems to be 
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playing on the word “acts” here, since he references a passage from Acts and 
defines ethical character by “acts;” evildoers and evil-speakers cannot be good 
men or proper moral guides for a single slave let alone an entire nation.   
The major fallacy of Tobin’s argument, from Cugoano’s view, is a false 
distinction between internal character and outward behavior.  Tobin defends 
“the characters of so valuable, respectable, and useful set of men,” as he 
describes the “British West India planters,” even as he does not wish “to be 
ranked among the advocates for slavery” like them.  Tobin falsely believes that 
the planters can be considered honorable men even if their practice of enslaving 
others ought not be condoned.  Tobin further claims to side with Ramsay in hope 
for “the blessings of freedom” for slaves someday, but takes issue with Ramsay’s 
supposed misuse of “the sacred lines of religion,” manipulation of the 
“prejudices of the misinformed multitude,” and seeming hypocrisy against the 
very same planters who he counted among his “social intimates” when living as 
a neighbor among them “within the tropics.”  Tobin castigates Ramsay for being 
a hypocritical neighbor to the same West Indian planters who he once called 
friends.  Tobin’s concentration on the neighborliness of fellow British subjects, 
however, erases from view the very individuals most at risk in the debate on 
slavery—the African slaves themselves.  When Cugoano writes, “who distress 
their neighbours by their thrift, robbery, and plunder,” he refers to the African 
peoples debased by slaveholders, who are violated by the real hypocrisy of 
“wicked” acts inflicted against them by their neighboring Christians who 
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desecrate the fundamental golden rule of neighborly compassion (19).  Even if 
Tobin may not be a trader or owner of slaves, his public defense of those 
practices and misrepresentation of the reality of plantation slavery of is no less 
malicious for contributing to an immoral climate just as dangerous as slavery 
itself.  Cugoano turns the tables on Tobin’s argument to show that traders in 
human cargo, slaveowners, and their defenders are uniformly, criminally guilty 
since their collective contribution to the nation is the idolatry of money over 
reformation, placing Britain on a morally destructive path.   
 It is this theme of moral destruction and method of Biblical analysis, both 
fitting for the jeremiad genre, that intersects closely with Cugoano’s method of 
deconstructing racist rhetoric.  This extended deconstruction of racial rhetoric 
first appears in his own personal narrative of capture to describe the lost 
innocence of an idyllic childhood vastly different than the bleak portrait of Africa 
described by Long.  Cugoano is still a child in a state of “innocence,” “enjoying 
peace and tranquility,” venturing “into the woods to gather fruit and catch birds, 
and such amusements as pleased” he and his “play-fellows” when “several great 
ruffians” unexpectedly close in upon the children.  It is in fact emotional 
manipulation that initially subdues the youngsters when the abductors, preying 
on the African child’s implicit ignorance of dishonesty, accuse the children of 
committing “a fault against [the kidnappers’] lord” for which the boys “must 
answer.” It is not until the boys try to flee that the “enslaving men” restrain them 
at knifepoint and gunpoint: “Some of us attempted in vain to run away, but 
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pistols and cutlasses were soon introduced, threatening, that if we offered to stir 
we should all lie dead on the spot.”  So, ensues Cugoano’s fall from a state of 
innocence into a state of misery, swiftly exposed to the multifarious forms of 
violence of the slave trade.  He suffers physical violence in the form of 
kidnapping and restraint, psychological violence through the death-threat of 
“pistols and cutlasses,” moral violence as an object of deception and “treachery,” 
emotional violence through false accusation and “fear,” and spiritual violence in 
his lost innocence (19, 12-15).  His first encounter with deceit and violence of any 
kind is at the hands of European kidnappers, his supposed Christian saviors who 
steal him from his family, from his childhood liberty and safety while “playing in 
a field” along “with about eighteen or twenty more boys and girls” (12).   
Cugoano works through ironic contrast and reversal.  Thoughts and 
Sentiments inaugurates its reader with the immediate and sustained contrast 
between those many moral claims of the apologist for slavery against 
descriptions of horror.  Even as Cugoano alludes to and quotes specific 
proslavery texts and passages, he unremittingly contrasts those claims to his 
lived reality, those postures of moral superiority to the actual behavior he has 
witnessed and suffered, as have thousands and “millions” (86).  In so doing, he 
reverses accusations of inferiority to decenter debates about African character; 
instead, he forces the English and the European apologist for slavery to defend 
his own tangible behavior rather than conjectural African character.  For 
example, Cugoano’s personal narrative juxtaposes European “wickedness” to 
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African innocence, tangible conduct versus moral-spiritual ontology.  He calls 
into question the very basis for defining supremacy in terms of skin color or 
culture, asking if this is the behavior of the racially or culturally superior, then 
who would ever aspire to it?  Or as Cugoano exclaims, “their aspirations are 
insidious and false … And if such men can boast of greater degrees of 
knowledge, than an African is entitled to, I shall let them enjoy all the 
advantages of it unenvied, as I fear it consists of a greater degree of infidelity, 
and that of a blacker kind than only skin deep.”  Cugoano strategically places his 
personal narrative against the proslavery posture of “saving” the African.  
Africans are not saved, they are stolen; Europeans are not saviors, they are 
thieves (11).   
Just as proslavery rhetoric works in an aggregate manner, concurrently 
denigrating culture and race, so does the rhetoric of Thoughts and Sentiments to 
debunk it.  Advocates for slavery use Biblical stories to figure black skin as a 
mark of innate immorality.  Slavery apologists read black skin as the mark of 
Cain or claim that Africans are the Canaanites, the cursed descendants of Ham.  
Cugoano directly confronts racist misappropriations of scripture by offering his 
own Biblical readings that neutralize black skin as a negative signifier.  He does 
so by showing alternative symbolic meaning of skin tone and by reversing the 
symbolic trope of blackness back onto the slave trafficker.   Sometimes this works 
through simple reversal of animalistic language; Jeffrey Gunn points to some of 
these phrases: “‘white devils’” “‘beasts of the night,’” “‘prowling for their prey,’” 
 100  
“‘impious dogs,’” and “‘dens of thieves’” (“Creating a Paradox,” 642).  Most 
times, Cugoano extends his contrast between behavior, began in his personal 
narrative, and racist arguments that read physiognomic blackness as a sign for 
internal evil: “A good man will neither speak nor do as a bad man will; but if a 
man is bad, it makes no difference whether he be a black or a white devil” (12).  
Here he begins to dismantle the association between skin color and moral worth. 
He writes that it does not matter whether he was kidnapped by “black or white” 
men, since, again, it is the evil of the abduction that reflects character (12).  Some 
pages later, he asserts, “their external complexion, whether black or white, 
should be no excuse for them to do evil” (19).  If Wheeler claims that skin color 
was a less consolidated notion of race, then Cugoano’s frequent treatment of skin 
color and motifs of blackness or whiteness suggests otherwise.   
By and large, Cugoano transforms color into one of spiritually symbolic 
but earthly benign significance.  He asserts that only the Divine can understand 
internal moral worth since human variety derives in God and is wholly outside 
man’s power: “And God alone who established the course of nature, can bring 
about and establish what variety he pleases; and it is not in the power of man to 
make one hair white or black” (29).  Indeed, God, in his wisdom, generated the 
variety of skin color as spiritual guide, “intended to point out and shew to the 
white man, that there is a sinful blackness in his own nature, which he can no 
more change, than the external blackness which he sees in another can be 
rendered otherwise; and it likewise holds out to the black man.” When man 
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comes to face judgment at the end of his earthly existence, the outer shell of the 
flesh, or his “black or a white coat,” will be discarded, and all that will remain is 
his behavior (40-41).  Cugoano likewise rejects Long’s polygenesis thesis in favor 
of a Biblically coherent monogenesis:  
God who made the world, hath made of one blood all the nations of men 
that dwell on all the face of the earth.  Wherefore we may justly infer, as 
there are no inferior species, but all one blood and of one nature, that there 
does not an inferiority subsist, or depend, on their colour, features of 
form, whereby some men make a pretense to enslave others.           29 
Any differences in features or skin tone only incidentally reflect the natural 
variations resulting from “different climates” which also logically bespeak of 
God’s wisdom in adapting human bodies to best suit the requirements of their 
environments.   According to Cugoano, the divine hand in creation implicitly 
and incontestably means that no aspect of human variety can be evil in and of 
itself.   God’s hand in creation designs all the variety of nature to be “equally 
innocent” (40).    
In two beautifully rendered passages, Cugoano extends the motif of 
blackness from one of neutral symbolic significance, to a motif of innocence and 
equality, and then to a motif of wholeness, loveliness, and beauty like the 
rainbow: 
the external blackness of the Ethiopians, is as innocent and natural, as 
spots in the leopards; and that the difference of colour and complexion, 
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which it hath pleased God to appoint among men, are no more 
unbecoming unto either of them, than the different shades of the rainbow 
are unseemly to the whole, or unbecoming to any part of that apparent 
arch.                  40-41  
This passage works in tandem with an earlier allusion to a passage from the  
Book of Jeremiah regarding how “the Ethiopian can [neither] change his skin” 
nor “the leopard his spots,” which Cugoano interprets to mean that if God 
appointed black skin color to signify anything, it was as a form of divine but 
merely symbolic “instruction intended … to shew … that none among the fallen 
and apostate race of men, can by any effort of their own, change their nature 
from the blackness and guilt of the sable dye of sin and pollution” (39).  Cugoano 
builds ironic contrast between blackness of skin and blackness of soul.  He thus 
refigures the color black back into the realm of the symbolic, inverting and 
disrupting the tropes of racial difference that had been projected onto the figures 
and forms of people of color. Cugoano extends his point when he writes that “all 
men are like Ethiopians (even God’s elect) in a state of nature and unregeneracy, 
they are black with original sin, and spotted with actual transgression, which 
they cannot reverse” except, that is, “through the blood of Jesus” (40).  Man 
cannot be the savior of man; “God alone” brings “life and salvation, with light 
and gladness to men” (40).  Instead of trying to elevate the Ethiopian in the eyes 
of the oppressor, Cugoano ironically discovers human equality by occupying 
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God’s omniscient view of man; from this view, all men are sinners, therefore all 
men are equal.   
The treatment of the trope of black sin and black skin is contextually ironic 
and radical in several ways.  Most obviously, Cugoano’s performance of logical 
reasoning from a Christian perspective flies in the face of the racialist discourse 
that had fabricated the unintelligence, illogic, and heathenism of the black man.  
Cugoano uses his mode of reversal as just the first step toward showing how 
behavior is the true mark of sin and barbarity.  Tropes for slavery operate in two 
directions.  In one direction, advocates for slavery construct tropes of African 
inferiority.  Simultaneously, Europeans contend that their superiority places 
them in the position to civilize the African through a gentle form of governance. 
Turnbull claims that West-Indian “servitude, or slavery, as it is called, is of the 
very mildest kind” for the Negroes who “are not at all fitted to fill the superior 
stations, or more elevated ranks in civil society” (34-35).  His colonial pastoral 
fantasy draws on the language of sensibility in his illustration of the new West-
Indian slave’s “cheerful” reunion with “near and dear relations,” who dance, 
sing, and gratefully praise “the white men [who] are very good.”  In an almost 
sexualized image, Turnbull claims that the slave auction, or “day of sale,” is not 
an act of objectification but a welcome opportunity for the African to show off his 
physical assets:  the slaves “not only meet the planter’s looks [ . . . ] but they try, 
by offering their stout limbs to his inspection, jumping to shew their activity, and 
other allurements, to induce those, whose appearance pleases them, to buy them, 
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and to engage, if possible, a preference in their favour” (22-23).   This passage 
goes so far as to suggest that the slave seduces the master!  Turnbull’s 
sentimental, erotic, and pastoral imagery and his air of Christian superiority 
participate in a long tradition of colonial imagery that propagandized the New 
World as a New Eden.  Wrapped up in this colonial fantasy are multiple 
delusions of Christian benevolence.  The English saw redemptive possibilities for 
themselves, fashioned themselves as the planters of faith among Native 
Americans and Africans, and they erected these fictions to disconnect their 
colonial acts of violence from supposedly more brutal Spanish conquistadors, or 
the Black Legend.     
Cugoano challenges these fantasies and postures of superiority by 
describing his forced diaspora from Africa.  To his deep personal “shame,” 
Cugoano admits that some of kidnappers were “of [his] own complexion” (16).  
His mortification for the actions of his countrymen places guilt upon black and 
white slave traffickers alike.  This stance is rhetorically consistent with his 
argument about racial equality because he makes no moral exceptions for either 
black or white accomplices in slavery.  Although his mortification is genuine, 
Cugoano is also disrupting the racist binary between white/black, 
European/African by his rational and morally conscience stance.  His rationality 
and conscience strategically forces the English reader into an ethical bind.  The 
reader cannot maintain both African inferiority and his own superiority at the 
same time. If the African is morally inferior for his participation in slavery, then 
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so is the European.  If the European is morally superior, then partaking in the 
supposed cultural practices of an inferior people is inexcusable and degrading, 
thus degenerating his supposed superiority.  In assuming a degree of moral 
culpability, then, Cugoano highlights the sham of Christian justifications for 
slave trafficking.  Cugoano’s work here is not merely a reversal of racialist 
rhetoric because he is not preoccupied with simply shifting the status of white 
over black to black over white.  His work becomes deconstruction because he 
steps entirely outside the white-skin/black-skin dichotomy characteristic of 
racial-supremacist thinking by showing how behavior determines “brutishness,” 
not skin color; it is the European who lacks “probity,” or moral integrity and 
honesty, because of his multitudinous, “wicked” acts of violence (10).   
He has already described his childhood abduction, but he goes on to detail 
“the horrors” of the Middle Passage; the shame of the slave auction; and the 
nightmarish reality of plantation life rife with unremitting starvation, rampant 
sickness, familial separation, frequent sexual abuse, and “the most horrible … 
beatings and lashings” (15-16).  Slaves are not allotted land or animals, but they 
are treated like animals by “The bold and offensive enslavers of men, who 
subject their fellow-creatures to the rank of a brute, and the immolate value of a 
beast” (83).  Of the slave auction, he writes, “Here daughters are clinging to their 
mothers, and mothers to their daughters, bedewing each others naked breasts 
with tears; here fathers, mothers, and children, locked in each others arms, are 
begging never to be separated.” No dance, no music, no food, no joy—but there 
 106  
is “pleading,” “praying,” “entreating,” “weeping,” and “bemoaning,” to 
unyielding and “unfeeling masters” (74).  Cugoano draws on the same language 
of sensibility as Turnbull to paint a very different description of the African 
experience, full of many emotions, none of them pleasant, and all of them set 
against the backdrop of the uncompassionate actions of the European; behavior 
reveals “the darkest shades of nature” (40).  Lauren Henry, speaking of Phillis 
Wheatley, James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Ignatius Sancho, Olaudah 
Equiano, and Cugoano, proclaims, “In their poetry, narratives, letters, and 
essays, these individuals asked that the English reading public recognize them as 
living, thinking, and writing human beings” (68).  Henry recalls Henry Louis 
Gates Jr’s assertion that eighteenth-century Britain saw writing as the most 
“‘visible sign of reason’” and “‘genius’” (68).  The Afro-British authors felt it a 
moral imperative to use their literacy and artistry to deny “allegations … ‘of the 
childlike nature of slaves’” through displays of individual genius (68).  
Cugoano’s act of writing acts as protest by displaying all those characteristics 
denied by racist rhetoric, but it also displays a humanity and dignity of restraint, 
since he, unlike the slavers, chooses to engage in a public debate on slavery 
rather than their direct acts of violence.  
Wollstonecraft and Nonrecognition 
Wollstonecraft eschews questions of essentialism.  Readers unfamiliar 
with Rights of Woman might be surprised to discover how little space 
Wollstonecraft allots to describing the essential nature of woman or in point-by-
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point rebuffing specific misogynistic views.  Indeed, this seemingly missing 
content and seeming acquiescence was what an earlier generation of academic 
feminists bemoaned of the text some decades ago.  The noticeable absence of 
sustained definition of woman’s essential nature or in denying woman’s inferior 
social state is deliberate.  It is deliberate because, for this writer, gender is a social 
construction rather than an innate identity.  She perceives the sexist reliance on 
claims about the inferior nature of woman as a contrivance by which to enforce 
the sexual hierarchy; and it is the sexual hierarchy that manufactures and 
naturalizes gender difference.  Wollstonecraft poses many queries about female 
identity, but she poses these questions in surprising ways.  For example, the 
author does not ask, “what is woman?”  Rather, she implicitly asks, “What is it 
like to be a woman?” In other words, how does a female’s daily experience 
reflect her assigned social position and her restricted functions within it?  
Wollstonecraft does not wonder, “Are women inferior to men?”  Of course, they 
are!  “But how did they become this way and why?” she interrogates.  Her mode 
of interrogation establishes a new conversation about women that steps outside 
the “epithets of weakness,” what-is-woman question (73).  Instead, she aims to 
uncover the hidden agenda underlying essentialist arguments to expose the 
injurious consequences for dehumanized women, desensitized men, and the 
entire moral state of society.  But Wollstonecraft does not simply describe these 
problems as ambiguous outcry; she has a comprehensive social justice agenda in 
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which she defines human dignity, if only to show how social constructions 
blockade woman from achieving that dignity.  
But first, Wollstonecraft presents her own identity as exemplary of a 
woman the moral and civil conscience to which women can aspire; she also 
highlights her social position as an educator with critical insight based on direct 
experience.  In contrast to the writing persona chosen for A Vindication of the 
Rights of Men (1790), in which the reading public assumed male authorship, 
Wollstonecraft quite self-consciously, conspicuously, and immediately draws 
upon her identity as a woman and professional experience as an educator in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman.  She writes in the first-person throughout the 
text, calls women her “fellow-creatures,” and points to her intentions for 
advocacy when she writes, “I plead for my sex—not for myself” (71).  She evokes 
her professional educational experience, her reading-research, and her rational 
observations when she writes, “I have turned over various books written on the 
subject of education, and patiently observed the conduct of parents and the 
management of schools” (71).  Her immediate identification of herself as female 
means that she writes from the social position of a woman hampered by cultural 
prejudices, but she also points to her social positon as an educator to emphasize 
her professional expertise.  Her experiences as a woman and expertise as a 
teacher causes Wollstonecraft to lament the appalling condition of women as a 
symptom of many cultural and socioeconomic factors: “the neglected education 
of my fellow-creatures is the grand source of the misery I deplore; and that 
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women, in particular, are rendered weak and wretched by a variety of 
concurring causes” (71). Woman’s entire social milieu at every phase of life 
produces physical, mental, and moral disadvantages.  The author already locates 
woman’s disadvantages as rooted in false preconceptions about the nature of 
woman that have justified the cultural practices and socialization processes that 
manufacture “woman.”   
Wollstonecraft announces her intention to advocate reform to the 
processes affecting the development of her target audience of middle-class 
women, and she draws upon aspects of her own identity to appeal to that 
readership.  The first of these is her own authority as female professional.  In 
Susan Skedd’s chapter “Women Teachers and the Expansion of Girls’ Schooling 
in England c. 1760-1820,” she describes the new “commercial” “girls’ schools” as 
one of the great “innovations” of the eighteenth century that gave unprecedented 
numbers of primarily middle-class girls access to “public” education rather than 
the strictly “private” instruction of governesses hitherto afforded by families of 
greater social rank.  Skedd connects the rise of “public education” for girls with 
the related rise in teaching as a female profession: “Not only did the commercial 
schools provide a public education for girls, they also brought a new source of 
employment to women, in a profession that was far from private in character.  
Teaching was a common occupation for women in Hanoverian England and 
running a school offered them a chance to manage their own businesses and the 
prospect of independence” (101-102).  The author’s work as governess to a 
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wealthy family and schoolmistress of her own school was within a growing 
professional sphere tolerated for single and married women of middling class.  
However, Wollstonecraft’s many biographers alongside Skedd have 
comprehensively considered the author’s troubled outlook regarding her 
miserable time as governess and precarious self-employment as headmistress of 
her own public school in Beverley, a venture that eventually “failed to find 
enough pupils to make the school viable” (111).  While a growing line of work, 
teaching was nevertheless financially risky and far more uncommon in the 1790s 
than it was by the 1810s, as Skedd’s data reveals (105).  Professional teaching was 
still a nascent career for women and one that offered Wollstonecraft some 
distinction. 
The author emphasizes her professional qualifications, perhaps 
exaggerates her pedagogical research, and especially highlights her methodical 
investigations on the effects of parental and instructorial interactions with 
children.  Having been both governess to the wealthy and instructor to middle 
class students, Wollstonecraft did indeed witness the socialization of children 
across social ranks; as a woman, she has indisputable insight regarding the daily 
tasks, routines, and habits of women at all stages of life.  Access to the 
“minutiae” of feminine existence would have fallen outside the realm of 
expertise for the male author due to the formalities of decorum during this 
period (162).  I assert that she is yoking her feminine identity and professional 
skills to transform her otherwise oppressed social position into one steeped with 
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special insight.  Foremost, her emphasis on reading, observing, and reflecting 
appeals to an eighteenth-century model of cognitive development, as seen in my 
reading of Smith, in which a constant back-and-forth interaction between the 
social environment and internal reflection is the hallmark of human 
consciousness that can lead to an empathic, humane rational conscience.  
Wollstonecraft thus already suggests how woman’s characteristically weak sense 
of internal identity and related ineptitude in rational operations can be altered to 
strengthen the female character.  Wollstonecraft’s entreaty on behalf of her sex 
reinforces my interpretation here.  In Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, human 
rationality has a social purpose.  He couples the cultivation of a strong internal 
sense-of-self with a strong sense of empathy for humanity.  In this manner, self-
interest and social-improvement counterbalance each other for the benefit of the 
individual and society.  When Wollstonecraft writes, “I plead for my sex—not for 
myself,” she presents her feminine, professional, reformist, and authorial identity 
as morally and empathically motivated by “the love of mankind” and “the moral 
and civil interest of mankind” (71, 66).  She constructs a morally conscience 
writing persona to demonstrate to her audiences the moral capacity of woman 
and to suggest, by example, how the improvement of woman could contribute to 
the overall improvement of society.  
Unfortunately, women’s lives and identities are determined by the male 
authorities that surround them; and misogyny is the undeniable, “prevailing 
prejudice” of those male authorities that govern females: “women are not 
 112  
allowed to have sufficient strength of mind to acquire what really deserves the 
name of virtue,” namely “rationality” (108, 84, 102).  Eighteenth-century, British 
culture, built on one key hierarchy of male over female, assumes female 
inferiority of bodily strength as an outward symbol of her inferior mind.  It 
subsequently raises girls into women in ways exactly counter to the development 
of her reason and internal self-worth whilst also disesteeming her social roles.  
For Wollstonecraft, the cultivation of internal identity, moral character, and 
social agency is nearly impossible since women are unacknowledged as fully 
human in the first place.  The nonrecognition of woman’s full humanity first 
comes from inherited cultural prejudice, then socialization and acculturation 
processes habitually and persistently defraud woman from any chance “to 
cultivate her dormant faculties,” which are those very same faculties of reason, 
imagination, empathy, and modesty, that could prove misogynistic notions 
about women to be false (93).   
Wollstonecraft primarily assesses woman’s character as an externally 
assigned social position in contrast to the “specious reasoners” below who 
mystifyingly demand whilst hypocritically loathing woman’s supposedly, 
naturally “submissive demeanor of dependence” (99).  Even in literature 
professing interest in “the education of women,” women “are still reckoned a 
frivolous sex, and ridiculed or pitied by the writers who endeavour by satire or 
instruction to improve them” (74).  Wollstonecraft implicates diverse, 
authoritative, and prominent texts for the perpetuation of misogynistic views of 
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women as “weak,” “capricious,” “frivolous,” “rak[ish],” and “deceitful” (80, 113, 
129, 193, 97).  Some of these texts include John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667), John 
Dryden’s The State of Innocence: and Fall of Man (1677), Alexander Pope’s Of the 
Characters of Women: An Epistle to a Lady (1735), Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, or, 
the History of a Young Lady (1748), Dr. John Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to His 
Daughters (1761), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile, or On Education (1762), and 
James Fordyce’s Sermons to Young Women (1766).  Wollstonecraft reads in each of 
these authors an inherited sexual prejudice: 
Probably the prevailing opinion, that woman was created for man, may 
have taken its rise from Moses’s poetical story . . . or, only be so far 
admitted as it proves that man, from the remotest antiquity, found it 
convenient to exert his strength to subjugate his companion, and his 
invention to shew that she ought to have her neck bent under the yoke, 
because the whole creation was only created for his convenience or 
pleasure.                  92                                                                                     
Wollstonecraft sardonically articulates the sexual double standard pervasive in 
her culture built on the biased, perhaps wholly fabricated, belief that God 
mandated woman to be the subservient comfort of man.  The author’s words, 
“convenience or pleasure,” reveal a perceptible disgust aimed at the corrupt 
sexual motives behind man’s scriptural interpretation.  Ironically, considering 
their claim to “the greater portion” of reason, men have in fact relied on brute 
physical strength to reduce woman to a social status more akin to the animal 
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than fellow human and “helpmate” (83, 162).  They have wielded writing of 
diverse genres for the same purpose.   
Routine physical and cultural acts of violence have supported masculine 
sexual prerogative for centuries.  Writing may be less obviously violent, but its 
influence on culture carries direct consequences for women.  The nonrecognition 
of women, for instance, manifests itself when women are everywhere “ridiculed” 
and “mocked” as “the objects of pity” and “the objects of contempt (74, 102, 73).  
Wollstonecraft implicates these texts for levelling “sarcasms” at women’s 
capacities, characters, and achievements (193).  She finds the mocking of female 
achievement particularly disturbing since women have been denigrated for 
pursuing and attaining the only forms of knowledge made available to them.  
Constant ridicule under the veneer of advice sinisterly demoralizes women’s 
impetuses to improve themselves.  Cultural prejudice underscored by literary 
texts from poetry to sermons to educational treatises mutually reinforce one 
another and subsequently inform how girls are raised, thus abetting the 
normalization of daily acts of disrespect and abuse toward women. 
Such misguided cultural representations encourage the continued 
degradation of women by discouraging social reforms necessary to counteract 
the disadvantages against which many women struggle.  Most fundamentally, 
the writers above perpetuate preconceived prejudices that relegate women to 
social functions little better than other “domestic brutes,” “principally created for 
the use of m
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“pleasing at the expence of every solid virtue” (87).  Misogyny thus infiltrates 
every social setting, every relationship, and deliberately damages the 
development of females from their earliest years to make women docile, pleasing 
creatures.  Fathers rule homes like tyrants: “the weak king to the weak father of a 
family; they are all eager to crush reason; yet always assert that they usurp its 
throne only to be useful” (67).  Within the intimacy of the home and by 
exploiting the natural dependency of the child, fathers demand the 
unquestioning obedience of wives, children, and servants but always demand 
more restraint and compliance from daughters: “The child is not left a moment to 
its own direction, particularly a girl, and thus rendered dependent— dependence 
is called natural” (109).  The education of girls incites their fear and demands 
their constant restraint to condition her obeisance; these adapted, learned 
behaviors only appear “natural” since the habituation process begins at such an 
early age.  
For example, parents force the girl “to sit still for hours” to suppress her 
natural inclination for “exercise;” parents guide the girl to quietly pursue vain 
entertainments, like “dressing” and “dolls,” instead of independently exploring 
the outdoors or voicing her curiosities about the world.  Independent rambles 
and encouraged curiosity would activate her faculty of reason and “unfold her 
imagination” (109).  But girls are forbidden to exercise their minds and their 
bodies.  The distinct dissimilarities between girls’ and boys’ upbringings exposes 
to Wollstonecraft the deliberately calculated processes by which women are 
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weakened and alienated from their otherwise innate capacities.  For this author, 
the rearing of young women already coincides with Rousseau’s advised 
educational model in Emile, in which he recommends parents, in the best interest 
of their daughters, prepare girls for their subservient social role by forbidding 
“liberty,” demanding her “’habitual restraint,’” and instilling her “‘fears’” (156).  
By suppressing both her physical and mental strengths and producing constant 
apprehension, the socialization process produces female “docility, which fear 
stamps on the behaviour” (156).  Fear also manufactures fragility: “Fragile in 
every sense of the word, [women] are obliged to look up to man for every 
comfort” (132).  Wollstonecraft writes, “These fears … shew a degree of 
imbecility which degrades a rational creature in a way women are not aware of” 
(132).  Parents and educators inculcate a girls’ mistrust of herself, apprehension 
of the larger world around her, and outright terror of the male authority figures 
who will govern her from birth until death; all of this begins in “infancy,” prior 
to the child’s earliest inclinations toward independent, rational thought, and long 
before the girl can form any awareness of the violation imposed upon her (84).  
Wollstonecraft articulates how the gender hierarchy translates into day-to-
day circumstances for women.  Fittingly for a treatise on education, the author 
focuses much of her attention on the education and upbringing of daughters.  
Virginia Sapiro reminds scholars of this text that “education” in this period 
carries the broader meaning of upbringing and socialization in addition to 
schooling (238).  Indeed, Wollstonecraft adheres to Adam Smith’s model of 
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cognitive development expressed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which 
theorizes about education proper and the entire process of socialization from 
infancy to adulthood.  No critic has acknowledged Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
extended application of Adam Smith’s Theory, but she engages Smith’s 
descriptive theory in her contrasts between boys’ and girls’ upbringings 
throughout the text.  Smith’s work has been increasingly accepted as an early 
example of cognitive-psychological theory since he describes morality through 
the methods by which inherently social human animals come to measure the 
propriety of their own and others’ actions within social contexts.  When 
Wollstonecraft refers to the innate faculties of passion, reason, and imagination, 
for example, she applies specifically Smithian terminology for innate mental 
structures which help man organize his world and experiences in it.  The two 
broad structures of the human mind in Smith’s eighteenth-century phrasing are 
the passions and reason, terms already familiar to eighteenth-century readers.   
However, Smith converts the passion-reason opposition into an 
interactive dialectic; passions are natural motives that function in dynamic, back-
and-forth interplay with reason.  Smith divides the passions into two main 
categories.  First, the passions of the body include “hunger,” sex, and the 
avoidance of “bodily pain;” second, the passions of the “imagination,” which he 
further categorizes as either “unsocial passions” or “social passions.”  Unsocial 
passions include “hope,” “fear,” “grief,” “anger,” and “resentment” since they 
reflect the subject’s internal concerns for himself.  Social passions include “love,” 
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“Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem, all 
the social and benevolent affections” that moves man away from pure self-
interest and toward a concern for his fellow man (Smith 56).   
The different categories of passions are not in opposition; both are equally 
necessary and simply represent different sets of human motives (59).  Smith 
writes of the self-preserving value of the unsocial passions: “These passions, 
however, are regarded as necessary parts of the character of human nature.  A 
person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still and submits to insults, 
without attempting either to repel or to revenge them” (49).  Thus, the “unsocial” 
passions spur an individual’s self-preservation and become a “utility to the 
public” when applied to causes for “justice and the equality of its 
administration” (49).  By contrast, Smith considers social passions to be the 
foundation of “mutual sympathy,” or empathy, and love—emotions necessary 
for genuine human connection: “the chief part of human happiness arises from 
the consciousness of being loved” (62).  Although no passion or “appetite” lacks 
“propriety,” he nevertheless holds the social passions as the most sacred and 
socially stabilizing.  For Smith, the innate desire for human connection and love 
motivates social formation and social cooperation.  
What truly separates man from brute is man’s higher-level cognitions of 
“judgment” and “self-command” that motivate man to develop a balance 
between his personal desires and his concern for others.  Self-command is the 
first step toward moral conscience:  individuals must be “well inured to the hard 
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discipline of self-command” to accustom themselves to the “restraint” required 
by society (146).  Restraint initially displays as proper “Conduct,” which is 
typically motivated by the unsocial passions of fear and self-preservation: “A 
very young child has no self-command; but, whatever are its emotions, whether 
fear, or grief, or anger, it endeavors always, by the violence of its outcries, to 
alarm, as much as it can, the attention of its nurse, or of its parents” (145).  Only 
when caregivers “are … obliged to frighten it” does the child learn, out of a sense 
of “its own safety” to restrain “the passion which incites it” (145).   For man to 
achieve human dignity, fear-driven compliance must transition into an 
internalized “sense of duty” motivated by the social passions, or the desire to 
win the approval, love, and sympathy of others:   
When it is old enough to go to school, or to mix with its equals, … It 
 naturally wishes to gain their favour, and to avoid their hatred or 
 contempt … and it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than by 
 moderating, not only its anger, but all its other passions, to the degree 
 which its play-fellows and companions are likely to be pleased with 
                              145-146 
The child first moderates his behavior out of the unsocial motive of fear and then 
later out of the social motive to win the approval and esteem of his peers.  Smith 
describes here a shift in consciousness in which the subject’s earliest motives are 
the unsocial passions of self-preservation which eventually give way to the more 
precious motives of the social passions through the expansion of the social 
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matrix and varied human interactions.  Mere behavioral compliance, therefore, 
does not define human dignity.  Dignity arises when the mature mind can 
negotiate between his personal desires, the dictates of society, and the relative, 
moral merit between those competing demands.  Smith famously calls the 
achievement of this process the “impartial spectator.” 
  Imagination, which Smith views as a form of reason, is the building block 
of the “impartial spectator.” The impartial spectator is, again, a dialectical 
concept that measures the propriety of our own actions and the actions of other 
men. To judge others, the subject imagines himself “in like situation;” this is 
empathy.  To judge oneself, the impartial spectator helps man push aside his 
immediate appetites to judge the propriety of those appetites from the imagined 
perspective of an outside observer: “We endeavor to examine our own conduct 
as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” (110).  
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is a distinct, higher-level cognitive 
process by which we judge the appropriateness of “our own conduct” via an 
imagined, idealized self in observance with the most noble, “sacred rules” of 
society (138).  The development of the impartial spectator and the mental ability 
to negotiate between “self-love” and the “sacred rules” of society defines human 
dignity.  Human dignity is not tantamount to utter selflessness and self-sacrifice.  
Rather, human dignity rests in the cultivation of a moral conscience that can 
measure the merits of self-interest against cultural ethics.  This capacity, in turn, 
allows the subject to choose which interest is most appropriately attended to and 
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by which most ethical course of action.  Human dignity thus rests in the 
individual’s moral choice.  Sometimes his own self-preservation overrides social 
dictates; sometimes societal needs require a degree of self-sacrifice. In either case, 
the morally dignified person’s actions stem from his internal ethics and 
reflection, not from instinctive fear or lack of options.  
Wollstonecraft argues that Rousseau’s educational advice for girls closely 
resembles how they are already raised.  But with Smith’s articulation of human 
dignity in mind, Rousseau’s educational model is exactly the correct formula for 
supplanting the human dignity of women since it is founded on fear.  Therefore, 
he is exactly wrong to subscribe to the worst views of woman as man’s 
designated play-thing and, even worse, to disseminate the means by which to 
dehumanize her.  His educational model obstructs the development of the 
female’s faculties of reason, imagination, moral conscience, and human agency to 
enact her own ethical choices in the world.  Thus, Wollstonecraft holds him up as 
both brilliant and depraved, as the quintessential example of male depravity 
ruling society rather than rationality.  He is a “sensualist” and a “libertine,” 
whose intellectual gifts and “talents” have been “bent by power to sinister 
purposes” (90, 74, 80).  The root of his debauchery is as it is for most men, their 
absolute power over women.  
“Absolute power,” just like absolute oppression, “degrade the human 
character” by removing the necessity to reason.  The interplay between the 
young person’s desires and the moral limits imposed upon him by the social 
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environment stimulate the mental faculty of reason by compelling him to restrain 
his instinctive, self-centered passions to earn the approbation of his peers and 
loved ones.  Absolute power removes from the human experience those moral 
limitations since the powerful are never told “no;” accustomed to having all their 
desires, whims, and caprices unquestionably fulfilled, no circumstance arises to 
spark the faculty of reason or its resulting empathy.  Even as men negotiate 
professional relationships through the exercise of reason, men of all ranks also 
occupy a positon of unmitigated power over women of the same or lower rank.  
Like Rousseau, men who may otherwise display rationality and empathy when 
in the company of their peers and equals, suspend those faculties in their 
relationships with women.  Thus, Rousseau represents the worst symptoms of 
the “unnatural” gender hierarchy that allows the “vice” of unrestrained (sexual) 
appetite to “reign” which, in turn, occludes the possibility of genuine love, 
empathy, and friendship between the sexes (94).   
By contrast, woman’s upbringing is one of a different extreme—absolute 
tyranny.  She is forbidden exercise, confined from the world, and disallowed 
curiosity or inquiry.  Whereas the young man must, at least semi-independently, 
negotiate peer, parental, and professional relationships in his wider world of 
daily experience, the young woman is constantly kept indoors, in sight, and 
“governed by fear” (91).  Continual surveillance coupled with constant fear 
obstruct the spark of reason in females since they are given no opportunity for 
self-reliance or internal reflection.  Both unlimited indulgence and complete 
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constraint extinguish the rational faculty because the child never has occasion to 
learn self-command.  The unrestrained tyrant functions at the animal level by 
succumbing to all “his sensual appetites” of the unsocial passions.  Meanwhile, 
the woman subjugated by fear lives in that perpetual “childish” state of “mind,” 
in which she restrains her conduct for reasons of self-preservation but rarely 
through a genuine moral conscience or as a “moral agent” (211, 104).  Young 
women are automatons rather than autonomous subjects: “If they be not allowed 
to have reason sufficient to govern their own conduct— why, all they learn— 
must be learned by rote!” (193).  The height of feminine achievement, other than 
her physical beauty, is “rote” recitation; the young woman rather functions on 
“rote” herself, always repeating in her own mind the directives of authority 
without opportunity to measure the moral worth of her actions internally.  
Without reason, or the rational capacity to make independent, moral decisions, 
women are left “groping in the dark” (67).   
Wollstonecraft demonstrates the self-fulfilling prophecy of misogyny in 
terms closely echoing Opotow’s definitions of moral exclusion.  First, moral 
exclusion occurs when groups “are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or 
undeserving” (Opotow 1).  Men morally exclude women as “nonentities” 
through the gender hierarchy predicated on false notions of female inferiority; 
men view women as “underserving” of genuine respect, as public ridicule, 
mockery, and contempt reveal; men also view women as expendable, as every 
feature of their upbringings renders women weak, feeble, fragile, docile, and 
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disposable.  Once perceived as underserving of respect, the harm excluded 
groups suffer becomes normalized.  For women, the inequitable aspects of their 
educations appear to be, from the misogynist viewpoint, perfectly “acceptable” 
in accordance with her innately inferior capacities as well as perfectly” 
appropriate” to the demands of her social roles (Opotow 1).  It is through the 
theme of expendability, however, that Rights of Woman perhaps most severely 
demonstrates the deleterious consequences of moral exclusion that places 
women “outside the boundary in which … considerations of fairness apply” (1). 
Wollstonecraft explores expendability in her discussion of the discarded, fallen 
woman, easily victimized by the sexual double standard that unfairly stacks the 
decks against women and which begins to do so from their earliest 
developmental years.   
Unsurprisingly, debilitating aspects of women’s educations make them 
easy targets for seduction and sexual exploitation.   Obedience and deference are 
the prized behaviors for women just as they are the prized behaviors for all 
inferior groups: “blind obedience is ever sought for by power, tyrants and 
sensualists are in the right when they endeavour to keep women in the dark, 
because the former only want slaves, and the latter a play-thing” (90).  Men want 
women who “are rendered weak and wretched,” whose “strength and 
usefulness are sacrificed to beauty,” whose “minds … are enfeebled,” and who 
are “so much degraded” that they can be easily “disregarded” as human beings, 
as wives and mothers without vital social roles to fulfill, and as non-citizens 
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without concerns for the moral progress of society (71-75).  Wollstonecraft 
ascertains a connection between woman’s socialization into docility and her 
dictated social role as man’s pleasurable “play-thing.”  A theme of sexual 
corruption preoccupies Rights of Woman, such as in the author’s frequent 
references to sensuality and libertinism:  a woman’s “body and mind are 
sacrificed to libertine notions of beauty, to the desire of establishing 
themselves,— the only way women can rise in the world,— by marriage. And 
this desire making mere animals of them” (74).  From infancy, women are 
disciplined through physical and mental confinement against exercising reason 
while they are rewarded for dressing their dolls and, later, their own persons.  
Parents thus encourage females to cultivate only “corporeal accomplishments” 
and “personal charms” (88).  Physical beauty, gentleness, silliness, innocence, 
and a “reputation of chastity” are the requirements for wives, the only respected 
social role allowed women (216). The cultural norms that regulate women’s 
upbringings raises them to be preoccupied with own bodies, ignorant of human 
sexual relations, and inculcated with a desire to please men.  Their mental 
debilitation coupled with physically dissipation is perfectly calculated to make 
them erotically pliable, “unfortunate victims” (222).   
The sexual double standard that valorizes female chastity without the 
same norm for men heightens masculine pleasure in the chase and conquer of 
sexually ignorant women: “Unnatural distinctions regarding sexuality … put 
women in grave danger, not of ‘falling,’ but of being ‘pushed’” (Sapiro 133).  
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Men establish the stakes in a “war between” the sexes wholly in their favor, 
acculturating women to be easily “duped by their lovers,” and then ostracizing 
them from society (Wollstonecraft 90).  As Sapiro sums up: “If she is unchaste, or 
even seems to be, she is excluded from respectable society and is condemned 
forever to trade on her body” (133).  Sapiro’s use of the word “excluded” is 
telling here even if her concentration is not explicitly on social injustice as 
exclusion.  For Wollstonecraft, as in Smith, sexuality is a neutral, necessary, and 
acceptably enjoyable appetite.  However, injustice as exclusion becomes 
downright perverse when it manifests specifically as sexual injustice as exclusion.  
Wollstonecraft identifies many forms of rape like sexual assault, men’s “brutal 
indulgences” (196); mental rape, when males rob women of their own 
“intellects” (83); and emotional rape, when men purposefully attack the 
personalities and characters of women.  Mary Wollstonecraft comprehends how 
nonrecognition of women as the worthy recipients of fair and moral treatment 
(moral exclusion) allows the unnatural distortion of sexuality into a vehicle by 
which to control women through “abuse” and terror (219).   
No one grasps this more than the fallen woman: “Necessity never makes 
prostitution the business of men’s lives; though numberless are the women who 
are thus rendered systematically vicious” (143).  Fallen women are not just 
rendered abstractly invisible as voiceless and abandoned women surviving on 
the margins of society.  Ostracized from the society of their friends and families, 
they are literally made invisible to their former connections and support systems 
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who will no longer see or help them for shame.  Blockaded from redemption for 
their “folly,” they are rendered utterly invisible through death from disease and 
starvation (but not before continued sexual exploitation), or what Wollstonecraft 
refers to as the “fatal” consequences of poverty-stricken “prostitution” (143, 219). 
Oxymoronic “numberless” perfectly mirrors the nonrecognition of the untold 
multitude of fallen “victims” (219).  Nonrecognition, passed down as inherited 
prejudices about women manifests as very real and deadly consequences for 
women.   
Ruinous prostitution might appear to be an extreme, even sensational, 
example of woman’s debased social position, but for Wollstonecraft there is scant 
divide between the disreputable prostitute and the young lady “legally 
prostituted” on the marriage market (130).   Both roles, prostitute or wife, reduce 
woman to her lowest “corporeal” “utility” to men (152, 119).  Complete 
dependency on her husband for day-to-day “subsistence” coupled with an 
obligatory “obedience required of women in the marriage state” means women 
in either province of existence trade the “pleasure” of their bodies and 
reproductive labor for their bread (142, 143).  The sacredness of marriage, 
wifehood, and motherhood is counterfeit given the actual behavior of “faithless 
husbands” (68).  In short, even the seemingly socially “respected” status of wife 
exposes women to the “‘injustice’” of being required “‘to bear the insults of a 
husband without complaint’” (156).  Woman’s lack of dignified identity and 
social agency makes her a perpetual victim even to her husband.  She is a victim 
 128  
even here because she “tamely sits still and submits to insults” in exactly the 
manner that Smith calls “contemptible” for failing to preserve oneself by first 
apprehending the immoral actions of others upon oneself (Smith 49). 
It is crucial to acknowledge Wollstonecraft’s complex understanding of 
identity as a concept intertwined with culture and acculturation.  Identity is 
partly the internal sense-of-self, partly how one functions in the world, and 
partly one’s social role as perceived by the culture at large.  In other words, she 
apprehends how identity is “handed down from above,” and her analysis of 
women’s educations and social roles seeks to “denaturalize” the identity 
category of woman to demonstrate how women are made, not born as such.  
If women have little strength of character or senses-of-self founded on moral 
consciences, then this is because nearly every aspect of their upbringings, the 
requirements of their social roles and functions, and even the representations 
they receive of themselves from misogynistic literary authorities impede the 
development of the crucial ingredient of the moral conscience, reason. They are 
restricted from making autonomous moral choices as well as restricted from the 
human agency to extend those moral decisions into independently-driven 
actions in the world, either in the domestic sphere of the home or the larger 
world of public and professional spheres outside of the home.  Finally, 
Wollstonecraft turns her attention to assess woman’s identity through her 
common social roles as either wife or prostitute.  While the title of wife acquires 
social respect and the designation of prostitute garners disrepute, the author 
 129  
ultimately finds both roles equally disturbing for similarly defining women by 
their corporeal “utility” to men (119).  Woman’s assigned social roles are bleak 
ones.  But the author’s purpose is not a reiteration of the negative valuation 
placed on the identity of woman.  Rather, she engages a sustained deconstruction 
of the social processes by which men “render,” “degrade,” “weaken,” and 
“discard” women to fabricate sexual difference through exclusionary injustice 
through nonrecognition (72, 124, 279, 262).  In showing the ways culture (or the 
male arbiters of it) constructs female identity, she attempts to dismantle the very 
category of woman itself.   
  An element of dark, situational irony constantly informs Rights of Woman.  
Dismantling the construct of woman also exposes the construct of man, which 
Wollstonecraft also interrogates throughout the text.  Man’s self-empowering 
claim to superiority in fact conceals his debauched motives; from his positon of 
power, man organizes society in ways conducive to the spread of dissipation 
rather than the moral progress of civilization.  The sexual hierarchy, intended to 
degrade women and empower men, has been applied to such remarkable effect 
that men have in fact succeeded in degrading themselves.  Sexual difference, as a 
cultural construct, is anything but benign. When Wollstonecraft famously 
“throw[s] down her gauntlet,” she challenges men to recognize women’s duties, 
(in this context as mothers, teachers, household managers) as ungendered 
“human duties” (119).  She raises the status of those roles into “respectable,” 
principled, and empathically-guided social virtues (119).  In other words, she 
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refigures women’s roles, that men have based solely on bodily (even carnal) 
“utility,” into professional occupations that require the cultivation of reason, 
“understanding,” and the virtue of a “common sympathy” for “the moral and 
civil interest of mankind” (119, 217, 66). 
But, she also challenges the male reader to do the same for himself—to 
apply a measure of his moral conscience, supposing he has one, in sustained 
impartial reflection upon his own virtue and fallen state.  The notion of reflection 
is especially significant for Wollstonecraft not just as a secular concept for human 
cognition but also as a spiritual, meditative practice.  Rights of Woman asks men 
to contemplate the nature of God against their own natures and what they have 
made of women.  In other words, she extends her dismantling of gender 
distinctions into a dismantling of another, reciprocally supportive concept by 
which misogynistic culture elaborates hierarchal difference, in this case through 
a misguided conception of the Divine.  Just as men have made themselves deities 
to women, so they hold God up as a violent manifestation of “omnipotent” 
supremacy: “[man’s] reason is clouded by these crude opinions, even when he 
thinks of the Deity.— His omnipotence is made to swallow up, or preside over 
his other attributes” (113).  Man’s ultimate self-conceit is his irreverent concept of 
God that emphasizes divine power over divine reason.   
Man’s stubborn and steadfast prejudices in social hierarchies have 
grotesquely distorted his understanding of the divine.  Man worships God’s 
“power; he adores a dark cloud, which may open a bright prospect to him, or 
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burst in angry, lawless fury, on his devoted head— he knows not why” (114).  In 
this stunning passage, Wollstonecraft articulates how God has become to man 
what man has become to woman; like the unpredictable, tyrannous husband or 
father, His is an arbitrary, capricious, demanding, and impulsive nature.  
Wollstonecraft deconstructs man’s notion of God to poignantly reconfigure God 
into a rational entity.  She argues, “The only solid foundation for morality 
appears to be the character of the supreme Being; the harmony of which arises 
from a balance of attributes.”  Appropriately, her reconfigured model of the 
Divinity poises justness and wisdom, omnipotence and goodness (113).  If men 
be reasonable enough to genuinely, “humbly” embrace their own social duties to 
humankind, then they must shed their “deeply rooted prejudices,” revise their 
“image of God,” and exert their moral consciences to the cultivation of greater 
justness, wisdom, and goodness in themselves (114, 76, 133).  Part of her 
challenge to men resides in her concept of God:  a “just conception of the 
character of God” would “impose” upon men “wholesome restraints” (114).  By 
“wholesome restraints” she means those social passions moderated by reason 
that dignify man; man’s cultivation of those attributes that truly merit the name 
of virtue would reform the entire social fabric through human empathy, equality 
in friendship, and moral social cooperation. In looking to a corrected model of 
the divine, Wollstonecraft seeks to symbolically transform the entire social 
pattern upon which the identity of both sexes is conceived.  
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Godwin’s Caleb Williams and Disrespect 
If a phrase from Rights of Woman haunts Godwin’s Things as They Are,  
then that phrase is “warps the understanding.”  While I focus on Wollstonecraft’s 
interrogation of engendering through socialization and the sexual hierarchy for 
their effects on identity, Rights of Woman in fact interrogates repeated patterns of 
social hierarchies across an array of settings, as, perhaps, her examination of the 
conception of God suggests.  As with gender and the family, she ascertains a 
repeated pattern of dehumanization across the hierarchies of government, 
notably due to “the divine right of kings” (108); social rank, from the aristocracy, 
to the middle class, to “the most menial servant” (259); the military, the men of 
which “can never” be “resolute” or “robust” since they are “well disciplined 
machines” who lack “vigorous faculties” and “any depth of understanding” (89); 
and religious organization, in a particularly literary passage that reads how 
professional station inscribes upon the physiognomies of “the servile dependent 
gait of the poor curate and the courtly mien of a bishop.”  In each of these 
examples, “subordination” “cramps … the faculties,” and “warps the 
understanding, till men of sensibility doubt whether the expansion of intellect 
produces a greater portion of happiness or misery” (82-83).  Wollstonecraft 
analyzes the ascribed status of social positions, the relative regard or disregard 
those positions receive in culture, the moral-social ethics of gradations of respect; 
and how those ascriptions affect identity by influencing the behavior received by 
others and affecting the subject’s opportunity to cultivate his human dignity 
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from within.  She applies and adapts Smith in her work to define human dignity 
in a new way that breaks with a traditional notion of dignity as the entitled 
deference belonging to status.  She enlarges the notion of dignity to include 
humankind “collectively,” removes it from external trappings of rank and 
embodiment, resituates it internally, and expands it spiritually.   
I invoke Wollstonecraft for two reasons.  First, just as in Wollstonecraft 
scholarship, scholars of Caleb Williams question how the novel interrogates the 
relationship between social environment and human subjectivity.  For example, 
Gary Kelly forwards Godwin’s intention to craft a novel that exposes social and 
political corruption, demonstrates the power dynamics and inevitable 
oppression of hierarchal social arrangements, and expresses the fear and pain of 
persecution for the oppressed individual within that corrupt social framework.  
Kelly’s reading, however, concentrates on Caleb Williams as historical allegory 
and critique of Edmund Burke’s politically conservative, anti-revolutionary 
pamphlet, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).  Although Kelly 
acknowledges Godwin’s concerns about the corrosive effects of social corruption 
on humanity, he does not explicate the titular protagonist’s subjective experience 
of corruption in any sustained manner.  He briefly claims that the allegorical 
significance of Caleb’s Welsh surname carries with it a “Cambrian race” 
stereotype of “impetuosity,” which in turn evokes the impulsivity of French 
revolutionaries and British reformers alike (The English Jacobin Novel 205).  A bit 
later, Kelly acknowledges the “complex emotional relationship between Caleb 
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and Falkland,” but reads the “vocabulary” through which the author expresses 
Caleb’s “feelings” as a linguistic limitation of the author who could only draw on 
his own Calvinistic “feelings toward God” (208).  I think Kelly misses an 
opportunity here.  He misses the opportunity to inquire about the connection 
between language and theme.  Caleb venerates Falkland; Falkland envisions 
himself Godlike. He proclaims as much by way of warning to Caleb: “You might 
as well think of escaping from the reach of the omnipresent God, as from mine! 
(140).  Recollecting Wollstonecraft’s analogous deconstructions of the characters 
of men and their mistaken conception of God, I suggest Godwin intentionally 
evokes a culturally flexible language of reverence applicable across different 
forms of social hierarchies as part of his social critique.   
Caleb and Falkland are not flat allegorical symbols.  Both certainly 
symbolize a social station, with Caleb of the peasantry and Falkland of the 
gentry; but both figures are dynamic, complex characters who Godwin imagines 
as individuals with struggles of conscience and agency.  The author manipulates 
audience expectation and character stereotype to question cultural assumptions 
correlating social class to moral capacity.  Through Ferdinando Falkland, the 
author interrogates paternalistic prejudice about the superior faculties of persons 
of higher rank.  Falkland clings to the forms of ceremony, reputation, and the 
performance of his role as country squire.  However, he is the furtive murderer 
of three people—the churlish neighboring squire, Barnabas Tyrrel, and the 
estimable, piteous tenant farmers, father and son Hawkins, who he allows to be 
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wrongfully accused and executed for Tyrrel’s murder.  Despite occupying a 
dignified social station, he is morally defective.  He clings to the “ceremonials of 
[his] station,” but his status is “a ceremonial veil” concealing degeneracy 
(Wollstonecraft 81, 221).  Falkland cannot balance human fellowship against self-
interest.   
Through Caleb, the author interrogates a corresponding prejudice against 
the lower orders in the form of exclusionary injustice as disrespect by 
confronting his eighteenth-century reader’s presumed prejudice of moral 
exclusion bound to the servant stock character.  Caleb defies the stereotype of the 
stock servant character by being dynamic, psychologically complex, morally 
right, and, therefore, undeservedly but “routinely maligned [and] disparaged.” 
Godwin’s work through Caleb functions on two levels.  First, his fiction imitates 
“everyday life interactions” by presenting the constant threats to the aspirations 
and moral identity in the lives of humble people (Fraser 7).  Relentless 
oppression and abuses of authority threaten to “warp” Caleb’s moral identity, 
but Godwin does not morally exclude Caleb as a subject even as the prejudicial 
social actors of his imagined social matrix do.  Caleb Williams thus also challenges 
how literature influences society through representation, how disrespectful 
stereotype emboldens readers to abuse their humble “neighbors” (McGirr 3).  
Mr. Collins acts as key to understanding Godwin’s departure from stereotype 
since Collins, fellow servant of Caleb within the Falkland household, clings to his 
ingrained paternalistic prejudice that places greater human and moral value on 
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his betters rather than his equals.  Collins exhibits considerable fellowship and 
sympathy with Caleb. He is neither unsympathetic nor iniquitous, but, he 
ultimately fails his friend and the cause of social justice when he neglects the 
finer appeals of conscience for prejudice.  
Scholars have often been at a loss to locate Godwin’s moral instruction to 
the lower-class reader, however, I locate his unobtrusive instruction in the 
contrasting responses characters make to conscience that accumulate in either 
just or unjust treatment in their daily interactions with others and through the 
themes of disrespect and dignity.  Like Wollstonecraft, Godwin calls into 
question the correlation between human dignity and social status, relocating 
dignity internally rather than centered on the mandated conduct of rank and 
deference.   In this section, I investigate Godwin’s social commentary through 
three characters, Caleb, Falkland, and Collins.  Guided by the work of McGirr 
and Nash, I attend to character sketches to demonstrate how Godwin creates 
incongruous cues to characterization that demand readers attend to character 
behavior and moral judgments counter to social stereotype.  Caleb Williams 
challenges eighteenth-century reader expectation; like Collins, readers would 
have assumed the moral superiority of the upper-class figure and the suspect 
morality of the lower-class figure.  None of Godwin’s characters are flat, or 
lacking internal sympathy; likewise, Godwin’s characterization is not simple 
reversal of typography, to apply McGirr’s term.  All three figures appeal to 
reader sympathy and exhibit moments of empathy and struggles of conscience.  
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The author’s commentary thus resides in degrees of moral aptitude and the 
striving for human agency against externally imposed obstacles and ingrained 
cultural prejudices.  He finds dignity in the strivings of conscience and 
characters’ resolves to exert the dictates of conscience.  
Caleb and Falkland reflect the ill-effects of their social stations on human 
identity and dignity, and they do so in particularly Wollstonecraftian ways. This 
brings me to my second reason for invoking Wollstonecraft.  I argue that, like 
Wollstonecraft, Godwin assimilates a Smithian model of the interplay between 
human cognition and the social environment into his characterization technique.  
Scholars mention, as a matter of course, Godwin’s innovations in 
characterization that usher in a new era of psychological complexity for the novel 
between the French-Revolutionary and Romantic periods.  Oddly, no critic has 
ever explained exactly what those innovations are.  I contend that Godwin 
achieves that complexity by writing the imagined dialogue of the self; or, put a 
slightly different way, he portrays the interior reflection of the impartial 
spectator imagined as dialogue.  The author shows the competing demands of 
Caleb’s unsocial passions, like fear, hope, or anger, and the social passions, like 
esteem, friendship, humanity, and kindness.  His is a complicated struggle to 
cultivate that moral conscience and then to apply that faculty to negotiate 
between his needs for self-preservation; his needs for the approbation, even love, 
of his fellows; and his need to honor the sacred rules of society even as he is torn 
between competing sets of “sacred rules” (Adam Smith 145) 
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I want to draw attention to three passages from Godwin’s initial character 
sketch of his protagonist, articulated through Caleb as retrospective narrator.  
The first of these passages draws attention to Caleb’s sheltered existence, social 
position, and mental faculties: “But I had an inquisitive mind, and neglected no 
means of information from conversation or books. My improvement was greater 
than my condition in life afforded room to expect” (3).  The second passage again 
mentions the protagonist’s eagerness to educate himself and highlights his lack 
of worldly experience: “Though I was not a stranger to books, I had no practical 
acquaintance with men. I had never had occasion to address a person of this 
elevated rank, and I felt no small uneasiness and awe on the present occasion” 
(4). The third passage conveys Caleb’s emotional response upon this first 
interaction with Falkland: 
My reception was as gracious and encouraging as I could possibly desire. 
Mr Falkland questioned me respecting my learning, and my conceptions 
of men and things, and listened to my answers with condescension and 
approbation. This kindness soon restored to me a considerable part of my 
self-possession, though I still felt restrained by the graceful, but unaltered 
dignity of his carriage.              4 
Godwin’s introductory character sketch already cuts against literary convention 
and stock stereotype. In Servants and Paternalism, Nash explores two conflicting, 
well-established “literary stereotypes” with the servant as either “blindly faithful 
domestic family retainer” or the servant as “selfishly scheming family destroyer” 
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(4).  Common to both stereotypes is a stock servant character who inhabits a 
marginal place in the narrative and lacks a “private life” of human depth, 
psychological complexity, emotional range, and interior transformation.  The 
servant is a childish, mentally underdeveloped, immoral or amoral subject.  He is 
either immorally depraved or amorally simpleminded with neither a personal 
life nor internal identity outside of the occupation that encompasses him. At this 
earliest point in the narrative, disillusioned, retrospective, and reflective Caleb 
recounts his social positon born of peasant parents who are already deceased and 
the circumstances that led him into service for Falkland.  Godwin already cuts 
against literary convention by centering his story on a servant’s history, but 
retrospective narration contributes a distinct layer of richness and complexity 
since it is, by definition, the imagined personal reflections of that narrator on the 
events of his own life.  The entirety of Caleb Williams is a servant’s sustained 
introspection; this servant is the novel’s emotional center, its psychological moral 
conscience, and its cultural commentator.  
The entirety of Caleb Williams is the protagonist’s sustained introspection, 
and the passages above draw attention to the tensions between his mental 
faculties, artlessness, and social position.  He is young, actively curious, and keen 
to learn. His social position, or, rather, the conditions implicit to his social 
position, closely parallel the middle-class, female subject who Wollstonecraft 
defends from ridicule for rote learning and who she cautions against overly 
imbibing in sensationalistic novels.  Wollstonecraft has an ambivalent opinion on 
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the effects of novel reading; Godwin’s sketch of Caleb incorporates these same 
ambivalences.  On one hand, young women read novels because it is “the only 
improvement … their station in society” allows them “to acquire” (131).  In 
strikingly similar prose, Caleb’s mental improvement from reading surpasses 
that which his lower-class station typically permits.  On the other hand, 
Wollstonecraft worries how frivolous reading overexcites rather than “regulates 
the imagination” (131).  Readers suspect Caleb’s over-indulgence of books has 
over-activated his imagination when he recalls his over-enthusiastic interest in 
Falkland, “I was excited by every motive of interest and curiosity to study my 
master’s character, and I found in it an ample field for speculation and 
conjecture” (5).  Yet, “any kind of reading” beats none since “the mind” craves 
“enlargement” through the “exertion of its thinking powers” (Wollstonecraft 
272).   Godwin iterates his protagonist’s psychological demand for the 
sustenance of intellectual activities in the first passage with the words 
“inquisitive, “mind,” “information,” “conversation,” and “books.”  Yet again, 
overstimulated imaginations, social inexperience, and daily monotony all 
contribute to rendering women easy victims of sexual folly (Wollstonecraft 272).  
Godwin points to similar features of Caleb’s upbringing; he is overly bookish, 
unsophisticated, and discomforted by social interaction due to his sheltered and 
isolated life: “In early life my mind had been almost wholly engrossed by 
reading and reflexion. My intercourses with my fellow mortals were occasional 
and short” (5).  Godwin thus constructs him as exhibiting those mental faculties 
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of inquiry and imagination, as achieving more than typical for a peasant, but also 
suggests that Caleb’s learning coupled with worldly inexperience may leave him 
vulnerable to folly.   
But, these passages mainly convey promise and fortune for juvenile Caleb.   
He appears exceptional: exceptionally bright and exceptionally fortunate to come 
under the benevolent, notice of his social better.  But herein lie two competing 
notions of dignity that Godwin demands his readers consider throughout the 
novel.  One version of dignity relates to Falkland’s practical social status as a 
man of rank with the power of patronage.  He is condescending to Caleb in a 
particularly positive sense for this period.  Samuel Johnson defines 
“condescension” as “‘to depart from the privileges of superiority by a voluntary 
submission; to sink willingly to equal terms with inferiours’” (Miller 241). 
Falkland decorously acts the generous patron to Caleb in humbly engaging the 
young man in courteous conversation and in setting him at ease in his presence.  
The squire’s conduct bespeaks his “dignity,” which Godwin means in a very 
traditional sense here.  Falkland’s dignity specifically refers to his privileged 
social status and the visible signs of that status:  his manner of speaking, his 
formal observance of decorum, and his deportment as a gentleman.   
Meanwhile, these passages present readers with a second notion of 
dignity allied to Caleb’s human capacity.  Godwin’s iterations and reiterations of 
Caleb’s inquisitive mind; the demands of his mental faculties; his narrating and 
interpreting the events of his life; and, especially, his deciphering the behavior 
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and character of Falkland all point to cognition and conscience.   The third 
passage is particularly rich for its double-layered meaning of dignity since it 
contains words that signal the customs of rank and deference and words that 
allude to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Caleb properly observes the discreet 
conduct expected by social custom.  At the same time, the words “restrained” 
and “approbation” echo Smith’s hypothetical school-youth motivated by the 
need for esteem, who acquires self-command, or “self-possession,” by closely 
observing whether his behavior meets the “approbation” or “disapprobation” of 
others (Smith 145).  Godwin displays his protagonist’s demands of the mind and 
needs of the heart, or passions.  Caleb engages his critical faculty when he 
searches Falkland’s conduct for approval and governs his own behavior 
accordingly; he may experience the unsocial passion of trepidation upon meeting 
Falkland, but it is the more sacred, social passion of esteem that prompts his self-
control and immediate admiration for his new benefactor.  However brief, 
Godwin’s character sketch of Caleb presents a second notion of dignity unyoked 
to social status and defined as the intrinsic value of personhood by virtue of the 
rational faculty which, when motivated by esteem, can translate into social 
cooperation and fellowship.   
All sounds promising for Caleb as an imagined subject and as an 
unconventionally dynamic character, but his recollection of promise has already 
been framed by catastrophe: “My fame, as well as my happiness, has become his 
victim. Every one, as far as my story has been known, has refused to assist me in 
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my distress, and has execrated my name” (3).  Caleb’s youth, inexperience, and, 
perhaps, overreaching the normally accepted limits of his station have indeed 
resulted in folly: “Hitherto I had had no intercourse with the world and its 
passions; and, though I was not totally unacquainted with them as they appear 
in books, this proved to be of little service to me when I came to witness them 
myself” (103).  He is defamed and cast off by all who know him. His 
circumstance calls to mind the fallen woman, ostracized from good society, and 
cast off to be forever forgotten by friends and family.  If it was customary to 
blame the social inferior for her own victimization, then it is reasonable to 
imagine that the original audience would have held Caleb suspect for his own 
desolation and defamation and deserving of Falkland’s persecution. Indeed, the 
fate of the Hawkinses exposes the disrespect of a rampant blaming-the-victim 
prejudice that cannot distinguish between social status and authentic character. 
Godwin does not yet disclose Caleb’s folly, but he manipulates literary and 
cultural bias to establish a gripping and perplexing atmosphere.  The author 
already conveys several incongruities.  The greatest of these incongruities is 
between reader-expectation of literary convention and the unexpected 
experience of reading a narrative told through the imagined consciousness of a 
servant.  But there are other, more detailed and equally provocative 
inconsistencies between Caleb’s reversal of fortune from early promise to later 
defamation, Caleb’s emotional shift from admiration to animosity for Falkland, 
and Falkland’s apparent alteration from benevolent patron to persecutor.  These 
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incongruities prompt questions about who these characters truly are, by what 
means Caleb’s life deteriorated, and what has he done to deserve his fate.  
Godwin drizzles Caleb’s identity in incongruity, but he steeps Falkland’s 
in it.  Godwin asks readers “to decode potentially deceptive signs and therefore 
to read moral characters properly” by “exposing and delineating [a] divergence 
between appearance and essence,” and he does so through the simultaneously 
critical and naïve lens of Caleb (McGirr 3).  Readers first learn of Falkland as 
Caleb does—by reputation.  Mr. Falkland is a cultured, “benevolent” “country 
squire of considerable opulence.” Imposing!  How perplexing, then, is Caleb’s 
observation of Falkland’s actual physical presence:    
I found Mr Falkland a man of small stature, with an extreme delicacy of 
form and appearance. In place of the hard-favoured and inflexible visages 
I had been accustomed to observe, every muscle and petty line of his 
countenance seemed to be in an inconceivable degree pregnant with 
meaning. His manner was kind, attentive and humane. His eye was full of 
animation, but there was a grave and sad solemnity in his air, which for 
want of experience I imagined was the inheritance of the great, and the 
instrument by which the distance between them and their inferiors was 
maintained. His look bespoke the unquietness of his mind, and frequently 
wandered with an expression of disconsolateness and anxiety.               4 
… 
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He was compassionate and considerate for others, though the stateliness 
of his carriage and the reserve of his temper were at no time interrupted. 
His appearance and general behaviour might have strongly interested all 
persons in his favour; but the coldness of his address and the 
impenetrableness of his sentiments seemed to forbid those demonstrations 
of kindness to which one might otherwise have been prompted.            6 
I note above the particular literariness of Wollstonecraft’s passage contrasting the 
curate to the bishop.  I say this because her physiognomonic illustration briefly 
links external appearance, or at least demeanor and bearing, to the inner, 
emotional condition of her contrasted cleric figures.  Her technique recalls 
McGirr’s discussion of the eighteenth-century character and the significant role 
physiognomic description plays across all artistic genres in this period.  The 
typographical character sketches that sprang up to immediate popularity in the 
seventeenth century straightforwardly aligned external appearance to inner 
qualities: “the characters’ inner worth can be read by their external appearance.”  
By the end of the eighteenth-century, coinciding with the development of the 
novel, characterization becomes more complex.  Outer appearance increasingly 
obscures moral worth: “Experience seemed more likely to expose a disjunction 
rather than a correlation between the physical and the moral:  eighteenth-century 
literature is full of bad hearts masked by good faces.” McGirr finds this 
disjunction especially true of novels of “the Romantic movement” that were 
concerned with the dichotomy between social “artifice” and human authenticity 
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(1-2).  The incongruity between Falkland’s reputation and his appearance 
suggests Godwin’s Romantic interest in the difference between artifice and 
authenticity.   These two passages cover almost the entirely of Godwin’s initial 
character sketch of Falkland.  This squire’s physiognomy contradicts his 
imposing reputation.  Readers are meant to attend to those recurring details of 
smallness:  Falkland’s insignificant physique, his almost feminine fragility, 
softness and fineness of facial expression.  His deportment never varies even as 
his affect does.  In both passages, his affect is changeable.  He moves between a 
moment of warmness and vivid liveliness, to a moment of severity and lackluster 
flatness, to a moment of fretfulness and overanxious distraction.  Falkland is 
compelling and off-putting, sympathetic to others but repels sympathy from 
others.  The finer aspects of Godwin’s phrasing are just as inharmonious.  
Falkland is both great and small.  The smallest line of Falkland’s face contains 
within it unimaginable significance. His glance is vibrant, but his disposition is 
somber.    
These passages present Caleb’s critical gaze, emphasize Falkland’s 
inconsistencies, and ask the reader to exercise her judgment.  Like the eighteenth-
century reader, Caleb examines Falkland’s physiognomy.  Reading books 
disposes him to critical observation of the world and people around him, but is 
he over-reading?  Language in phrases like “inconceivable degree pregnant with 
meaning” and “ample field for speculation and conjecture” serve Godwin’s craft 
in suspense, but they also beg the reader to make judgments about Caleb’s 
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naiveté and Falkland’s moral identity.  Caleb echoes Wollstonecraft’s easily 
duped, bookish young lady and prefigures Jane Austen’s heroine in Northanger 
Abbey (1817), Catherine Morland, who superimposes Gothic mystery onto 
otherwise nonthreatening circumstances.  She misreads manners and motives; 
for instance, she misinterprets the respectable manner of concealing private grief 
as suspiciously concealing a murderous misdeed.  The social politeness of 
concealing grief may be nonthreatening, but Catherine’s invasion of the familial 
privacy of her acquaintances is not; her impropriety leads to the considerable 
embarrassment of her friends and shame to herself.  Godwin relates something 
similar here of Caleb.  Quite by accident, Caleb stumbles upon a deeply 
anguished Falkland examining the contents of a chest.  Falkland reproaches him 
for interrupting an emotional and private moment: “Wretch, interrupted Mr 
Falkland with uncontrolable impatience, you want to ruin me. You set yourself 
as a spy upon my actions. But bitterly shall you repent your insolence. Do you 
think you shall watch my privacies with impunity?” (6-7).  Caleb retells the 
inappropriately violent reaction that casts suspicion upon his employer, the 
moment in which Falkland’s artifice cracks and his ceremonial veil of reserved 
manner threatens to unshroud the private emotions he prefers to conceal, but is 
Caleb morally right to scrutinize his employer so intrusively?   
Caleb’s is a breach of the conduct expected of a servant, a breach of 
deference required of him within the paternalistic social hierarchy.  However, his 
rational review of all the evidence he soon learns proves him correct to suspect 
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Falkland. Caleb’s continued spying disrespects his benefactor, but Falkland has 
killed Tyrrel and has allowed the decent father and son Hawkins to be executed 
by hanging. Godwin thus establishes two competing claims, or sacred rules, for 
Caleb. The first of these sacred rules is to the traditional social order in which he, 
the servant, ought to abide by a deferential code of conduct assigned to him from 
above and which allots the privileges of privacy, judgment, and oversight to his 
social better.  From this perspective, Caleb’s intrusiveness uncovers a crime 
about which he has no ethical basis to investigate and which would be better 
forgotten if exposing it meant destabilizing the established social order by the 
death of a gentleman.  His social position places him in a trap of injustice as 
exclusion through moral exclusion.  If he betrays Falkland, then he appears self-
serving like the shrewd servant who secretly loathes his employer; this stock 
type certainly has the intelligence to understand morality but he runs counter to 
it.  Therefore, he is morally excluded as inherently incapable due to a “vicious,” 
self-serving nature threatening to social order (Godwin 288).  If Caleb retains 
Falkland’s secret in service to his patron by deferring his own sense of moral 
rectitude to the supposedly better judgment of his superior, then he becomes the 
simpleminded servant.  He may not violate the social order, but he is still 
morally disrespected because he lacks full cognizance regarding why he abides 
by the rules handed down to him from authority, rules that permit the wrongful 
murder of innocents.  
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Collins articulates this exact dilemma when he asks Caleb what purpose 
convincing him of Falkland’s guilt would serve: 
And what benefit will result from this conviction? I have known you a 
promising boy, whose character might turn to one side or the other as 
events should decide. I have known Mr Falkland in his maturer years, and 
have always admired him as the living model of liberality and goodness. 
If you could change all my ideas, and show me that there was no criterion 
by which vice might be prevented from being mistaken for virtue, what 
benefit would arise from that? I must part with all my interior consolation, 
and all my external connections. And for what? What is it you propose? 
The death of Mr Falkland by the hands of the hangman?             287-288  
Collins speaks “conventional morality,” or the “‘practical wisdom’ of the world 
to dictate right and wrong” (Nash 65); he comprehends full well how one man’s 
virtue is another man’s vice when self-interests compete.  He devotes himself to 
retaining the gentleman’s secrets, rather turning a deliberate blind eye, to 
subscribe to the paternal social hierarchy.  Nash understands paternalistic 
subscription by servant characters as indicative of their lack of agency in works 
prior to the nineteenth century, but Godwin presents Collins in a more 
complicated way.  Collins is no “comic fumbler straight out of the long tradition 
of incompetent servants” (Nash 61).  His moral conscience, or impartial 
spectator, displays here in his deliberation between his two competing notions of 
dignity and genuine affection for Caleb and Falkland; he also weighs the 
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potential good or evil that can come from either man’s final proof of innocence or 
guilt.  He may subscribe to conventional morality for the servant to defer to the 
judgment of his employer, but he does this with awareness of the implications of 
his choice.  From his view, Caleb is a “machine … not constituted to be greatly 
useful to [his] fellow men” since he seems unable to set aside his self-interest in 
proving his own innocence when it would mean proving the guilt of his better, a 
man upon whom so many depend (288).  He chooses a social framework that has 
offered him, and by implication most individuals of the lower orders, certainty—
physical safety, emotional esteem, moral clarity, and sense of purpose—and he 
advises Caleb to do the same.  
 If Mr. Collins seems to turn a rather deliberate blind eye to Falkland’s 
potential criminality, it is not without a reasonable basis.  The bulk of Volume I 
and the first chapter of Volume II consist of Caleb’s purportedly verbatim record 
of the village conflicts and cruelties told him by Collins.  Falkland persistently 
acted the rational mediator for social good and advocate for the victims of 
Tyrrel’s violence.  Falkland honorably intervened in the abysmal history of Emily 
Melville.  He saved her from death by fire and rape, but she nonetheless died 
resisting the legally permissible persecution by her cousin and guardian, Tyrrel.  
Falkland similarly intervened with moral counsel, advising Tyrrel to moderate 
his behavior with compassion, temperance, and benevolence toward the 
Hawkinses. Tyrrel again ruined his social subordinates.  Collins then relates the 
public condemnation of Tyrrel for Emily’s wrongful death; his subsequent public 
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beating of Falkland; Falkland’s trial and acquittal for Tyrrel’s murder; and the 
succeeding conviction and hanging of the Hawkinses for the same crime. But 
Collins is more correct than he knows when he comments on the utter 
annihilation of Falkland’s sense of internal dignity upon the public beating and 
trial: “To Mr Falkland disgrace was worse than death. The slightest breath of 
dishonour would have stung him to the very soul. What must it have been with 
this complication of ignominy, base, humiliating and public?” (93).  Nothing 
“could ever remove the stain” from Falkland’s hitherto unblemished reputation, 
since “No man had ever held his reputation so dear to him as Mr Falkland” (95-
96).  He later describes the complete alteration in Falkland, from a man secure in 
his “self-approving and heart-transporting benevolence … who had lived 
beyond any man upon the grand and animating reveries of the imagination, 
seemed now to have no visions but of anguish and despair” (94).  Falkland is 
dynamic as a character because his crisis alters his identity, but that change is 
disastrous for his fragile identity and for social welfare.  Collins, like young 
Caleb, mistakes the subtle difference between the performance of benevolence, 
chivalry, and decorum with authentic friendship and empathy.  
If readers experience sympathy for Falkland, it is because Godwin guides 
that sympathy through Collins’s perception.  Readers are meant to be more 
critical, perhaps by asking how the Hawkinses might judge Falkland just as 
Caleb does, as one of the victimized.  Falkland’s moral limitation compares to 
Wollstonecraft’s female subject who “cautiously preserves her reputation free 
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from spot,” and who is, therefore, “reckoned a good kind of woman” (117).  
Never allowed to “judge for herself,” reputation is a necessary ceremony for her 
social status as “good woman.”  Or, more accurately, he is the courtier who 
Wollstonecraft associates as similarly conforming to forms over substance:  
Whence arises the easy fallacious behaviour of a courtier? From his 
 situation, undoubtedly: for standing in need of dependents, he is obliged 
 to learn the art of denying without giving offence, and, of evasively 
 feeding hope with the chameleon’s food:  thus does politeness sport with 
 truth, and eating away the sincerity and humanity natural produce the 
 fine gentleman.         210 
Falkland’s dignified identity is inextricably bound to his social standing, less 
obviously to his wealth as much as the public perception of his benevolence:  he 
“would have purchased the character of a true, gallant and undaunted hero at 
the expence of worlds” and “thought every calamity … a stain upon his honour.” 
Godwin points to Falkland’s self-interest in a word—“fame” (100).  Fame is the 
ultimate self-aggrandizement, the intense and narcissistic magnification of 
oneself in the world through the visibility of status. Falkland mistakes the public 
appearance of virtue for authentic dignity, performing benevolence for his own 
status with limited, authentic sympathy for his inferiors.  He pities them but does 
not respect them; he helps them but does not love them, at least, not enough.  
The agonizing limitation of Collins’s moral insight resides in his correct 
understanding of moral conduct but his mislaid judgment of authentic character.  
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He states how his own sympathy, like the general public’s “compassion,” turned 
against Hawkins as a “barbarous” coward for not coming “boldly forward to 
meet the consequences of his own conduct, [rather] than suffer a man of so much 
public worth as Mr Falkland … to be tried for a murder that he had committed” 
(102). Collins rightly comprehends ethical moral action when judging members 
of his own social class, but he exhibits an exceptionalist attitude for his social 
superiors.   
What is the alternative, then?  Modern readers want the narrative to offer 
positive valence for a second set of “sacred rules” that counter the “conventional 
morality” of paternalism.  It does to an uncertain extent.  Respecting the dictates 
of his own conscience dignifies Caleb as a subject, but claiming dignity in a 
hostile social environment carries the price of physical confinement and social 
alienation. As this novel becomes one of flight and pursuit, the protagonist’s 
ever-expanding world is in fact bitterly ironic as he suffers multiple 
imprisonments and escapes, emotional dejection and resolution, frequent 
sympathy for others and his own increasing alienation.   The plot of Caleb 
Williams; or, Things as They Are offers no shortage of disrespectful or malicious 
events.  It is relentless.  In many ways, the plot closely resembles the slave 
narrative.  William L. Andrews’s “An Introduction to the Slave Narrative,” 
(2004) offers a concise but superlative summary of the structure and content of 
the slave narrative as an autobiographical account written by a fugitive slave that 
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“portrays the condition of slavery as a form of extreme physical, intellectual, 
emotional, and spiritual deprivation, a kind of hell on earth:”  
Precipitating the narrator's decision to escape is some sort of personal 
crisis, such as the sale of a loved one or a dark night of the soul in which 
hope contends with despair for the spirit of the slave. Impelled by faith in 
God and a commitment to liberty and human dignity … the slave 
undertakes an arduous quest for freedom     
If I replaced the word “slave” with “servant,” this summary would be wholly 
accurate of Caleb Williams.  The earlier slave narratives, like Cugoano’s Thoughts 
and Sentiments, portray the narrator’s pre-enslaved life to a state of innocence.  
Slave traders coerce the naïve, often very young, African into slavery either by 
trickery or violence, which is the moment of that narrator’s fall from innocence 
into a life of tyranny.  Now enslaved, the African suffers the unspeakable 
violence of terror, imprisonment, forced migration, beating, rape, exposure, 
malnourishment, and alienation.  Caleb suffers in parallel ways. Caleb Williams is 
a first-person account of the tragedies and humiliations suffered by its 
protagonist.  Caleb describes his humble parentage and his youthful innocence 
that is “free from the usual sources of depravity.”  He “has no practical 
acquaintance with men,” lives in a “remote county of England,” and has a 
“rudimentary” education.  Much as Africans were imagined as primitive, so 
Caleb is rustic; much as Africans were imagined as geographically obscure, so 
Caleb is isolated; and much as Africans were imagined as simple, so Caleb is 
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uncultivated.  Parentless, propertyless, penniless, and prospectless, Caleb is 
already alienated, but his migration to service under Falkland, precipitates 
Caleb’s fall into a “deserted situation with terror.”  Proslavery rhetoric reads 
black skin as a mark for perpetual servitude.  Caleb writes: “I have been a mark 
for the vigilance of tyranny, and I could not escape. My fairest prospects have 
been blasted. My enemy has shown himself inaccessible to intreaties and untired 
in persecution” (Godwin 1-5).   
Godwin echoes Cugoano’s infernal scene of the thunderous cries of 
enchained thousands, with Africans beseeching, grieving, praying, battling, 
mutinying, fleeing, and dying at the many hands of European captors and 
tormenters.  Falkland terrorizes Caleb with constant oversight, coercion, 
emotional manipulation, postures of superiority and divine right, public 
defamation, malnourishment, multiple imprisonments, capture and recapture, 
and a fugitive-servant advertisement.   Godwin depicts a moment of Caleb’s 
despair: “Among my melancholy reflections I tasked my memory, and counted 
over the doors, the locks, the bolts, the chains, the massy and grated windows 
that were between me and liberty” (175).  The following passage conveys a 
moment of crisis for Caleb who contemplates flight: “Escape from his pursuit, 
freedom from his tyranny, were objects upon which my whole soul was bent; 
could no human ingenuity and exertion effect them?” (233).  Caleb discovers 
fortitude: “I resolved that I would not remain quiescent, till mischief should 
overtake and devour me” (259).  Some pages later, a reiterative passage conjoins 
 156  
Caleb’s fortitude to hope, and hope to resistance: “Yet I was not cast down. I 
resolved that, while I had life, I would never despair. Oppressed, annihilated I 
might be; but, if I died, I would die resisting” (266).   Like his enslaved 
counterpart, fugitive servant, Caleb, resists and flees into an uncertain future.   
Caleb achieves moral dignity because he chooses that uncertainty.  He 
follows the dictates of his own conscience but his is a process of negotiation 
between competing demands for self-preservation and conflicting social 
allegiances often without clear answers.  He vows to keep Falkland’s secret, but 
Falkland’s obsessive surveillance and his own guilt smother him.  He resolves on 
an alternative to keep Falkland’s secret but liberate himself.  He flees, and so 
ensues the flight and pursuit plot that for which this novel is so famous. Caleb 
fears and reveres, hates and loves, hides and confronts, is accused and accuses.  
His is a circuitous journey in which he negotiates the competing demands of his 
own sense of moral right, his allegiance to his patron, the temptations of 
“‘practical wisdom’” that would offer him succor, and a struggle to maintain a 
sense of personhood (Nash 65).  Time and again, Godwin displays that 
negotiated personhood through the imagined internal debate between the 
passions and the impartial spectator:  
I had now every thing to fear. And yet what was my fault? It proceeded 
from none of those errors which are justly held up to the aversion of 
mankind; my object had been neither wealth, nor the means of 
indulgence, nor the usurpation of power. No spark of malignity had 
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harboured in my soul. I had always reverenced the sublime mind of Mr 
Falkland; I reverenced it still. My offence had merely been a mistaken 
thirst of knowledge.               130 
Caleb expresses competing emotions. He does not just exist in reactionary or 
instinctive fear like Adam Smith’s infant; rather he knows he has very real cause 
to fear.  He nonetheless engages in rational meditation; his rational faculty allows 
him to command his fear and to examine his motives from the perspective of the 
imagined moral spectator.  No unjust, unsocial, self-serving passion motivated 
his discovery or his flight. Even as he has been imprisoned and publically 
maligned, he still respects Falkland and honors his promise to secrecy.  But, at 
this relatively early point in his persecution, he cannot accept how his social 
position occludes his “knowing,” forbids him epistemic justice as an accurate 
judge of character, ethics, or truth.  Indeed, he will not accept this injustice.   
Flight offers no freedom, even as it offers worldly experience. Most 
scholarship finds itself at a loss to locate Godwin’s instruction to the lower-class 
audience.  I assert that Godwin instructs that audience through the relentless 
striving of Caleb to exert his agency in the world, and to repel, revenge, or repair 
the insults against him; he not only adheres to the dictates of conscience but he 
also resists the perversion, or “warping,” of his understanding.  Godwin 
illustrates the detrimental consequences of social subornation on Caleb but he 
also imbues Caleb with acute sensibility and the self-reflective faculty.  Upon 
entering service to Falkland as librarian and secretary, young Caleb occupies that 
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expanding social matrix required to cultivate the higher-level faculty of the 
impartial spectator that defines human dignity.  Readers witness Caleb’s world 
expand.  Unfortunately, his expanding social matrix does not coincide with the 
Smithian ideal of home, to school, to profession, to promotion, to political post.  
Smith’s archetypal subject occupies a social position far above peasant Caleb’s.  
Therefore, Caleb’s expanding social matrix works in rather reverse order in 
ironic tension with Smith’s Theory.  He certainly has wider experiences in the 
world, however, his is a story of short-lived service and sharpening 
subordination even as his plight, indeed flight, from manic Falkland carries him 
hundreds of miles across the English countryside, to London, and to Wales.   
Godwin asks, in echo of Wollstonecraft, whether those expanding 
experiences, topographical and emotional, “produce a greater portion of 
happiness or misery” (83).   Godwin answers this question in very short order: “I 
little suspected that the gaiety and lightness of heart I had hitherto enjoyed were 
upon the point of leaving me for ever, and that the rest of my days were devoted 
to misery,” narrates wiser Caleb (5).  Defamed Caleb writes in “faint” hope for 
future “justice” (3).  That future justice comes to pass in the last chapter.  Caleb 
explains his rationale for finally pursuing legal justice: “It appeared therefore to 
my mind to be a mere piece of equity and justice, such as an impartial spectator 
would desire, that one person should be miserable in preference to two.”  For the 
“general good,” he reasons, either he or Falkland must suffer final legal 
judgment so at least one of them can reengage in a productive life.  He gives up 
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his “state of uncertainty” for resolution (295-296).  Resolution carries unexpected 
and disastrous consequences.  Caleb, upon finally seeing the wasted Falkland 
again, overcome with compassion, unable to stop legal proceedings, grasps the 
full weight of his actions—he will become Falkland’s defamer and murderer.  
Legal justice means the reinstatement of social position but at the purchase of his 
conscience; claiming dignity of conscience means the injustice of dispossessed 
social position.  In his final lines, Caleb avows, “I have now no character that I 
wish to vindicate” because he has exchanged dignity of social station at the cost 
of his dignity of personhood (303).  He has quenched his thirst for knowledge, 
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CHAPTER III 
DEFINING INJUSTICE AS MALDISTRIBUTION 
AND DEHUMANIZATION 
One passage from Wollstonecraft’s chapter, “On National Education” 
should haunt all her readers for its penetrating sensitivity and for its profound 
implications about the pervasive nature of violence in her culture.  Mary 
Wollstonecraft strikingly advocates for “Humanity to animals,” to be 
incorporated into a national co-education system (258).  Her animal rights 
advocacy is not striking because of its modern sensibility so similar to our own 
or even for her blunt recognition that humane treatment toward animals “is not 
at present one of [Britain’s] national virtues” (258).  Rather, what arrests the 
reader is that the “habitual cruelty” referred to in this chapter specifically refers 
to young boys who frequently “torment” “miserable brutes” as a singular 
pastime while at boarding school.  Wollstonecraft’s concern here is not just the 
treatment of animals, but the easy “transition” between violence to animals and 
violence to people; the same cruel boarding-school boys will inevitably transfer 
“barbarity to brutes” to their “wives, children, and servants” when adult masters 
of households (258).   
The connection between a boy’s cruelty to animals and his later 
murderous impulse was not an altogether new dialogue in eighteenth-century 
British culture.  William Hogarth’s The Four Stages of Cruelty (1751) illustrates just 
such a degeneration more than thirty years prior to the publication of Rights of 
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Woman.  The “First Stage of Cruelty” depicts a gang of twenty-two ferocious 
youngsters strangling, cauterizing, cockfighting, gouging, disemboweling, 
thrashing, and impaling— through the anus, no less —dogs, cats, and birds, all 
in view of church.  Hogarth’s central figure, Tom Nero, impales the dog through 
the rectum, while a nearby spectator sketches his sure death by hanging, which 
has already ensued by the final and fourth plate of the series.  In the “Second 
Stage of Cruelty,” Tom Nero, now a hackney-coach driver, mercilessly beats his 
emaciated and collapsed horse in full view of the four bewigged lawyers who 
occupy the toppled carriage, while a shepherd clubs a lamb to death, a toddler 
gets trampled by a beer cart, a farmer prods an overburdened donkey with his 
pitchfork, and a group of boys bait a bull.  “Cruelty in Perfection” illustrates 
Tom’s complete descent into criminality, now a thief and murderer, caught quite 
literally red-handed, having just gashed open the throat and mutilated the 
remains of his pregnant lover, Ann Gill.  A letter in the foreground from Ann to 
Tom conveys how she has obeyed his commands to rob her benevolent employer 
against her own conscience but for love of Tom.  Now, she lies prone in the dirt 
of a graveyard, conspicuously in view of a church bell tower and the 
whitewashed estate that hovers on a hill at a safely gated distance directly above 
her.   
Like Wollstonecraft, Hogarth presents violence to animals as 
degenerative, communally contagious, and socially sanctioned.   The writer and 
the artist each presents emblems of the absent overseer of authority.  In 
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Wollstonecraft’s passage on school-boy animal cruelty, that non-presence is the 
schoolmaster who is not instructing children in compassion.  It is the young 
man’s singular lack of fellow-feeling and pleasure in physical violence initially 
for animals that eventually founds and pervades the households of eighteenth-
century Britons, which consisted of wives, children, and servants; thus for 
Wollstonecraft the violence of the family makes this common institution an 
inherently exploitive and disempowering one for most of its members.  In 
Hogarth, the absence of the regulation of brutality comes in the forms of 
additional institutions like the church, the law, and the benevolent master or 
mistress under whose aloof eyes violence worsens.  Hogarth requires the viewer 
ask if Ann’s life is worth as little as the tortured animals or as much as the rather 
insignificant trinkets that she has stolen, since the shadow of authority only 
catches Tom after his criminal behavior becomes a threat to upper-class property 
in terms of goods and servants, not to mention his implicitly exploitative abuse 
of Ann’s socially appropriate feminine naiveté.   What Hogarth and 
Wollstonecraft demonstrate through their distinctive expressive mediums is the 
link between violence to animals and viewing people as animals, which is the 
core of dehumanization.  
Hogarth makes violence directly visible while the writers of this study 
convey violence more indirectly though linguistic imagery; however hyperbolic 
his illustrations may be, The Four Stages of Cruelty offers provocative context for 
considering the recurrent animal imagery and motifs of violence that preoccupy 
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the work of Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Cugoano.  Animal images abound in 
these three authors’ texts—cows, horses, devils, mice, monkeys, insects, swarms, 
elephants, dogs, pigs, demons, crocodiles, asses, spaniels, leopards, sheep, tigers, 
cats, monsters, lions, beasts, and, most frequently, brutes.  Images of animals 
work in tandem with motifs of violence, most obvious of which are the recurrent 
references to whips, chains, shackles, fetters, yokes, gibbets, prisons, 
deprivations, tortures, pursuits, and rapes—all objects or acts that inflict 
corporeal pain, confinement, or neglect.  Less obviously, accusations of 
weakness, feebleness, incapacity, barbarity, or disability also become acts of 
cruelty insofar as they contribute to defining persons and groups as subhuman, 
thus inflicting emotional, cultural, psychological, or spiritual violence.   
To make the effects of violence visible, all three authors work through recurrent 
images of animals accompanied by motifs and analyses of violence; I argue that 
in so doing, they identify a process of violent dehumanization that is at the core 
of social injustice through disempowerment, a process of injustice that Bufacchi 
defines as the exposure and exploitation of “a person’s vulnerabilities” (10).   
 Bufacchi assesses disempowerment as the exposure of vulnerability, an 
unfortunate phrasing which leaves open the argument that some persons may be 
naturally inferior; my writers, by contrast, display vulnerability as a process 
altogether forcefully and systemically rendered—they reject notions of natural 
inferiority to show how acts of violence along a spectrum of brutality and across 
a wide range of contexts create vulnerability to first dehumanize and then to 
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disempower masses of humankind.   Violence is predicated on social disrespect 
and enacted through systemic denials of resources and goods required for 
survival.  My brief illustration through Hogarth suggests that those resources 
and goods can take on broad meaning as he points to several systemic causes 
that permit or even cause neglect, poverty, and the violence that results.  He also 
displays violence in both active and passive forms, the boys who actively 
tortures animals and who later become murderers of women and the seemingly 
passive institutions of the Church, the estate, the law, the economy, and the 
academic and medical professions—all institutions regulated by educated men 
who apparently lack the moral conscience to intervene in any of these incidents 
of violence.  Hogarth’s pictures of absent Church leaders, self-absorbed lawyers, 
and inhumane surgeons begs the viewer ask how these men, too, must be 
implicated in those institutions that perhaps help create the socioeconomic 
conditions in which systemic violence occurs.  
To make the effects of violence visible, all three authors work through 
recurrent images of animals accompanied by motifs and analyses of violence; I 
argue that in so doing, they identify a process of violent dehumanization that is 
at the core of social injustice through disempowerment, a process of injustice that 
Bufacchi defines as the exposure and exploitation of “a person’s vulnerabilities” 
(10).  Bufacchi assesses disempowerment as the exploitation of vulnerability and 
my writers display vulnerability as a process altogether forcefully and 
systemically rendered—they rejected notions of natural inferiority in Chapter 
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Two under injustice as exclusion.  Now this chapter takes a longer look at how 
exclusion translates into systemic socioeconomic forms of deprivation, 
marginalization, and exploitation that is injustice as maldistribution. Bufacchi 
attempts to separate injustice as maldistribution from injustice as 
disempowerment, but this division is not possible when studying the work of 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, or Godwin.  These authors read denials of resources as 
morally threatening and life threatening acts of violence along a spectrum of 
cruelty in which maldistributive denials create profound forms of vulnerability 
which are always exploited.  
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin, writing in a period before the rise 
and prevalence of identity politics, perhaps have more a comprehensive 
understanding of the manufacture of inferiority through multiple paradigms of 
injustice.   In claiming the human status of women, workers, or slaves, all three 
authors avoid the pitfalls of essentialist arguments. Instead they interrogate and 
deconstruct how the identities of women, workers, or slaves are made and for 
what reasons.  To do so, they consistently look to the social environment for 
answers about how identity is constructed from above to complement their 
concurrent claims of human worth founded on the notion of universal human 
dignity.  For example, Wollstonecraft does not ask the essentialist question, 
“What is woman?” or the oppositional question, “What is woman’s purpose in 
relation to man?” but rather asks “What is it like to be a woman given what 
society has made her?”  Cugoano and Godwin ask parallel questions and come 
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to similar answers.  All three writers first and foremost target the essentialist 
denial of moral capacity, or moral exclusion, as the foundational prejudice 
through which the social environment validates nonrecognition, domination, 
and disrespect.  It stands to reason, then, that their first line of argumentation is 
the rejection of sexist, racist, or classist arguments that construct inferior 
collectivities from above through the wholesale denial of the moral capacity of 
those groups.  But, in looking back and forth between the lived conditions of 
being a woman, a worker, or a slave and the prejudices and interconnected 
environmental conditions that enforce those lived conditions, all three authors 
inevitably, fluidly delve into injustice as maldistribution.  They interrogate 
systemic denials of resources and goods, but they always attend to the victims’ 
experiences of those systemic deprivations—“from victims’ accounts of injustice 
we get the distinctive picture that what makes an injustice unbearable and 
unacceptable” is the exposure and exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability to 
produce that victim’s sense of disempowerment, degradation, and humiliation 
(Bufacchi 14). 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin anticipate the work of Bufacchi by 
demonstrating how one form of social injustice always “feeds into” another form 
of injustice (11).  Denigrating collective identities through manifestations of 
injustice as exclusion rationalizes subsequent denials of socioeconomic resources 
and opportunities for those same groups thus creating exploitable vulnerabilities.   
Furthermore, the denial of adequate resources creates inferiority that injustice as 
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exclusion normalizes to perpetuate inequality; it normalizes inequality through 
discourses of disrespect that excuse harmful deprivations and even violent 
behaviors toward the vulnerable.  Bufacchi defines social injustice as 
maldistribution as “the improper or injurious distribution of the benefits and 
burdens that arise from social cooperation.  An injustice occurs when the benefits 
and burdens are distributed according to criteria that not everyone (especially 
those who stand to receive less than others) could reasonably accept” (9-10).  He 
goes on to list two key features of maldistributive injustice.  First, he writes that 
maldistributive injustice can occur through formal institutions, like the law 
which protects rights for some groups and denies rights to other groups; and 
through informal daily interactions, for instance when parents allocate more 
money, food, or education to sons over daughters.  Injustice as exclusion and 
maldistribution more subtly converge in the second, informal example, since 
daughters may be loved by their parents, but are nevertheless disesteemed to the 
degree that parents offer them fewer resources.  Bufacchi cautions against 
equating all forms of social inequality to injustice.  Inequality often creates 
vulnerability, but injustice has not occurred until the more powerful social actor 
exploits that vulnerability: for example, by claiming an unfair share of limited 
resources.   
Second, the specific benefits or burdens, resources or responsibilities of 
maldistributive injustice can be “both natural and social” (10).  Bufacchi attempts 
to subsume John Rawls’s prolific work on redistributive justice, in which Rawls 
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defines resources as five kinds of “primary goods.”  These are resources that 
people need to have for a “complete life,” and he ranks them by order of 
importance.  Of primary importance are “the basic rights and liberties” of 
“freedom of thought and liberty of conscience” (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 
57-58).  The basic set of primary goods jointly preserves two kinds of moral 
capacities.  The first of these is the individual’s capacity to develop a “sense of 
justice,” “to understand, apply, and act on … principles of justice” for her own 
good, for the greater social good, and for its own sake.  Second is the individual’s 
“capacity for a conception of the good,” “to form, revise, and rationally pursue a 
rational plan of life” (Freeman 5).  These liberties precede all others because of 
their moral foundation. All of them preserve each person’s opportunity to first 
define for herself, and then pursue with agency, that which she decides 
constitutes a worthy life.  For Rawls, the basic set of primary goods must be 
universal because it establishes the reasonable basis for social cooperation in the 
first place.  For a society to be fair and just, all persons bound by the rules of that 
society require the opportunity to cultivate their moral capacities so as to 
improve from and invest in social cooperation.  In other words, the basic failure 
of a society to support each person’s moral development, including the chance to 
act on the dictates of conscience, undermines the justness of that society from its 
very foundation.   
Rawls’s remaining four categories of primary goods are rights and 
liberties that protect the integrity of the individual, such as “freedom of 
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association … freedom of movement, occupation, and choice of careers, and a 
right to personal property” as well as the equal right to political participation, 
access to “positions of authority,” and social respect.  Rawls emphasizes that 
social respect does not mean respect “toward oneself” but rather the “public 
recognition” of each person’s moral capacity and right to moral empowerment, 
regardless of the incidents of birth status, natural endowment, or luck (Rawls 58, 
Freeman 4).  Reasonable social cooperation refers to “reciprocity” and means that 
everyone needs to end up better off: “no one benefits at the expense of the 
poorest” social members (Freeman 7).  Maldistributive injustice occurs when 
inequalities of primary goods unfairly advantage or disadvantage a person’s “life 
prospects” so that one social member or group becomes “better off” to the 
increasing “detriment of the less well off.”  A just society means that social 
institutions and individual social members will not exaggerate inequalities of 
“native endowments,” “initial social position,” or “good or bad luck over the 
course of life” (Rawls JF 124).  To correct this foreseeable injustice, Rawls 
establishes the “difference principle,” in which he acknowledges that inequalities 
of wealth and income may exist, but posits that an ethical society founded on 
rational cooperation will intervene to redistribute resources for the overall 
betterment of the lowest social members. This is not wholesale egalitarianism, 
because the liberties of moral self-determination take precedence over 
redistribution of wealth.  
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Bufacchi founds his definition of injustice as maldistribution on Rawls’s 
theory, but it is important to note a significant distinction between them.  
Bufacchi, Fraser, Amartya Sen, and Anthony Pogge would all agree that Rawls’s 
encompassing theory does not emphasize the urgency of correcting life-
threatening injustice.  Even though Rawls grounds his work on eighteenth-
century philosophers, like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel 
Kant, his work is in no way dependent upon the historical circumstances of this 
period.  Rather, he revives facets of an earlier methodology to place his work in a 
longer historical conversation about ideal institutional justice.  For example, his 
work assumes that the hypothetical subject would be a “free rational person” as 
well as politically equal.  Neither of these foundations can be assumed for the 
groups my literary texts represent.  These texts are already speaking to an unjust 
society because women, workers, and slaves already lack liberty, already lack the 
recognition of their moral capacity, already lack the opportunity to exert their 
moral will in the world, and already lack political enfranchisement or the means 
to achieve it.  So, on the one hand, Rawls is invaluable as a guide for 
understanding the broadest long-term vision of my texts and for offering a map 
of the vast array of resources my writers target as necessary for a more just 
society.   
On the other hand, his theory does not capture the sense of urgency 
characteristic in the work of Sen, Pogge, Bufacchi, Fraser and my primary texts.  
For example, while he certainly identifies wealth, income, and other natural 
 171  
resources in his list of primary goods, these are secondary to his first principle of 
moral empowerment.  For the other social justice scholars, however, natural 
resources often need to take immediate priority when their denial results in life-
threatening deficits.  Fraser defines three typical manifestations of resource 
deficits that she understands to be unjust under her rubric “the politics of 
redistribution.”   The first deficit is exploitation, which means “having the fruits 
of one’s labor appropriated for the benefit of others.”  The second deficit is 
marginalization, or “being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being 
denied access to income-generating labor altogether.”  The last deficit is 
deprivation, or “being denied an adequate material standard of living” (7). 
Fraser’s definitions align with Pogge’s in that both locate maldistributive 
injustice predominately in economic structures.  Accordingly, activists for 
redistribution would call for “economic restructuring,” which could mean 
raising income, “reorganizing divisions of labor,” or “democratizing the 
procedures by which investment decisions are made” (Fraser 6-7).  Even as these 
definitions provide a concise starting point in contrast to Rawls’s more 
encompassing theory, they are of limited use across my primary texts because 
none of the texts focus on solely economic concerns.    
Despite the profound deficits suffered by women, workers, and slaves, 
none of my texts focuses on solely economic resources—not even Cugoano, who 
represents the most abjectly impoverished and violated collectivity.   To be sure, 
all my writers agree that social justice can mean correcting systemic causes of 
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poverty to ensure all people have a fairer prospect to survive; but mere survival 
is not enough.  Thriving as cooperative moral agents whose contributions are 
properly rewarded and equitably esteemed is also necessary.  Therefore, I use all 
of these theories to define the parameters through which to read Wollstonecraft, 
Cugoano, and Godwin.  Fraser offers a way to understand how the writers 
address minimal standards of subsistence, while Rawls helps me recognize the 
more sweeping and long-term changes each writer envisions for a more just 
society.  Finally, Thomas Pogge offers the most poignant account of the 
conditions of “radical inequality”: the “worse-off” social members are abjectly 
and blatantly so; they are worse off than most, if not all, other social members. 
They are so abjectly exploited that it is nearly “impossible … to improve their 
lot.”  Their inequality pervasively affects “all aspects” of life and is avoidable, so 
that better-off social members can ameliorate the condition without becoming 
badly off themselves. Finally, the “better-off” have “no vivid idea of what it is 
like to live in that way” (World Poverty and Human Rights, Second Edition, 2002;  
204).   Pogge recognizes how radical inequality is in fact violence, and oftentimes 
violence of an arbitrary nature since “feasible institutional alternatives” and 
“feasible reforms” are likely available (205, 178). Akin to Rawls’s difference 
principle, Pogge asserts the moral imperative of a just society to pursue reforms 
or institutional alternatives to ameliorate or eradicate radical and violent 
inequality.  
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Pogge’s work intersects with Rawls since the imposition of such abject 
poverty and exploitation could never be agreed upon by reasonable people. My 
primary texts understand how women, workers, and slaves have all been denied 
the recognition and respect of their moral capacities, as innate capacity and as a 
right to cultivate this capacity. They therefore already implicitly protest unjust 
social arrangements to which women, workers, and slaves have not reasonably 
agreed.  Even so, Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin identify additional 
goods, or social and natural resources, necessary for women, workers, or slaves 
to achieve a self-determined good life, or, at least, a life not predicated on 
violence.  This chapter explores how each writer the resources each author 
targets for redistribution with the aim to improve the life prospects of the 
collectivities they represent.  As stated in my introduction, the writers approach 
social justice from the ground up by examining the actual lives and prospects of 
oppressed peoples. They identify a multitude of resources that cover the full 
range of Rawls’s categories of primary goods. I focus on the resources that seem 
most urgent and fully developed toward achieving each author’s long-term 
vision. Amartya Sen stresses the importance of ending “manifest injustice,” 
holding Rawls’s “transcendental theory” as somewhat negligent for failing to 
meet urgent needs (7, 19).  I situate my primary texts between these visions of 
justice.  Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin protest manifest injustice, but do 
so with a longer view of transcending injustice for the wholesale benefit of all 
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social members.  Most importantly, these texts work from the ground up, first 
citing injustices and then working toward solutions to those injustices.   
Cugoano and Exploitation 
 In his book, Moral Capital (2006), Christopher Leslie Brown reevaluates the 
British abolitionist movement, retracing how a pre-parliamentary “antislavery 
sentiment” gradually built momentum into a full abolitionist campaign.  Brown 
notes, “The morality of the slave system had troubled men and women for 
decades, but no one in Britain had attempted to overthrow it” (24).  He asks how 
the seemingly sudden momentum came about and why it happened in the later 
decades of the eighteenth century.  Most accounts of the abolitionist movement 
focus on the later generation of political, parliamentary advocates. But for 
Brown, this is the dénouement of a much longer history of “abolitionism,” a term 
he uses to distinguish an earlier era of antislavery ideology foundational to the 
later, organized abolitionist movement.  Moral Capital voices dissatisfaction with 
two split traditions in historical understandings of the abolitionist movement.  
On one side, scholars studying the later formal abolitionist movement offer too 
narrow a view; they “either fail to analyze or severely condense the problem of 
beginnings;” in studying the abolitionist movement only at the founding of the 
Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, these researchers 
connect the success of the British abolitionist movement to economic decline in 
the British colonies coinciding with the rise of capitalism and free labor ideology 
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(18-21).13  Meanwhile, another critical thread examines the roots of antislavery 
ideology at an earlier period, but falls into oversimplification and tautology, 
locating antislavery sentiment as “arising from climates of opinion” vaguely 
labeled as humanitarian discourses of “‘the Enlightenment’” or of 
“‘Evangelicalism.’”  
Brown seeks to bridge this gap and especially hopes to bring the human 
element into view, to understand what events sparked antislavery sentiment into 
social action: “British mobilization would never have developed if particular 
individuals and groups had not conspired to create it.”  Without attempting to 
“lionize” the key figures of early abolitionism, he reexamines “familiar 
protagonists,” like Anthony Benezet, Thomas Clarkson, Williams Dillwyn, 
Olaudah Equiano, Hannah More, Margaret Middleton, James Ramsay, Granville 
Sharp, Phillis Wheatley, and William Wilberforce.  If none of these persons 
“began life as an abolitionist,” then Brown asks what experiences led them to 
become abolitionists at a time when “abolishing any aspect of the slave system” 
could not have been “regarded as a plausible project” (21-25).  Even though 
Brown briefly credits the insurrections of slaves themselves with influencing the 
eventual success of the British abolitionist movement, his concern is with how 
the early abolitionists encountered and responded to legalized violence against 
slaves. Thus, Brown locates moments of transformation for many of these key 
                                                
13 Critics such as Frank Joseph Klingberg, Sir Reginald Coupland, Dale H. Porter, Roger 
Anstey, C. Duncan Rice, and James Walvin 
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figures.  For example, he writes that “Granville Sharp did not begin life as a 
humanitarian.  The antics of slaveholders made him one” (93). One of those 
antics was slaveholder David Lisle’s attempt to “reclaim” and ship to the 
Caribbean the brutalized slave, Jonathon Strong, after Lisle nearly beat Strong to 
death and indeed left him for dead on a London street.  Brown reasons that it 
was not the brutality of the beating that influenced Sharp, since beatings of black 
and white servants alike were commonplace.  Sharp was motivated, rather, by 
the peculiar legality that gave Lisle rights to assault, repossess, and remove his 
cast-off slave back to plantation slavery.  For Sharp and many other early 
abolitionists, the problem was the apparent emergence and growth of slavery in 
England proper that propelled their work, more than antiracist or equal rights 
motives.   
I introduce this section with Brown because he helps me articulate a 
couple of meaningful problems related to Cugoano and the place Afro-Britons 
occupy in historical interpretations of abolitionism.  First, once again, Cugoano 
receives only brief mention in Brown’s splendidly detailed, historically 
expansive, and often compassionate study.  The few substantial essays on 
Cugoano, which I surveyed in my introduction, tend to view this writer in 
isolation, or place Cugoano in dialogue with other Black writers, isolating all of 
them from the larger abolitionist movement.  Thoughts and Sentiments, published 
in 1787, falls just outside Brown’s temporal parameter.  But, although Brown 
includes some Afro-Britons in his work, Equiano and Wheatley likewise get 
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rather short attention.  For Brown, like many scholars before him, the white 
abolitionists are rather viewed as benevolent patrons of Afro-Britons in England.   
If “Black leaders like Equiano … emerged in London during the 1780s,” 
then those Black spokespersons “took advantage of the emerging antislavery 
movement to claim a public voice for themselves.”  The antislavery campaign 
changed the lives of its Black participants, even as those participants influenced 
the campaign, “sometimes push[ing] the antislavery cause far beyond the aims of 
its British organizers” (296).  Cugoano is one of those radical Black 
emancipationists.  Part of what makes him so radical is his articulation of 
maldistributive injustice as a consolidation of the grossest forms of coercion, 
negligence, deprivation, violence, and exploitation onto the collective body of 
African slaves.  The second aspect that makes Cugoano radical is his constant 
centering of the victim.  In Chapter 2, Cugoano avoids the pitfalls of essentialist 
debates by redefining moral worth by behavior. However, when he addresses 
injustice as maldistribution, he emphasizes the experience of victims.    
 When reading Thoughts and Sentiments through the lens of injustice as 
maldistribution, readers might expect Cugoano to begin by articulating the 
deprivations of the basic needs of slaves.  Cugoano certainly does so, but his 
work is no simple survey of deprivation.  Perhaps, one reason for this is because 
Anthony Benezet had exposed the deprivations of slavery two decades before 
Thoughts and Sentiments in his treatise, Some Historical Account of Guinea, Its 
Situation, Produce, and the General Disposition of Its Inhabitants. With an inquiry into 
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the rise and progress of the slave trade, its nature, and lamentable effects. Also a 
republication of the sentiments of several authors of note on this interesting subject: 
particularly an extract of a treatise written by Granville Sharpe. By Anthony Benezet 
(1772).  Quoting an even earlier, anonymous work on American slavery, Benezet 
exposes how “‘The Negroes in our Colonies endure a slavery more compleat and 
attended with far worse circumstances than what any people in their condition 
suffer in any other part of the world, or have suffered in any other period of 
time’” (86).  Next, Benezet supplements that general assessment with Thomas 
Jeffrey’s more detailed account of slaves’ “‘misery’” and “‘wretched’” 
“‘condition’” of “‘servitude,’” in which they are “‘in a manner reduced to the 
condition of beasts of burden.”  Jeffrey describes the deprivations of subsistence 
in the form of food, clothing, and shelter along with the routine violence suffered 
by the enslaved:     
“In general a few roots, potatoes especially, are their food, and two rags, 
which neither screen them from the heat of the day, nor the extraordinary 
coolness of the night, all their covering; their sleep very short; their labour 
almost continual, they receive no wages, but have twenty lashes for the 
smallest fault.”                   Benezet  87 
Cugoano assumes his readers are already to some degree aware of these earlier 
accounts, but he places new emphasis on the degree of abjection, the frequency 
of violence, and the routine resistance of slaves themselves to move descriptions 
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of deprivation toward their more extreme form of exploitation predicated on 
violent acts of coercion.   
 First, he emphasizes coercion through his repeated motif of chains to bear 
witness to the particularly violent form chattel slavery takes.  His first set of 
chain images occur at the beginning of the text, all coming in rapid succession as 
part of his personal narrative of capture. Through his childish eyes, he recounts, 
“I saw many of my countrymen chained two and two, some hand-cuffed, and 
some with their hands tied behind.”  Escorted by “treachery” and death threats, 
he arrives at the African coast to be forced aboard the slave ship: “But when the 
vessel arrived to conduct us away to the ship, it was a most horrible scene; there 
was nothing to be heard but the rattling of chains, smacking of whips, and the 
groans and cries of our fellow-men.” Aboard the slave ship bound for the 
colonies on the Middle Passage, he exposes how “it was common for the dirty 
filthy sailors to take the African women and lie upon their bodies [while] the 
men were chained and pent up in holes” (14-15).  These images come in the 
context of his own narrative of capture, a circumstance that made him both 
victim and witness to the entire “factory” system of enslavement that required 
constant guard, weaponry, trickery, confinement, rape, flogging, and 
innumerous, merciless acts of violence to subdue and secure unwilling, human 
cargo (12).  Such images are fitting illustrations for an abolitionist text that 
protests the British slave trade and the entire international slave economy that 
spanned across the Atlantic.  Cugoano places a renewed and extended emphasis 
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through his eyewitness account on the acts of “barbarity” of the slave trade, the 
slave ship itself, and, later, the systemized violence of plantation slavery. He also 
implies the culpability of the British reader who consumes and profits from the 
products of slavery.  
 Cugoano highlights slave resistance and the coercive nature of violence 
inflicted upon slaves.  For example, he shows how the entire system of slavery is 
predated on coercion in the forms of kidnapping, entrapment, and death threats. 
In his personal narrative, he describes his childhood capture at knifepoint and 
gunpoint from which he and his companions, though mere children, attempted 
to flee: “Some of us attempted in vain to run away, but pistols and cutlasses were 
soon introduced, threatening, that if we offered to stir we should all lie dead on 
the spot” (13). He describes the attempted but failed shipboard mutiny during 
the Middle Passage: “when we found ourselves at last taken away, death was 
more preferable than life, and a plan was concerted amongst us, that we might 
burn and blow up the ship” (15). Cugoano asserts that “It is the duty of every 
man to deliver himself from rogues and villains if he can” (4).  He argues that no 
law is binding if based on the non-consent, therefore all the laws on England that 
legalize slavery and attempt to govern it in the colonies are non-binding for the 
slave: “a man may lawfully defend himself, and endeavour to secure himself, 
and others, as far as he can, from injuries of every kind” (59). As Vincent Carretta 
explains, Cugoano “believes that slaves have not only the right but the obligation 
to rebel” (Thoughts and Sentiments xxi), and the author routinely shows slaves 
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trying to avoid, escape, or die before submitting to slavery.  He thus wants to 
demonstrate how slavery is predicated on non-consent; it is non-cooperative 
social arrangement to which no enslaved person has ever consented, therefore it 
is unlawful in the eyes of God and by the laws of contracts to which proslavery 
writers so often refer.  Coercion by definition nullifies the supposed contract of 
slavery because it operates through threat and force; it compels nonconsensual 
behavior in the forms of rape, forced reproduction, and compulsory labor; and, 
most importantly, it nullifies human will through restraint and domination.   
Brown suggests that even Granville Sharp may have been less motivated to 
abolitionism by his witness of violence than to the “antics” of slaveowners.  He, 
like other Britons, may have been more tolerant of corporeal punishment.   
 Moreover, many Britons, perhaps partly disbelieving antislavery tracts, 
may have thought the corporeal punishment of slavery akin to that of local 
servants or even indentured servants in the colonies. Cugoano centers that 
violence to show the absolute abjection of slaves that is not just relatively 
comparable to other impoverished groups.  Slaves are wholly dehumanized.  
Violence accomplishes the task, and slaveowners are well-studied in its effects.   
His childhood abduction and portrayal of the middle passage displays the 
brutality requisite to conquer a resistant people.  Soon, in Grenada, “without any 
hope of deliverance,” he observes how slavery consolidates deprivation, in the 
form of starvation; exploitation, in the form of forced labor; and yet more 
brutality, in the ruthless and regular beatings of starving slaves who dare to 
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chew the sugarcane which their own labor has produced: “For eating a piece of 
sugarcane, some were cruelly lashed, or struck over the face to knock their teeth 
out” (16).  Other slaves have their teeth deliberately extracted as a systemic 
deterrent to others even before attempting to stave off their starvation.  Cugoano 
recognizes how regular beatings result in concussed brain damage, for those who 
do not die from such frequent and merciless abuse, soon grow “stupid with 
many cruel beatings and lashings” combined with constant “hunger and hard 
labour” (16).  The unadulterated, abject nature of slavery allows Cugoano to 
demonstrate several forms of maldistributive injustice within brief but dense 
illustrations.  The slaves are not well-maintained, and, desperate from food 
deprivation, they risk extreme punishment or even death just for a taste of 
nourishment.  This is not only deprivation, but the most extreme form of 
exploitation in that slaves are entitled to no share, not even a morsel, of the crop 
that is the fruit of their own labor— the sugar their hands produce and which 
British consumers take for granted on their tables.  But most significantly for 
Cugoano is the calculated systemic dehumanization process observed here. The 
slave-traders and slave-owners well know the accumulative effects of 
psychological threat and direct violence on the enslaved, the power of brutality 
to stupefy, scare, sacrifice, and subdue unwilling victims through deliberate 
demonstrations of the master’s unrestrained power and the victims unmitigated 
worthlessness.  
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 To reflect that brutalizer’s mentality and experience of abject 
victimization, Cugoano repeatedly draws upon a repeat motif of animal imagery 
and the hunt to show the total abjection of chattel slavery and persistent 
resistance of African people.  Animal imagery demonstrates this author’s 
profound understanding of how the absolute exploitation of chattel slavery is 
synonymous with total dehumanization.  He thus anticipates the work of David 
Livingstone Smith in his book Less Than Human:  Why We Demean, Enslave, and 
Exterminate Others (2011), in which Smith defines the connection between 
exploitation and dehumanization through extensive, comparative historical and 
cultural descriptive analyses.  Smith asserts that, “although scholars from a wide 
range of disciplines are convinced that dehumanization plays a crucial role in 
war, genocide, and other forms of brutality, writings on the subject are 
shockingly thin on the ground.”  Smith focuses “on the dehumanization of Jews, 
sub-Saharan Africans, and Native Americans” because “the horrors” of their 
“persecution, enslavement, and destruction” have had “immense historical 
significance” that “in many respects are unparalleled” (6).  Dehumanization, 
predicated upon defining groups as less than human, as lacking some essential 
attribute necessary to qualify as such, serves a psychologically distancing 
function which Smith calls a “rhetoric of enmity,” in which war, murder, rape, 
and torture are morally and psychologically sanctioned and even encouraged 
(Smith 103).  The mentality of enmity enables the brutalizer to violently exploit 
his victim from a socially-sanctioned attitude.  Smith’s work intersects with 
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Bufacchi, Fraser, and Rawls who all maintain the interconnected nature of 
injustice, in which the lack of human recognition, moral exclusion, and social 
disrespect all feed into the socioeconomic exploitive practices of social injustice 
as maldistribution.  The difference for Smith, and the reason I include him here, 
is his level of specificity in identifying how propagandistic animalistic language 
helps create that social and psychological enmity for the most horrific degrees of 
exploitation, such as war, genocide, and slavery.       
 For example, Nazis “labeled Jews as Untermenschen (“subhuman”) 
because they were convinced that, although Jews looked every bit as human as 
the average Aryan, this was a façade and that, concealed behind it, Jews were 
really filthy, parasitic vermin … They were regarded as insidiously subhuman.  
Their ostensible humanity was, at best, only skin deep” (5).  Just as Jews were 
maligned in World War II Nazi propaganda films, so were the Native American 
and African peoples subjected to genocide and slavery from the sixteenth 
century and onward throughout the eighteenth-century, and with remarkably 
similar slurs across the European nations that engaged in colonialism and 
slavery.  During the first phase of European colonialism, the Spanish debated the 
human status of Native Americans, with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda arguing for 
the forceful enslavement or slaughter of Native Americans based on the claim 
that they were “‘by nature, uncivilized, barbarian and inhuman;’” they were 
more “‘like beasts’” than persons (77).  Englishmen did no better, with Captain 
John Smith calling the Powhatan Indians “‘cruell beasts’ with ‘a more unnatural 
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brutishness than beasts;’” with Samuel Purchas’s popular travel books in 
England informing the reading public that Indians only had the shape of a 
human but were actually even more debased than the creatures they hunted to 
eat; and with Wait Winthrop supporting extermination of the Narragansett 
Indians as “‘flies,’” “‘rats,” “‘mice,’” and “‘swarms of lice’” (Smith 81-82).  
Therefore, modern chattel slavery ought to be understood as a scant step from a 
more direct state of war in that forced servitude takes priority over genocide—
but only so long as the slave can be made useful.   
Indeed, Cugoano’s succinct account of the violence aboard the slave ship 
already details the ways in which, as Smith also observes, African slaves were 
considered “human beasts,” “recruited to work alongside oxen and donkeys, or 
in the case of many captive women, to satisfy the victors’ sexual urges.”  
Cugoano’s description of guns, knives, whips, chains, beatings, lashings, and 
tooth extractions reflect the ways slaves endured the same disciplinary modes of 
control as domestic animals, such as “‘whipping, chaining, branding, castration, 
cropping ears’” (Smith 107).  But Cugoano returns to these images again and 
again, uncompromisingly and unprecedentedly.  At times, he confesses near 
speechlessness at the horror he has seen: “To give any just conception of the 
barbarous traffic carried on at those factories, it would be out of my power to 
describe the miserable situation of the poor exiled Africans, which by the craft of 
wicked men daily become their prey” (Cugoano 73).  He does not refrain from 
trying.   
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His is among few Black eyewitness accounts of the slave system, and he 
persistently stresses the violence and the trauma of that structure, the cruelty of 
the social agent who inflicts harm and the reprehensible consequences of that 
injury to victims.  In a later extended passage in which he reiterates the 
systemized “factories” of slavery, each sentence he constructs pairs the 
“inhuman” actor and the dehumanized victim.  For example, he points to the 
“treacherous, perfidious and cruel methods made use of” by European slavers on 
African soil, which “are horrible and shocking” to unsuspecting African men, 
women, and children.  Next, he documents the combined physical pain and 
psychological shame of “subjecting [Africans] to brutal examinations stripped 
naked and markings” as he simultaneously calls attention to the “barbarous and 
base” abuser.  In the very next sentence, he confronts “the unfeeling monsters of 
Captains” responsible for “stowing” Africans “in the holds of the ships like 
goods of burden, with closeness and stench” (74).  Arrived in the colonies, 
African people “are again stripped naked for the brutal examination of their 
purchasers to view them, which, to many, must add shame and grief to their 
other woe, as may be evidently seen with sorrow, melancholy and despair 
marked upon their countenances” (74). He never allows the reader to ignore the 
social actor, the criminally “vicious” European; he comprehends the systemic 
manner in which physical and psychological brutality serve exploitative 
purposes, to stupefy victims into submission.  For the enslaved, social disrespect 
takes on the singular meaning of unqualified abjection predicated on studied, 
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systemic violence from the moment of capture until the moment of death.  
Cugoano’s consolidated interrogation of injustice as maldistribution and 
dehumanization coincides with Pogge’s work on radical inequality. Thoughts and 
Sentiments illustrates through vivid animalistic imagery and scenes of violence 
the abject conditions of slavery that those “better-off” readers have no “no vivid 
idea of what it is like to live” amidst.  
Cugoano, like Smith, uncovers how the radical inequality of slavery is so 
wholly absolute that the slave’s life is only of value so long as he is exploitable 
for labor: “But our lives are accounted of no value, we are hunted after as the 
prey in the desart, and doomed to destruction as the beasts that perish” (85-86).  
Slaveholders claim that plantation slaves suffer no worse than “the poor in 
Great-Britain and Ireland labour under,” but Cugoano avows that “the poorest in 
England would not change their situation for that of slaves” (19).  “No freeman,” 
he continues, “would resign his liberty for that of a slave, in the situation of a 
horse or a dog.” No poor but free laborer, however difficult his circumstance, has 
so little human value as to be “bought and sold” “like animals.”  The employers 
of poor laborers or servants in England may beat their inferiors, but they may not 
exert unremitting violence as do the “capricious owners” of slaves, whose 
“torturing and tearing [slaves] to pieces, and wearing them out with hard 
labour” is legally sanctioned.  Moreover, “should the death of a slave ensue by 
some other more violent way than that which is commonly the death of 
thousands, and tens of thousands in the end, the haughty tyrant, in that case, has 
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only to pay a small fine for the murder and death of his slave” (19-20).  Cugoano 
rejects any argument that likens slavery to typical British servitude or day labor; 
he likewise rejects proslavery arguments that accuse other nations of worse 
atrocities; and he indicts such arguments as symptomatic of exactly that “rhetoric 
of enmity” that Smith describes.  Cugoano voices his utter shock, indeed 
repugnance, at the backwards audacity of defenses for slavery based on worse or 
worst degrees of hardship, destitution, and degrees of viciousness: “An equal 
degree of enormity found in one place, cannot justify crimes of as great or greater 
enormity committed in another” (21).  If any worse condition could be found 
than modern chattel slavery, then this should only motivate its total and 
immediate abolition.  But the mark of proslavery degeneracy is its backward 
logic, or “strange perversion of reason,” that justifies evil with evil (29). 
  Cugoano may seem to run the risk of resurrecting violent colonial 
propaganda, but his relentless use of animal and hunting imagery is a calculated 
risk to harness the language of disrespect to make visible its sinister power to 
generate incalculable acts of real violence.  Recurrent use of animal and hunting 
metaphors reflects onto the British public its own culpability in even passively 
benefiting from criminally coercive slavery.  In addition to these frequent images 
of abject misery, Cugoano lists the many other acts of unjust coercion, such as 
theft, kidnapping, human trafficking, “robbery and murder,” that manufacture 
the most criminal enterprise of all, the “involuntary servitude” of “slavery” (86).  
Even though he earlier asserts the intellectual and rational capacity of Africans, 
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his jeremiad emphasizes maldistributive injustice in the most extreme forms of 
deadly violence and deadly exploitation; he thus frames European colonialism, 
imperialism, and systemic slavery as legally criminal and spiritually wicked.  
Cugoano does not always distinguish between the active proponents and passive 
beneficiaries of slavery, nor does he limit his outlook to single nations as offering 
better or worse forms of enslavement.  From the African perspective, all “the 
inhabitants of Europe” have colluded to “grievously injure” Africans.  The 
“blood of millions,” “the groans and cries of the murdered” “cry out against 
them” and “cry for justice” (21, 49).   
 Thoughts and Sentiments deploys animal imagery to reflect the radical 
inequality of slavery predicated on dehumanizing violence, serving exploitative 
intentions for the benefit of the European, and always placing Africans in the 
“worse off,” indeed worst possible state of existence.  Slavery is not just 
marginalization, it is life-threatening forced labor; it is not just exploitation, it is 
life-threatening theft; it is not just deprivation, it is life-threatening poverty; it is 
not just dehumanization, it is often death. The author declaims proslavery 
postures of humanity, “it is not the intention of those who bring them away to 
make them better by it; nor is the design of slave-holders of any other intention, 
but that they may serve them as a kind of engines and beasts of burden” (23).  
Here Cugoano refers to that familiar paternalistic pretense of the proslavery 
position in which slave traders claimed it their civilizing mission to rescue Blacks 
from poverty, ignorance, and heathenism in Africa. The slaveholder took a pose 
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of paternalistic benevolence, claiming custodial guardianship of childlike and 
“grateful slaves” (George Boulukos, The Grateful Slave, 1).  Cugoano seeks to 
counteract this rising discourse of paternalism in his sustained debunking of 
proslavery rhetoric and radical supplementation of antislavery arguments by 
drawing on the language of rights and liberties, portraying abject poverty, 
displaying exploitation that dehumanizes, and demonstrating how all of these 
violations defy international civility through global conspiracy against many 
sovereign peoples.   
My understanding of Cugoano’s rhetoric of international civility intersects 
with Sandiford’s assertion that “Cugoano seems to take as his basic assumption 
the view that a love of liberty and a desire to extend those benefits to one’s 
fellows without discrimination should be an indispensable rule of conduct for an 
enlightened, civilized people” (105).  Cugoano exhibits the African’s love of 
liberty in three key ways.  First, he directly states this as fact, that Africans have a 
profound, deeply held value of liberty as much as any British citizen.  Second, he 
exhibits the African’s love of liberty through those lamentable images of Africans 
rather choosing to die than relinquish freedom. Third, he displays it implicitly 
through the language of the hunt, in which fleeing Africans, striving for freedom 
and liberty, run from their pursuing captors.  Sandiford surmises that Cugoano 
could not reconcile pretenses of European enlightenment and progress with the 
economic system of slavery.  Indeed, figuring Africans as hunted simultaneously 
figures the European as “unjust” “ruffians and barbarians,” as “thieves and 
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vagabonds,” as “pirates, thieves, and robbers,” and as “persecutors and 
murderers” (Cugoano 3, 10, 19, 90).   
Slavery is an unjust institution because it betrays all the values of moral, 
fair, and equitable social cooperation, any single condition of which qualifies as 
maldistributive injustice. Predicated on corporeal violence, psychological 
intimidation, murder, and abduction, its manifold coercive foundations oppose 
any notion of social cooperation, moral choice, or rational self-determination.  
Even more specifically, slavery violates the rights and liberties of “freedom of 
association,” “freedom of movement, occupation, and right to personal 
property.”  Slaves have no freedom of association, forcibly removed from their 
communities, homelands, religions, families, and nations.  They have no freedom 
of movement, kidnapped, held at gunpoint and by death threats, enchained, 
whipped, confined in pens, sold like animals, and slaughtered. They have no 
choice of occupation save unpaid labor or death.  Slavery, in fact, consolidates all 
the forms of economic injustice detailed by Fraser, since the fruits of the slave’s 
labor always serves another’s benefit (exploitation); since the slave is denied 
income-generating labor altogether in the most undesirable of occupations 
(marginalization); and since the starved, naked, and homeless slave is denied an 
adequate standard of living, or a life at all (deprivation).  They have no personal 
property, since they have no claim to a single product of their own labor, not the 
millions of pounds of sugarcane or tobacco they produce; nor even parental 
rights, as “fathers, mothers, and children … have been barbarously tore away 
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from” each other and “their native shore” (74).  Africans have been robbed of 
their homeland and properties there, of their families and communities, and of 
themselves: “but they take a man himself, and subject him to their service and 
bondage, which is a greater robbery, and a greater crime, than taking away any 
property from men whatsoever” (71).  Jeffrey Gunn narrowly classifies many of 
these crimes as forms of theft, but I demonstrate how Cugoano in fact covers an 
expansive range of rights and liberties to expose the “perfidious and cruel 
methods” of slavery that violate all notions of “moral rectitude, justice, equity 
and righteousness,” all the core values of just social cooperation (43).  As 
Cugoano says it best, no man, woman, or child would choose “a state of a degree 
equal to that of a cow or a horse” (23).   
Manifold maldistributive injustice runs “contrary to all the genuine 
principles of Christianity,” “contrary to the natural liberties of men,” and 
“contrary to that which is good” (24, 35, 40).  Images that figure the European 
participant in slavery as a thief, criminal, pirate, or murderer point to his 
“willful” hypocrisy “contrary to all the boasted accomplishments” of 
Enlightened, civilized, Christian Europe (49).  Cugoano castigates direct 
participants and indirect beneficiaries of an economic system predicated on 
conspiracy, non-consent, and brutality: “if you give it a sanction by your passive 
obedience, it manifests that you have gone over to those brutish enemies of 
mankind, and can in no way be a true lover of your king and country” (95).  He 
makes slavery an issue of civic interest and patriotism.  In A Representation of the 
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Injustice and Dangerous Tendency of Tolerating Slavery; or of Admitting the Least 
Claim of Private Property in the Persons of Men, in England (1769), Sharp examines 
the legality of slavery within England proper under British law and condemns 
the institution of slavery as immoral according to Christian precepts: “Slavery is 
destructive of morality and charity, and cannot therefore be consistent with the 
Christian religion; because it gives worldly minded men a power to deprive their 
Slaves of instruction and spiritual improvement, by continually oppressing them 
with labour” (162). For Sharp, slavery is illegal in England, unchristian for its 
moral incapacitation of the dispossessed, and corruptive through its unequal 
power relation between master and slave.  Cugoano agrees with Sharp, and he 
illustrates that abject inequality and corrupted nature of enslavers through the 
sustained motif of animals and images of violence.  Slavery is a consolidated 
form of socioeconomic maldistribution, and it is an international moral-spiritual 
disaster.  Active and passive supporters of slavery willfully betray the 
“irreversible and universal” “laws of civility” founded in Genesis (54, 90).  The 
law of nation ought to reflect the “law of God” (55).  The ultimate crime of 
slavery is its inversion of the law of God that forbids coercion, robbery, and 
murder; man-made laws sanction an economic system in betrayal of divine 
commandments. Biblical law requires restitution for these betrayals: death to 
covetous thieves and death to murderers.  Slaves are within their rights to 
demand this restitution.  
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And not just slaves; millions of Africans and other Native peoples across 
the globe have suffered acts of violence tantamount to war and calculated 
genocide.  Unprecedentedly, Cugoano extends the concept of law from one of 
national interest to one of expansive international genocide when he links the 
shared histories and experiences of violence between African and Native 
American victims of the European colonial enterprise. Proslavery rhetoric bases 
its benevolent mythos on the civilizing mission, in its moving groups of people 
away from geographical locations already characterizes by a scarcity of resources 
and goods to locations in which those groups would gain access to more 
resources, goods, and opportunities.  Proslavery rhetoric, therefore, creates a 
myth of its own redistributive justice.  It looks to the supposed lack of 
educational, governmental, judicial, religious, and moral systems of Africans, as 
it did in earlier centuries regarding Native Americans, as rational explanation for 
invasion, colonialism, and slavery.  Citing these various socioeconomic 
resources, moreover, suggests a definition of sovereign nationhood based on 
geographical boundaries, government systems, and even the moral foundations 
and customs of community.  Eighteenth-century thought associates all of these 
systems with civil society and moral individuals. In turn, the moral citizen is the 
foundation of the moral nation.   
In debunking proslavery rhetoric, Cugoano locates his cry for justice 
within these complex associations.  He condemns the entire British nation 
alongside all European invaders of other sovereign nations, such as those many 
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African nations and all the Native peoples stretching across the Americans, Asia, 
and India.  He indicts entire government systems and rulers: “Wherefore, if 
kings and nations, or any men that dealeth unjustly with their fellow-creatures, 
to ensnare them, to enslave them, and to oppress them … when they have the 
power to prevent it … can it ever be thought that God be well pleased with 
them?” (85).  Slave traders as well as the plantation owners claiming British 
nationality, directly affect and reflect upon the entire moral character of their 
nation.  Moreover, Cugoano radically asserts that the active and passive 
beneficiaries of slavery are equally culpable for national evils.   But what is the 
extent of those evils?  Cugoano connects the national histories of Britain, Spain, 
and the other “Christian Nations,” to demonstrate a shared European history of 
colonial genocide and apartheid: “an hundred thousand” Africans killed 
annually in the slave trade, “hundreds of thousands” more held in bondage, 
“eleven million” slaughtered Native Americans, and “twelve million” starved 
and oppressed “in Asia” (68, 90). Cugoano exhibits a shared empathy with all of 
the colonized peoples of European imperialism; he rightly recognizes the global 
“business” in “bloodshed;” and he thus reveals the international conspiracy of 
“the West” which only arbitrarily recognizes civic nationhood (75-76).  
Imperial fantasies of economic, sexual, and social liberty for Europeans 
manifest as exploitation, rape, and bondage of Asian, Native American, and 
African peoples. No native peoples have ever been “made better” by these 
actions, and the criminal depravity rampant in European brutality suggests they 
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have been made no morally better either (Cugoano 23).  But it appears that these 
crimes also penetrate Britain too.  In the same year that Thoughts and Sentiments 
was published, another British abolitionist, Thomas Clarkson, was nearly 
assassinated for similar anti-slavery efforts; this event suggests the tremendous 
risk of radical abolitionist work and points to the accuracy of Cugoano’s moral 
indictment against its participants. Thoughts and Sentiments employs a mode of 
inversion to deconstruct European colonial and racial myths. And through the 
narrative of forced migration, animal imagery, and portraits of violence, 
Cugoano tries to educate the largely ignorant British public about the invisible 
crime of slavery, its supporting institutions, and the manifold forms of 
maldistributive injustice founded on violence and dehumanization.  He 
furthermore rejects notions of amelioration, demands immediate and “total 
abolition,” and calls for “universal emancipation … of all the Black People” (91).  
He even suggests legislation to impose penalties against slave ships and military 
deployment to stop further slave traffic. Cugoano’s forced migration to the 
British colonies and Britain both subjugates him and empowers him as a 
transatlantic witness to the global conspiracy of the West.  To an unprecedented 
degree, he recognizes the many structures of an international slave economy, and 
his sophisticated deployment of scripture and rationality is a radical 
demonstration of subaltern cultural appropriation against social injustice. 
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Wollstonecraft and Deprivation 
   If Amartya Sen rips a page out of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman, then 
the theme of that page is the balance between rights and duties, or what he calls 
“deontological demands” (Sen 19).  When Wollstonecraft discusses women’s 
entrapment by limited choices, especially regarding chastity, she makes a 
deontological argument.  Chastity serves as an illustration for the way 
Wollstonecraft understands injustice as exclusion to be interwoven with injustice 
as maldistribution.  In my previous chapter, I claimed that a dark situational 
irony informs Rights of Woman.  My emphasis there was on Wollstonecraft’s 
articulation of the deleterious consequences of the sexual double standard for 
women’s identities in terms of their daily lives, meaning the range of harms they 
come to at one extreme, in contrast to the best they can accomplish at the other 
extreme. For women to survive and to receive any modicum of social respect, 
they must either be chaste or maintain the perfect reputation of chastity in order 
to make an advantageous marriage.  Otherwise, they fall into absolute ruin.  At 
best, the unchaste woman suffers total social alienation; at worst, she dies; most 
likely both.  Thus, Wollstonecraft argues that the sexual double standard, with its 
life-threatening stakes for women’s chastity (but not men’s), may indeed achieve 
a seemingly moral consequence in curtailing “intemperance” (216).  However, 
the dire consequences of being unchaste mean that women have no fair choice at 
all.  Chastity becomes an unfair burden of social cooperation because it is a non-
negotiable duty unevenly applied across social members.  More importantly for 
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Wollstonecraft, it means women have no liberty to become moral agents through 
the exercise of their reason.  Women cannot be authentic moral agents unless 
they can set their intentions to good and accomplish that good to fruition.  This 
theme of choice is the predominant feature of Wollstonecraft’s work and, like 
Rawls, her principle subject is moral empowerment.   
Chapter 2 examined how Wollstonecraft understands identity as a social 
construct that discursively and systemically denies woman her capacity for 
moral conscience and human agency.  Wollstonecraft measures identity through 
the emotional, psychological, and spiritual consequences arising from limited 
moral development and agency as those limitations affect women in day-to-day 
ways, even as she always understands those limitations as arbitrarily imposed 
rather than essential aspects of feminine identity.  Her frequently practical focus 
demonstrates how lived experience cannot be separated from the social 
environment.  But as my inclusion of Rawls above should suggest, moral 
incapacitation carries special relevance within a framework of social injustice as 
maldistribution as much as it does for social injustice as exclusion.  If moral 
exclusion denies the moral worthiness of particularized identities and excuses 
unfair behavior towards those identities, then this disregard often manifests itself 
as the maldistribution of social resources and economic goods, cumulatively 
resulting in fewer life options for collectivities who have been subjugated based 
on the initial disrespect of their identity.   
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Wollstonecraft always concerns herself with the practical feasibility of her 
interventions for social reform.  Her outcry against injustice as maldistribution 
most closely follows the top-down aspect of her analysis.  She makes this aspect 
of her strategy clear when she opens the treatise by presenting her long-term 
vision for social reform, which is indeed her widest sweeping demand for 
woman’s full enfranchisement as equal citizens.  She intersperses throughout 
Rights of Woman additional passages that project her vision of women’s more 
complete lives.  For instance, she imagines the strong and dignified widow with 
access to respectable work who can provide the bread for her children should her 
husband die without leaving financial provision.  She imagines women choosing 
love matches in marriage and working as professional doctors and in positions of 
state.  Always a hopeful and long-term visionary, Wollstonecraft never seems 
quite so farsighted as in her first contention for the full rights of citizenship, with 
all that full enfranchisement would entail—access to social resources and 
economic goods largely and often wholly denied to women in this period.   
Framing her smaller visions within this larger, long-term goal of full 
political enfranchisement is in fact one of the strengths of Wollstonecraft's top-
down mode of analysis when scrutinizing the distribution of resources.  She 
articulates her long-term vision, but imagines the smaller, strategic gains in 
education and professionalization as the incremental steps by which women 
could achieve full citizenship one way or another.   One way would be the 
immediate granting of full citizenship by those who govern, such as Talleyrand 
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in France, to whom she dedicates the treatise, even while criticizing his intention 
to perpetuate the disenfranchisement of French women.  She has no illusions that 
immediate and full citizenship is likely for French or British women.  She is 
visionary but realistic.  Therefore, her smaller hopes for women must be read as a 
second route to full citizenship that begins with practical and incremental steps 
strategically aimed to gradually improve the condition of women one by one.  
She envisions how educational improvements could help women gain moral 
agency and a sense of justice.  A modicum of financial independence in the 
world of work or property ownership could empower women to survive outside 
of specifically sexually defined roles like marriage or prostitution.  Through 
moral and financial empowerment, Wollstonecraft imagines women as, 
eventually, developing a collective agency by which to demand full rights and 
liberties as citizens from the bottom up.   
Wollstonecraft’s sweeping vision is full moral citizenship for women and 
all that citizenship entails.  She frames Rights of Woman within this demand in her 
opening dedication to Talleyrand in which she protests the statesman’s support 
for the French constitution of 1791 that planned to totally disenfranchise French 
women from the rights and liberties of citizenship.  She asks him to reconsider 
denying women the rights of citizenship; to reconsider endorsing Rousseau’s 
subservient view of women; and to reconsider designating women to strictly 
domestic education and reproductive functions.  She then advances her 
overarching vision.  Women must attain “knowledge and virtue” through 
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“education” to become “patriots” who have a vested interest in the moral 
welfare of society:  
And how can woman be expected to co-operate unless she know why she 
ought to be virtuous? unless freedom strengthen her reason till she 
comprehend her duty, and see in what manner it is connected with her 
real good?                     66 
. . .  
Consider, I address you as a legislator, whether, when men contend for 
their freedom, and to be allowed to judge for themselves respecting their 
own happiness, it be not inconsistent and unjust to subjugate women, 
even though you firmly believe that you are acting in the manner best 
calculated to promote their happiness? Who made man the exclusive 
judge, if woman partake with him the gift of reason?                         67  
She emphasizes that she is “[c]ontending for the rights of woman,” that “truth 
must be common to all,” and it can “only be produced by considering the moral 
and civil interest in mankind” (66).  Her argument closely aligns with Rawls’ first 
principle, first set of primary goods, and the necessary moral foundations of a 
just society.  Like him, she highlights the themes of liberty and freedom, moral 
empowerment and education, and reciprocal social cooperation and patriotism.  
For women to choose responsible and ethical duties, they must first develop their 
moral capacities.  “Truth,” meaning moral truth and sense of justice, must be 
universally accessible to all social members; without this fundamental right and 
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liberty of conscience, all other duties are invalid, because women start off in 
society as already systemically worse off to the degree that they have no 
conception of the good, the just, or the means to achieve that moral agency.  
Thus, for this writer, moral conscience and the pursuit of it is often synonymous 
with what constitutes a good and complete life.  
 Wollstonecraft incorporates into her views on the necessary rights of 
citizenship the Smithian model of moral development and balance between self-
interest, civic engagement, and spiritual improvement.  Personhood is made up 
of a series of ethical choices in which the moral agent must always negotiate 
between promoting her own dignity and well-being, contributing to the progress 
of civilization through emotional and behavioral integrity, and enhancing the 
overall progress of civilization through empathic interactions with others.  Duties 
that require the sacrifice of an individual’s moral dignity can never be just, 
because such sacrifices under the pretense of duty undermine the necessary 
moral foundation that founds a just society on the dignity of the individual.  In 
practical terms, women’s lives can be neither just nor good unless they have the 
moral judgment by which to determine those standards for themselves.  The 
denial of education effectively denies woman her path to a spiritual 
understanding of herself—a practical ability to choose the most ethical path in 
life each day—and disengages her from those higher motives of civic investment.  
Wollstonecraft again interrogates Talleyrand: “Sir, you will not assert, that a duty 
can be binding which is not founded on reason?” (67).  Her references to 
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cooperation and patriotism founded on reason point to the Rawlsian idea of 
rational reciprocity as the basis of just social cooperation.  Without moral 
empowerment, woman cannot cultivate those necessary, socially stabilizing 
motives of kinship and fellowship that stem from within her own conscience and 
which bind society through sympathetic relations with others.  Without moral 
empowerment, all social arrangements are, by definition, unjustly exploitive 
because they have not been entered into from that free and equal starting point.  
Without moral empowerment, women are not ethically bound to a society that 
does not improve their condition.   
 One of the remarkable features of Wollstonecraft’s methodology is the 
way she sustains a theme across multiple paradigms.  For example, she 
recurrently traces the notion of consent and its converse, coercion, across 
microcosmic interpersonal incidents to macrocosmic global contexts.  In one of 
two allusions to Samuel Richardson’s eighteenth-century masterpiece, the novel 
Clarissa, Wollstonecraft rejects dishonor by rape: “When Richardson makes 
Clarissa tell Lovelace that he had robbed her of her honor, he must have had 
strange notions of honor and virtue. For, miserable beyond all names of misery is 
the condition of a being, who could be degraded without its own consent!”  
(143).  "Miserable" in this context does not mean sad; rather, it means abject.  The 
author anticipates Pogge in her description of women as utterly and blatantly 
abject relative to men, and in the absolute terms of preferring death to dishonor 
(204).   
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 She again addresses the way culture reduces a woman’s moral worth to 
her body: “Nay, the honour of a woman is not made even to depend on her will” 
(143). Again like Pogge, Wollstonecraft describes here the condition of woman as 
unable to improve her lot: her inequality is unavoidable.  Counter to cultural 
norm, Wollstonecraft argues that moral worth for both sexes is a spiritual and 
intellectual ethic dependent on the subject’s self-determination.  Without moral 
empowerment, there is neither good nor evil.  Her deontological ethic of moral 
agency stretches across her conversations on citizenship and bodily rape to show 
how the unavoidable “radical inequality” established at the largest institutional 
level of government authorizes daily acts of coercion, even violence, at the most 
debasing interpersonal level.  Nonrecognition of women as persons capable of 
moral development and worthy of fair regard feeds into injustice as 
maldistribution by enforcing woman’s state of degradation through complete 
disenfranchisement at every level of her existence; as Pogge phrases it, their 
inequality pervasively affects “all aspects” of life.  Even her sexual non-consent is 
disregarded to the extent that bodily rape only justifies her further economic 
abjection and social alienation.  That many or most women, like Clarissa, 
internalize the violence done to their bodies as dishonor upon their moral worth 
and socioeconomic value as objects of marriageability points to the complete 
alienation of woman from that foundational first principle that pairs self-worth 
with a sense of justice, both tied to socioeconomic survival.  
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Thus, Wollstonecraft often links the state of womanhood to that of slavery 
to make visible the injustice of “radical inequality,” which she calls “unnatural 
distinctions:” “They may be convenient slaves, but slavery will have its constant 
effect, degrading the master and the abject dependent” (221, 67).  Woman is like 
the slave who has never consented and would never consent to such miserable, 
servile, and unreasonable social arrangements that damage her development and 
prevent her from even recognizing the wrongness of her own victimization.  That 
most educated men, like the novelist Richardson, hold the same distorted view of 
woman’s honor points to the fallacy of patriarchal dogma that obscures coercion 
with the same posture of paternalistic benevolence that excuses chattel slavery.  
In an echo of the slavery metaphor, Wollstonecraft questions, “Besides, if women 
be educated for dependence; that is, to act according to the will of another fallible 
being, and submit, right or wrong, to power, where are we to stop?” (115).  Here 
she addresses the paternalistic for-your-own-good argument that man governs 
woman to improve her condition.  Oh, really?  “Fallible” and “power” are the 
words to attend to.  Still on the theme of consent and coercion, Wollstonecraft 
shifts her gaze from woman to man, from brutalized to brutalizer, to re-examine 
man’s moral agency.  Given his profoundly greater array of life options and 
power, has man behaved ethically and morally toward woman?  If man has 
undercut woman’s most fundamental right to cultivate her understanding, then 
what might this slippery slope also lead him to deny to her and to other groups 
like colonial slaves?  As it happens, he has already refused additional natural and 
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social resources to keep her ever more “under the yoke” (92).  If Wollstonecraft 
sometimes appears to shift moral blame onto men, it is because they have the 
liberties and choices that women do not, but they have routinely exploited, 
deprived, and marginalized women and other collectivities.  
Wollstonecraft appeals to larger historical and political contexts in her 
rhetorical questions to Talleyrand.  In fact, she rightly sifts through the trappings 
of genre to connect how a seemingly entertaining novel like Clarissa disperses 
injurious viewpoints no less harmful than Talleyrand’s direct political influence.  
Men establish unjust societies founded on unfair systems that rely on 
innumerable acts of coercion and which are initially predicated on two forms of 
moral exception.  Firstly, men exempt themselves from reasonable 
accountability; secondly, they do so by suppressing women as legitimate 
recipients of justice and legitimate advisors for justice.   Addressing Talleyrand, 
Wollstonecraft quotes his own political writing on the rights and liberties of man 
back to him: “‘With one half the human race excluded by the other from all 
participation in government, [is] a political phenomenon that, according to 
abstract principles, it [is] impossible to explain’” (66).  Wollstonecraft resituates 
Talleyrand’s words in the context of her treatise on women’s rights.  In so doing, 
these words take on new meaning to astutely connect how injustice as exclusion 
and injustice as maldistribution against women are both predicated on the moral 
exclusion of women and the moral exemption of men.   
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It is this consistent exclusion and maldistributive denials that demands 
explanation.  She appeals to Talleyrand’s supposed conviction of men’s right to 
“freedom” to “judge for themselves respecting their own happiness” to expose 
his “perverted” reasoning that supports the complete overthrow of the ancien 
régime but disallows women basic rights and liberties by incongruously 
appealing to the traditional patriarchal regime (155).  Wollstonecraft evokes a 
notion of justice founded on defensible and reasonable arguments when she 
demands rational accountability: “If the abstract rights of man will bear 
discussion and explanation, those of woman, by a parity of reasoning, will not 
shrink from the same test:  though a different opinion prevails in this country, 
built on the very arguments which you use to justify the oppression of woman— 
prescription” (67).  Traditional wrongs cannot vindicate perpetual wrongs.  
Talleyrand’s patriarchal viewpoint and paternalistic rationalization makes him as 
irrational and tyrannical as the absolute monarchy he helped to dismantle.  
Wollstonecraft draws on the language of political revolution to evoke the 
possibility of an eventual feminine revolution. 
Wollstonecraft often speaks in philosophical and political diction. Just as 
often, though, she presents injustice as maldistribution as the denial of rights and 
liberties in practical and experiential illustrations that carry the reader from the 
earliest formative years of girlhood to the later state of womanhood.  The 
socialization of woman calculatingly “warps her understanding” and weakens 
her body by preventing her from accessing the intellectual resources and 
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physical freedom available to men in the eighteenth century and which the body 
and mind require for “coherent” strength (Sapiro 69).  Education as schooling is 
itself a socioeconomic resource, but the faculties it could produce, mental and 
physical strength, are of principal (and principle) value for The Rights of Woman, 
since it is only through strength of mind and body that women can achieve 
independence as both moral and socioeconomic agents.  As Sapiro observes, 
Wollstonecraft rejects the belief in “the radical dichotomy between mind and 
body that Enlightenment and liberal thinkers are often credited with fostering” 
(68).  Sapiro also observes how “Wollstonecraft often cautioned that children 
must exercise their minds and bodies to make both strong” (69).  Sapiro makes 
these observations in the context of Wollstonecraft’s rejection of feminine 
sensibility, but I resituate Wollstonecraft’s value of strength as part of the 
author’s extended dialogue on rights and liberties.  Strength of body and mind 
are fundamental rights for the basic functionality of the individual unto herself, 
for her greater socioeconomic independence to work and act in the world for her 
own best interest, and to gauge the motives of others who may not have her best 
interests at heart.   
Education as schooling is itself a socioeconomic resource, but the faculties 
it produces, moral conscience and sense of justice, are of principal (and principle) 
value for The Rights of Woman.  Wollstonecraft frames the denial of rights and 
liberties by their concrete methods and results.  For instance, her bidirectional 
gaze bonds Rousseau and Talleyrand as conspirators. Talleyrand intended to 
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adopt Rousseau’s educational model; therefore, the education and socialization 
processes planned for girls have profound political implications for women.   
Should French or British girls receive any education at all, the educative 
process already coincides with Rousseau’s and Talleyrand’s misguided, 
misogynistic notions to occlude woman’s cultivation of conscience (which 
includes moral reason and a sense of justice) as well as bodily strength, which 
should be the first and necessary foundation of a reciprocally cooperative and 
just society.  I return to Wollstonecraft’s deconstruction of Rousseau to draw out 
how each feature she criticizes in fact corresponds to a specific kind of right and 
liberty, or primary good, listed by Rawls. For example, a young woman 
instructed and confined at home is blocked from freedom of association, which 
would, according to the Smithian model, contribute to the development of 
reason. She is barred from the experience of schooling that would expand the 
young person’s social environment to include not just formal requirements 
inside a classroom, but also the ordinary dialogues and debates that arise in 
educative environments between peers and learning cohorts. Upbringing and 
education likewise deny the girl freedom of movement and freedom of 
conscience.  She is constantly under watch and trained to restrain her physical 
and mental energies. In experiential terms, the young woman’s confinement 
inside the home and even inside of restrictive clothing during this period 
prevents her development of basic physical strength that could empower her to 
fend off bodily attack, to work for her own bread, to enjoy unpolluted fresh air, 
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to appreciate the natural environment on solitary rambles, or to simply 
contribute to a healthful constitution.  The young lady, mandated to silently obey 
her parents and governess within the confines of the home, primarily reads 
books that reinforce these behavioral expectations—too often sentimental novels, 
occasionally literature to educate her on domestic management, and almost 
never those more expansive texts of theological, philosophical, or economic 
debate.  These would expose her to larger public dialogues on rights and ethics 
and empower her to internalize a sense of self-worth through the development of 
her higher-level faculty of reason, which would allow her to internalize a sense 
of justice through engagement with intellectually rigorousness debates on ethics. 
All this would result in her empowerment to judge and reject unreasonable 
duties and demands and the defilement of body and mind.  
When Wollstonecraft calls women slaves or perpetual children, it is 
because the rights and liberties denied to girls at their earliest phases of life 
continue to be denied to women at all stages of life.  As girls, they are already 
disenfranchised as moral agents by weakened constitutions and by the 
narrowness of their social connections.  As women, their socioeconomic 
deprivation encompasses ever more incapacitation relative to their male 
counterparts.  For example, unlike men, women can exert no direct political 
influence, since they cannot occupy positions of authority.  Women of all ranks 
lack freedom of occupation or choice of careers.  Women of the lower orders “are 
made to work beyond their strength” (137); women of the middle and upper 
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classes have no occupations except reproductive functions within marriage and 
needlework: “yet, this employment contracts their faculties more than any other 
that could have been chosen for them” (147).  Single women, wives, and widows 
have no recourse for dignified survival outside marriage: “Who can recount the 
misery, which many unfortunate beings, whose minds and bodies are equally 
weak, suffer in such situations— unable to work, and ashamed to beg?” (136).   
 Indeed, socialization nullifies the girl’s moral agency, just as the law nullifies 
woman as if she does not legally exist at all: “The laws respecting woman, which 
I meant to discuss in a future part, make an absurd unit of a man and his wife; 
and then, by the easy transition of only considering him as responsible, she is 
reduced to a mere cypher” (226).  Wollstonecraft once again encapsulates how 
injustice as exclusion in the form of nonrecognition transitions into injustice as 
maldistribution.  This passage refers to the legal status of the married 
Englishwoman under the laws of coverture, which nullified her moral 
responsibility and legal identity and rendered her unable to own property, retain 
earnings, or instigate lawsuits for her own interests.   Sir William Blackstone, in 
his treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, paternalistically reasons that 
marriage functions as a protective and honorable state for the female: “These are 
the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may 
observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part 
intended for her protection and benefit.  So great a favorite is the female sex of 
the laws of England (Book I: Chapter 15: Of Husband and Wife).     
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 Blackstone employs the term “disability” in the narrow sense of “legal 
disqualification” to refer to how the law constructs collectivities who are 
debarred from the fuller range of legal and social privileges otherwise available 
to wholly enfranchised persons (OED).  He appears to concede that the law of 
coverture impedes women in his subtle phrasing, “for the most part.”  He offers 
a concluding analogy later in his analysis of marriage law in his section entitled, 
“Of Husband and Wife,” that likens the station of the wife to the same as that of 
a child or servant.  Since husbands bore all responsibility for the actions of their 
wives, except in cases of “treason or murder,” they in fact held greater authority 
over wives than they did over their children or servants; husbands retained the 
rights to “moderate correction” and restraint “of her liberty” to control a wife’s 
conduct.  The word "disability" may not be straightforwardly misogynistic, but 
its legal application reflects paternalistic prejudice built into law that weakened 
or erased the wife’s individual autonomy under the guise of greater good to her.   
Marriage nullifies the adult woman as a moral agent by making the husband the 
only responsible party for all her actions; this cannot be for her benefit since it 
reinforces her lack of basic right to moral agency.  
In fact, deprivation of one form feeds into a multitude of additional kinds 
of exploitation.  Marriage is woman’s only path to socioeconomic survival and 
social respect, whereas men of at least middling rank have relatively many 
options by which to pursue economic self-determination and the social respect in 
that self-guided pursuit of a good life:  
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In the middle rank of life, to continue the comparison, men, in their youth, 
 are prepared for professions, and marriage is not considered as the grand 
 feature in their lives, whilst women, on the contrary, have no other 
 scheme to sharpen their faculties.      129 
Marriage encapsulates economic deprivation, marginalization, and exploitation. 
It perpetuates woman’s deprivation of moral agency, it economically 
marginalizes her by confining her to limited career options without income or 
property of her own, and it exploits her all of her property transfers to her 
husband; property takes on a particularly sexual form, moreover, because the 
main fruit of her labor within marriage, children, are also considered the 
property of her husband.  Her morality, social standing, earnings, property, even 
her children are all primary goods transferred from wife to husband, to the 
disadvantage of her “life prospects” but to the greater and disproportionate 
advantage to his.   
Indeed, Wollstonecraft understands these numerous forms of 
maldistribution as accumulatively producing a collectivity of women who are 
socioeconomically and morally radically unequal to men by design.  She also 
figures inequality in terms of violence, drawing on metaphors of slavery and 
animals to convey the state of unsafety and fear women suffer through 
deprivation.  For example, she recognizes man’s initial social disrespect that fuels 
woman’s socioeconomic deprivation when she writes, “How grossly do they 
insult us who thus advise us only to render ourselves gentle, domestic brutes!” 
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(84).  Men not only systemically deprive woman of resources and goods, but they 
attempt to coerce her into depriving herself as well.  
 Just as Cugoano recognizes how systemic and routine forms of violence 
damages the brain and the human spirit, so does Wollstonecraft identify how 
confinement and violence produces learned helplessness:   
Considering the length of time that women have been dependent, is it 
 surprising that some of them hug their chains, and fawn like the spaniel? 
 ‘These dogs,’ observes a naturalist, ‘at first kept their ears erect; but 
 custom has superseded nature, and a token of fear is becoming a beauty.’  
           155 
Wollstonecraft returns to her castigation of Rousseau who “declares that a 
woman ‘should never, for a moment, feel herself independent …  that she should 
be governed by fear’ (91).  For Wollstonecraft, a life predicated on forced 
dependency and predicated on fear is tantamount to sexual slavery: woman is 
“made a coquettish slave in order to render her a more alluring object of desire, a 
sweeter companion to man, whenever he chooses to relax himself” (91).  
Woman’s socioeconomic vulnerability coupled with the inculcation of constant 
fear parallels the condition of slavery for Wollstonecraft.  Slavery itself is 
synonymous with an inhumane, animal existence, but, like Cugoano, 
Wollstonecraft also employs animal imagery to attend to dehumanization caused 
through systemic deprivation, fear, and coercion.  For women, coerced duties are 
always of a sexual nature.  Sexual slavery, like chattel slavery, is a form of radical 
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inequality predicated on violence and non-consensual, “degrading” forms of 
labor for “the abject dependent” (67).  Without moral conscience, self-
determination, and economic independence of any sort, woman is like “a blind 
horse in a mill, is defrauded of her just reward; for the wages due to her are the 
caresses of her husband; and women who have so few resources in themselves, 
do not very patiently bear this privation of a natural right” (137).  This passage 
perhaps reflects Wollstonecraft at her most ironic, for it comes in the context of 
the chaste and dutiful wife, who does everything within her human agency to 
fulfill her ascribed role.  Nonetheless, her husband dishonors her by transferring 
her “rewards,” which only amount to affection, to others.  The dutiful wife has 
no non-sexual occupation.   
Wollstonecraft consistently comprehends maldistributive injustice as the 
integrated and coercive relationship between many forms of disenfranchisement, 
from political disenfranchisement to the denial of all rights and liberties at every 
stage and level of female existence.  She frames some forms of 
disenfranchisement in altogether practical terms such as in the liberty of 
movement, from physical exercise, to sexual autonomy including the right to say 
‘no,’ to the physical strength to engage in work should that be necessary for her 
survival.  Some forms of disenfranchisement are more abstract such as in the 
right to social respect, from the opportunity to cultivate internal self-worth and 
self-protective motives, to the fair regard within marriage and familial 
relationships, to the just respect from society at large.  The right to freedom of 
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association also takes on a broad meaning.  For example, Wollstonecraft 
identifies an act of injustice when girls are blocked from an expanding world of 
peer friendships and learning cohorts, or when women are denied access to fully 
inclusive religious and political affiliations, and when the condition of marriage, 
rather than expanding her familial and kinship connections, rather relegates 
woman to an ever more isolated private sphere of the home as her husband’s 
desires are expected to define and fulfill the whole of her existence even at the 
expense of adequate attention to childrearing.  Knowledge, law, opportunity, 
and material resources are all obstructed from women under the suspect 
rationale of paternalistic defenses.  Just like enslavers claim that bondage will 
result in eventual improvement, so does the father, husband, brother, and 
guardian of woman. Wollstonecraft reads misused patriarchal power as gross 
social mismanagement that utilizes formal and informal institutions to undercut 
female freedom of thought and conscious and blockades her liberty to pursue a 
complete and moral life.  Rights of Woman thus correlates the coercive act of 
bodily rape as inherently violent to the individual woman to coercive denials of 
rights and liberties as inherently violent to most women to the coercive act of 
total political disenfranchisement as inherently violent to the body of women 
collectively.   While Wollstonecraft demands enfranchisement for women, she is 
none too optimistic for its near fruition, “who can tell, how many generations 
may be necessary to give vigour to the virtue and talents of the freed posterity of 
abject slaves?” (148).  Systemic deprivation will require generations to overcome.   
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Godwin and Marginalization 
Social injustice as maldistribution is an unacknowledged value of the most 
influential scholarly work on Caleb Williams, vaguely suggested when Kelly 
connects Godwin’s theme of “persecution” to characters’ assertions of “rights.”14 
Falkland, “the sophisticated, polished, and gallant gentleman obsessed with the 
purity of his honor,” represents the disintegrating remnants of feudalism and a 
code of “chivalry” as  “the most important bond between rich and poor, strong 
and weak” (193-194).15  Tyrrel, meanwhile, symbolizes a more local, British 
political force harking back to the Glorious Revolution; he is no less ambiguous 
as both “the rebellious spirit of the middle-class squirearchy,” “the independent 
country gentleman,” who at once “resisted the king” but “oppressed the peasant 
class” in the name of political and property “rights” (205-207).16  Ultimately, 
Falkland and Tyrrel, despite their seeming ideological differences, in fact collude 
in maintaining control of the socioeconomic resources needed by subjugated 
                                                
14 Unlike earlier scholarship, Kelly does not read Caleb Williams as merely a one-to-one 
allegory with Godwin’s political treatise. 
15 Kelly argues that Godwin does not subscribe to the violence and complete destruction 
“down to the whole fabric” of society that had already become of the French Revolution 
by the time Godwin writes Caleb Williams (195).  He reads Caleb’s transgressive 
surveillance of Falkland as representative of the moderate supporter of the Revolution 
who questioned noble entitlement, whose intentions may have been reformative, but 
who was equally responsibility for sparking violence.   
16 Kelly’s articulation of a multi-layered political allegory in fact conflates different 
realms of social justice.  His references to notions of truth and intolerance echo the foci of 
the politics of recognition in which persons are oppressed based on their perceived 
worth or lack thereof, with the novel offering corrective “truth” to affirm otherwise 
maligned subjectivities.  Meanwhile, Kelly’s observations about liberty and civil strife 
more correctly fall under the rubric of the maldistribution—of rights and 
opportunities—that motivated the English Civil War, the American Revolution, the 
French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution.  And, finally, the problems of 
“corruption” and “persecution” link revolutionary motives since social injustice in any 
of its guises is always about hostile exploitation that revolutionaries sought to redress. 
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characters for survival.  Both Falkland and Tyrrel occupy positons of 
socioeconomic superiority and unjustly wield their power over rights and 
resources against disempowered characters in corresponding ways despite each 
of their claims to civilized ethics, like paternalistic benevolence and 
protectiveness, toward their inferiors.  Falkland and Tyrrel enforce the imposing, 
paternalistic rights of rank and privilege as empowered men of property which 
Godwin distinguishes from the modest rights and liberties asserted by the 
collection of humble characters in the novel.17  
In this section, I attend to the claims made by disempowered characters 
who make altogether humbler assertions of their rights to basic sustenance, to 
freedom of movement, to pursue safe livelihoods, to preserve their families, to 
protect the sanctity of their persons and minds, and to follow the dictates of their 
consciences toward that which they believe to be a moral pursuit of a good life, 
or liberty.18  The true theme of injustice as maldistribution only emerges by 
attending to the recurrent pattern of suffering and failure across the 
                                                
17 If Kelly sees a relationship to French Revolution politics, then this is because similar 
socioeconomic shifts took place in England and France, changes wrought by parallel 
developments in the power of the mercantile classes furnished by the wealth of similar 
imperial projects.  Kelly rightly frames Tyrrel as nouveau riche, but places the symbolic 
importance too far back historically to the Glorious Revolution.  Tyrrel is too established 
and confident as a landowner and too similar an adherent to the paternalistic value 
system implicit in Falkland’s “chivalric code,” which is in fact a vein of social 
paternalism, to belong to that earlier period (Kelly 193).   
18 Kelly’s interpretation is undeniably important for understanding the novel as engaged 
in exposing political and socioeconomic “corruption” (Kelly 200-201).  However, he is 
less attendant upon the specific resources that empowered characters wield and never 
examines the how the number of disempowered characters relate to each other.  For 
example, Kelly’s assertion that Caleb symbolizes the French émigrés who were equally 
culpable for the violence of the French Revolution omits from consideration the theme of 
injustice (as maldistribution) as it extends across all of the lower-class characters in the 
novel in systemic ways and through the abuses of power by both Falkland and Tyrell.   
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disempowered characters of the novel.  These disempowered characters range 
from the disenfranchised woman of the gentry, to the displaced semi-
independent yeoman, to the exiled domestic servant and the outcast criminal 
gang member.  These diverse figures cut across gender, social, and economic 
strata, but nevertheless suffer the same problems of injustice as maldistribution 
by being denied valuable, but comparatively basic, resources that the Falklands 
and Tyrrels of Godwin’s imagined world presume as theirs to control by right of 
rank, wealth, and sex and under paternalistic doctrine and the related patronage 
system. 
These humble figures depend upon local landowners for survival and 
opportunity within the traditional paternalistic patronage system that assumes 
an altruistically reciprocal, if unequal, arrangement between social superiors and 
their subordinates.  Men of property are ideally, if hypothetically, bound by an 
ethic of benevolent condescension toward their inferiors; meanwhile 
subordinates are required to obey the dictates of their benefactors as intended for 
their own best interest and in the wider interest of social stability.  As Thomas 
William Heyck explains in The People of the British Isles:  A New History, “The 
central features of social relationships were closely related to property: patronage 
and deference. Property enabled a person to disburse patronage—gifts, jobs, 
appointments, contracts, favors—and the ability to act as a patron was the crucial 
measure of property and status” (Volume 2, 52).  “Patronage,” “condescension,” 
and “deference” are similar terms that describe how supposedly generous and 
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judicious persons of wealth and status help those of lesser rank and affluence.  
But benevolent charity, while civil and even seemingly coincident with Rawls’ 
difference principle, in fact reinforces the social hierarchy through the visible 
display of resource control: the resource may be offered, but not the sustained 
right to it. Cooperation within the paternalistic system places the greater burden 
upon the social inferior who becomes obligated to defer his own self-
determination and moral conscience to his superior for survival.   
Caleb Williams retraces this theme through multiple narratives of 
oppression.  As already seen in Chapter Two, Caleb Williams, our main 
protagonist, suffers unrelenting persecution by Falkland.  In this chapter, I 
concentrate on Godwin’s other subjugated characters, Emily and the Hawkinses, 
who have never received sustained treatment in Godwin scholarship.  Like 
Caleb, Emily insists on following the dictates of her conscience.  Godwin’s theme 
of moral conscience centers on Emily’s sexual autonomy and which is governed 
by her internal sense of modesty when she refuses to wed and bed a man who 
repulses her mentally and physically.  Ultimately, her resistance results in her 
death as Tyrrel, her cousin and guardian, exerts his socioeconomic and 
patriarchal rights over her self-determination.  He deprives her of liberty, 
economic support, and conspires to dishonor her by rape (perhaps Godwin’s 
critique of Clarissa).  She risks death, indeed does die, fighting for her liberty and 
morality.  Similarly, Godwin displays the socioeconomic resources that Tyrrel 
and all the neighboring squires of the English village use to their benefit to 
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render the humble man ever more worse off.  Hawkins is that hard-working, 
honest, humble man.  He, like Caleb, desires no wealth or fame, but he does 
insist on bettering himself and preserving his son from servitude. Godwin 
suggests a moral theme here as well, since Hawkins desires his son pursue the 
ministry, a dignified position not so much due to social status as much as 
centered on the preservation and cultivation of communal moral ethics.   
The powerful determine the opportunities available in the private lives 
and professional livelihoods of subordinates under the patronage system by 
which they control all political, proprietary, and professional arenas: “the ability 
to act as a patron was the crucial measure of property and status;” but for social 
inferiors, their very “means of survival and advancement” often depended upon 
their betters regardless of their intelligence, work ethic, skill, or talent since they 
had few protections by way of labor laws and no legitimate or lawful political 
voice (Porter 110; Heyck 51).  As Roy Porter expresses, “The geography of social 
relationships was as imposing and established as the hills [ . . . ] Subjects were set 
into the social strata [ . . . ] by their personal connections with others, especially 
authority figures: fathers, masters, husbands, parsons, patrons” (English Society in 
the Eighteenth Century, 2nd Edition, 1990; 21).  Without a “welfare state” or “social 
services” for the poor, the lower orders “depended on skills in the games of 
deference and condescension, patronage and favour, protection and obedience” 
(Porter web).  From government offices and clerical appointments to tenancies, 
apprenticeships, and domestic service posts, almost all livelihoods are 
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distributed by patronage.  In turn, extending patronage earns the benefactor 
“deference, which includes postures of gratitude, loyalty, service and obedience” 
(Heyck 52).   
The relationship between patron and dependent is figured reciprocally.  
The patron and paternalist maintains political and economic privilege, but he 
also assumes the burdens of ethical leadership, altruism, economic stability, and 
moral direction for each of his dependents and as his national duty of 
citizenship.  In exchange for the patron’s burden of responsible leadership, the 
rules of deference presume the obedience and consent of dependents as the 
patron’s right.  This assumed right to deference does not inform strictly 
professional relationships.  Financial and social relationships, including 
marriages, assume moral and intellectual superiority accompany the material 
advantages of king over subject, landowner over tenant, master over servant, 
husband over wife, and parent over child.  Inferiors owe deference to the 
socioeconomically and sexually advantaged in all of these hierarchal 
relationships.   
Godwin repeatedly juxtaposes paternalistic speech with violent action to 
interrogate the false assumption of material-to-moral superiority, the radically 
unequal patronage-deference socioeconomic institution, and the paternalistic 
belief system that philosophically endorses it.  The tribulations of Emily Melvile 
reveals the link between sexual and socioeconomic cruelty. Meanwhile, the 
parallel misfortune of the Hawkinses exposes the conspiracy between men of 
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wealth against their subordinates.  I concentrate on the experiences of Emily 
Melvile and the Hawkinses because no sustained study of their parallel 
mortifications has ever been published.  Their stories, however, supply the key to 
understanding by comparative extension the subjection of Caleb.  I believe that 
Godwin’s professed intention to affect the common, unphilosophical reader of 
eighteenth-century novels resonates most profoundly through these figures.  
Through them, Godwin poses challenges to those humble readers who may 
identify with the unfortunate subjects of this novel, the farmer, servant, or 
dependent gentlewoman, who also may be routinely coerced into unjust forms of 
deference and obedience against the dictates of their own hearts and moral 
consciences for the sake of survival.  
Emily Melvile is a pathetic, fateful, and astonishingly admirable character 
who has received only occasional and fleeting mention in Godwin scholarship.   
However, it is through the figure of Emily that Godwin exposes how 
patriarchalism is a specific manifestation of the broader paternalist disposition.  
Patriarchalism specifically refers to gendered inequalities, but it is paternalistic in 
the eighteenth century because it rests upon the same precepts of radical 
inequality, dependency, duty to obey, and authoritarian control glossed over as 
benevolence, condescension, and fatherly protectiveness.  Godwin introduces his 
chapter on Emily’s plight within the context of Tyrrel’s “domestic tyranny:” “The 
vices of Tyrrel . . . were peculiarly exercised upon his domestics and dependents” 
(Wollstonecraft 258, Godwin 48).  This opening sentence immediately codes for 
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the reader the vulnerability of Tyrrel’s subordinates who are subject to his 
capricious household rule.  The immediate attention drawn to Tyrrel’s cruelty to 
members of his household foreshadows Emily’s eventual destruction since she is 
wholly dependent upon her cousin, Tyrrel, for her survival.  
Godwin juxtaposes the grudging “benevolence” of the Tyrrels against 
Emily’s guileless and unpretentious tenderness to draw out the exploitative 
probabilities underlying social paternalism.  Emily is already the unfortunate 
victim of familial discord; she is Tyrrel’s orphaned cousin whose ostracized and 
deceased mother married for love over family dictates and who died financially 
destitute and abandoned (48-49).  Godwin characterizes Emily much like Caleb, 
as naturally gentle and inquisitive, as receiving rather by default a substantial if 
“casual” education, as unaffected by false refinement, and as reliant upon her 
intrinsic “stores of a just understanding” (50).   
The family displays little appropriate filial love for the amiable, cheerful, 
fearless, “good-natured and disinterested,” young woman, permitting Emily 
entrance into the home “into a sort of amphibious situation, neither precisely that 
of a domestic, nor yet marked with the treatment that might seem due to one of 
the family” (51, 49).  Yet the family “conceives” their dubious adoption of Emily 
as “the most exalted act of benevolence,” even if they fail to consider her due the 
“portion” of her mother’s withheld dowry or even a small yearly income upon 
the death of Tyrrel’s own mother (49).  Sheltering the destitute girl from harm 
and providing basic needs of food and clothing is the extent of their benevolent 
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generosity and filial sympathy.  Their apparent magnanimity extends strictly to 
room and board, even if the “gloomy,” “savage,” and “ferocious” Tyrrel “felt a 
kind of paternal interest in her welfare” and eventually comes to depend on “his 
good-natured cousin” for “superficial” amusements like “dancing and music” 
and her limitless emotional comfort (50-51).  From his perspective as her patron, 
these small comforts are her duty to perform in exchange for the shelter and 
sustenance that he provides.  
Emily has every enduring, modest, and agreeable feminine attribute of the 
ideal, eighteenth-century wife except beauty and money; this is Godwin’s irony 
here in that Emily is altogether moral and good but of no exploitable value on 
the marriage market.  Godwin’s portrait of Emily and her circumstances is 
delicately satirical and sexually candid in his characterization of her personality, 
her person, and her impoverished existence.  While she does not initially feel the 
want of her poverty, she is also too young and ignorant to understand the 
financial “portion” that “In equity perhaps she was entitled … and which had 
gone to swell the property of the male representative” (48).  While she epitomizes 
the internal attributes of the dutiful wife and receives an education that would 
amply prepare her for a career as a wife and mother, she lacks the external 
attractions of physical beauty and wealth that would tempt an appropriate 
partner of similar social rank to marry her.  In fact, the family wholly neglects to 
provide her with any sort of dowry or income with which she could attract a 
husband or maintain an independent living.  While she is no sexual temptation 
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to her cousin because of her smallpox scars, she fulfills all the companionable 
domestic duties of a wife as a docile, domestic comfort to Tyrrel and “mediator” 
between his rage and other members of the household (50).  In character, she is 
admirably rich; in position, she is abjectly poor.  
  Godwin candidly, if through negation, refers to the potential of Tyrrel “to 
look upon” his cousin and ward “with the eyes of desire” to suggest the 
intimately connected social, sexual, and financial vulnerabilities suffered by 
women within the familial context in which men and women occupy radically 
unequal standing.  His phrasing, “Emily’s want of physical beauty prevented 
him,” suggests that, had she been beautiful, Tyrrel may indeed have coerced 
sexual obedience and compliance from his cousin as one of the deferential duties 
expected of the female dependent.  Godwin’s deliberate word choices, such as in 
“swell the property of the male representative,” “playful arts,” “debauched by 
applause,” and “savage protector,” embed by connotation the potential carnal 
motives of male relatives for their consanguineous dependents (50-51).  Godwin 
thus turns a critical lens upon the family, contrasting the ideal of family and 
home as woman’s safe-haven to the social reality that familial inequalities create 
conditions under which a woman’s survival depends upon blind obedience even 
against the dictates of her own conscience.  Presumed and enforced sexual 
inequality combined with paternalistic demands of feminine deference threaten 
female safety and destabilize the supposed sanctity of the family as a protected 
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domestic sphere free of the corruption and competition of professional and 
political arenas.  
Unequal familial relationships pose extreme threat to the moral 
development, sexual security, and economic survival of women.  Tyrrel’s 
ruthless and calculated project of sexual brutality and financial humiliation 
against Emily makes these coordinated moral, sexual, and financial threats to 
female dependents shockingly explicit.  First, Tyrrel’s failure to provide a modest 
dowry blockades Emily’s opportunity for marriage or an independent living 
outside of his home.  As an impoverished woman of the gentry, much like 
biographer Elizabeth Robins Pennell notes of Mary Wollstonecraft, Emily at once 
lacks the training to survive by her own labor and the physical capacity for the 
strenuous labor of lower-class domestic work.  The lack of financial provision is 
just one means by which Tyrrel controls both her sexuality in terms of 
marriageability and liberty in terms of earning her own living by the fruits of her 
own labor.  But this degree of financial and sexual control is wholly within the 
socioeconomic purview of eighteenth-century familial paternalism.   
Tyrrel’s hitherto implicit and “savage” sexual jealousy takes a decidedly sadistic 
turn when conjoined to his hatred of Falkland and enacted upon the psyche and 
body of Emily.  Seventeen-year-old Emily unwittingly and unconsciously falls in 
love with Falkland:  she is “transported whenever he was present,” he becomes 
“the perpetual subject of her reveries and dreams,” and her “artless love” 
becomes the “fervent” rhapsody of “fairy-land and enchantment” after Falkland 
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rescues her from burning to death in a village fire (51).  She experiences these 
effusions of fancy for Falkland, but she is entirely unaware of their romantic 
significance.  Falkland deeply pities Emily’s “unprovided and destitute 
situation;” he judges her lack of provision as dishonorable to the benevolent 
reputation of the Tyrrels, a view informed by his internalized dictates of 
paternalistic moral responsibility.  Falkland’s sympathy is one of condescending 
compassion rather than conjugal love.  His own fineness of feeling and sexual 
decorum regulate his polite distance from Emily.  But a certain worldliness also 
governs Falkland’s prudence as he deliberately maintains distance to avoid 
arousing the repressed sexual jealousy of Tyrrel.  His worldly insight foretells the 
collapse of Emily’s girlish fairy-tale dreams into delirious deathbed nightmares 
through Tyrrel’s “oppression of despotism” (58).  
Ultimately, her socioeconomic disadvantage becomes Tyrrel’s opportunity 
to enforce his paternalistic rights over Emily in specifically legal, economic, and 
sexually coercive forms.  His manifold oppression negotiates the dictates of 
custom and legality while also obscuring his motives of sexual and emotional 
jealousy.  Emily’s adoration of Falkland nauseates Tyrrel to the point of 
“rancorous abhorrence” and he becomes “determined to wreak upon her a signal 
revenge” (57).  Tyrrel enacts his revenge upon Emily through imprisonment in 
the home, incarceration in the county jail via a bizarre lawsuit for restitution of 
his lifelong support, and through a peculiarly sadistic attempted rape.  Tyrrel 
cannot simply evict her to the “wide world” without ruining his own illusory 
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reputation as an altruistic man of property.  Therefore, he contrives to “impose” 
upon her the “mortification and punishment” of marriage to a man “in all 
respects diametrically reverse of Mr Falkland,” to an “uncouth and half-civilised 
animal;” in other words, Tyrrel projects his own lust onto a degrading choice of 
marital partner who resembles himself in coarseness if not in social status (58).  
Forced marriage to a man who Emily finds inhumanly repulsive lays bare 
Tyrrel’s incestuous tendency and sexual sadism nurtured by the socioeconomic 
inequality that placates and rewards vice easily glossed over as paternalistic 
privilege.  He relishes the “shame” she will suffer at the hands of the crude 
Grimes: “You must be taken down, miss.  You must be taught the difference 
between high flown notions and realities” (59).  The “high flown notions” 
alluded to here are Emily’s belief in her right to choose an appropriate marital 
partner, a likeable partner her equal and complement in disposition.   Emily 
resiliently refuses to defer to Tyrrel’s demands.  She asserts the dictates of her 
conscience, heart, and body in refusing to marry a man who repels her.  This 
passage also ironically refers to her naïve disbelief in her cousin’s depravity; she 
cannot comprehend that he would actually enforce his revolting intentions.  Mrs. 
Jakeman, Emily’s surrogate mother, “constant adviser,” and Tyrrel’s 
housekeeper, by contrast, “saw the whole in a very different light from that 
which Emily had conceived it” (59).  Godwin again guides his reader’s 
interpretation of these narrative crises through the understanding of the wiser 
character.  Mrs. Jakeman understands that “Nobody ought” enforce his 
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corrupted will upon his dependent, but “wicked and tyrannical men” routinely 
“persecute” members of their own family (59, 62).   
Mr. Tyrrel thus takes sadistic pleasure in facilitating his mediated rape of 
Emily through the abuse of his power if not the use of his own body.  Godwin 
displays several instances of rape through Emily’s experiences.  The most literal 
of these occurs when Tyrrel commands Grimes, his intended husband for Emily, 
to abduct and sexually assault the young woman in order to force the marriage.  
Grimes fails, but the incident draws out the connection between sexual, social, 
and familial maldistributive disempowerment.  Emily may not suffer the 
physical rape, but she does suffer the violation of her sense of safety in familial 
fidelity.  Had the rape transpired, she would also have suffered social rape of lost 
reputation and psychological rape of being obliged to marry her abuser.  Social 
rape and psychological rape are perhaps more obvious in the customary, 
accepted legality of Tyrrel’s paternalistic right to assert his sexual will, economic 
privilege, and legal power over his dependent’s internal moral dictates.  Emily’s 
own sense of “just understanding” motivates her more modest claims of rights 
and liberties.  Emily asserts her right to freedom from coerced sexual relations, 
the liberty of moral purity and physical chastity, and the implicit liberty to 
determine the path to her own contentment.   
The eviction of his ward and removal of financial support is not socially 
sanctioned; in the eyes of the world, the deliberate casting out of his dependent is 
an intolerable act of cruelty.  However, Tyrrel’s control of her person through his 
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sordid choice of marital partner is socially and legally sanctioned under the 
pretense of paternalism and the related rules of patronage and deference.  Tyrrel 
claims injury to his patronage in the following speech addressed to Emily, “You, 
whom we took up out of charity, the chance-born brat of a stolen marriage! you, 
must turn upon your benefactor, and wound me in the point where of all others I 
could least bear it” (64).  This passage reveals the grotesquely limitless nature of 
the rules of deference and obedience.  Tyrrel calls his aunt’s love-marriage a 
“stolen marriage.”  Her self-determination in choice of sexual partner robs the 
paternalistic family of its socioeconomic maneuvering through marital and 
material alliance.  Choosing love over money and self over authoritarian decree 
violates paternalistic authority that cannot comprehend the female’s desire for 
self-determination over her own body and future.  Paternalistic authoritarianism 
presumes the female dependent’s will as always subject to masculine direction 
and desire.  The most psychologically disturbing and damaging dynamic here is 
that paternalistic presumption mandates ‘self-rape’ by demanding the sexual and 
socioeconomic victim collude in her own coercion through the forceful 
subjugation of her moral conscience.  Godwin demonstrates how paternalistic 
authority within the radically unequal structure of the institutions of family and 
marriage is a legally sanctioned form of mediated rape in physical, 
psychological, and moral effect.   
These violations are instances of injustice as maldistribution.  Most 
straightforwardly, Tyrrel controls Emily’s access to food, water, shelter, and 
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economic opportunity (even if limited to marriage for most eighteenth-century 
women).  His methodical sexual terror displaces her from what should be the 
safety of home, and his bizarre suit for financial restitution misplaces her into the 
county jail where she dies of fever.  He unjustly deprives her of all the most basic 
human needs of sustenance, shelter, safety, and life.  The female dependent lacks 
self-determination over her body, lacks the freedom of mobility to leave her 
home at will, owns none of the fruits of her labor (not even her own children), 
and has no recourse for an independent livelihood.  Tyrrel as archetypal 
paternalist controls his dependent’s corporeal survival utterly, and he does so 
with deliberation.  Godwin wants readers to understand Tyrrel’s maldistributive 
injustice as calculated physical torture and psychological terror.  For the scant 
rewards of sustenance, shelter, and survival, and with no rewards of liberal 
rights or moral freedoms, the woman under guardianship of relatives or 
husbands routinely suffers the unreasonable burdens of the legalized rape of her 
body and the ceaseless violation of her self-worth by the deferential suspension 
of her will and moral autonomy.  
 Emily’s experiences are not isolated; they are neither isolated in the 
context of the novel nor as representations of actual social realities.  Readers 
witness a similar pattern of deprivation and terror in the Hawkins subplot.  For 
this story, Godwin shifts his focus from the dynamics of paternalism within the 
private sphere of the family to the dynamics of paternalism within the public 
sphere of professions: “This Hawkins had originally been taken up by Mr Tyrrel 
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with a view of protecting him from the arbitrary proceedings of a neighbouring 
squire, though he had now in his turn become an object of persecution to Mr 
Tyrrel himself” (36).  This passage is the author’s opening sentence to the 
Hawkins tale.  It directs readers to mistrust Tyrrel and sympathize with the 
beleaguered existence of the English tenant farmer.  In compressed composition, 
Godwin immediately establishes a pattern of “persecution” suffered by Hawkins 
at the hands of two squires—“the neighboring squire” and “Mr Tyrrel himself.”  
Next, Godwin emphasizes the precariousness of the patronage system that 
governs the landowner-tenant arrangement.  The word “arbitrary” is a highly 
suggestive one in eighteenth-century political writing that connotes 
unpredictable, unfair, and unbridled violations by authority.  The word 
“protecting” alludes to the paternalistic ethical responsibility of the superior to 
safeguard and nurture his subordinate.  Lastly, Godwin’s sentence structure, 
literally and syntactically, places Hawkins as “object,” objectified by the more 
powerful and unjust social actors who hold his livelihood and very life in their 
grasp.  Whatever opportunity Tyrrel offers, he soon retracts; Hawkins’s refuge 
here is as fleeting as it was with the neighboring landowner.   In a single opening 
sentence, Godwin has painted a portrait of the fearful existence of the English 
tenant farmer concurrently precarious and entrapped.   
No fewer than four squires persecute Hawkins. The first of these is  
Squire Underwood, who is the “neighboring squire” alluded to above.  He has 
evicted Hawkins from tenancy because the farmer refused to vote in a local 
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election as Squire Underwood “mandates.”  Hawkins is a tenant farmer, but he is 
also the owner of “a small freehold estate inherited from his father” (36).  He is a 
very modest landowner in his own right.  This property ownership gives him the 
right to vote in “the county elections.”  However, the gentry expect by customary 
deference the small man of property to vote as “required by his landlord.”  
Hawkins “refused to obey the mandate, and soon after received notice to quit the 
farm he at that time rented” from Underwood (36).  From the squire’s 
perspective, Hawkins has betrayed the burden of deference to which his better 
presumes his due.  His is a breach of the decorum of deference, but not a 
violation of the law.  Just as Emily was mandated to disobey the dictates of her 
conscience within a private and sexual circumstance, Hawkins is mandated to 
forgo his legal right to vote and to betray his own independent moral judgment.  
Nevertheless, his breach of custom justifies Underwood’s severing their 
professional relationship which endangers the modest livelihood of Hawkins 
and his family.  Underwood casts off his dependent tenants and paternalistic 
tenets easily.  
The second squire who threatens the survival of Hawkins is the very same 
political candidate for which he refuses to vote, Squire Marlow.  Hawkins 
explains his rationale for withholding his vote to Tyrrel:  the squire’s 
“huntsman” “three or four times” “rode over my fence, and so through my best 
field of standing corn” and ruined the mature “crops.”  Hawkins complains to 
Squire Marlow, who subsequently “threatened to horsewhip me” (36-37).  The 
 235  
huntsman violates land laws in jumping the fence and hunting on property not 
belonging to his own employer, tramples upon the subsistence of the farmer and 
his family, robs them and their landlord of crop-share payment, and then the 
squire unjustly threatens bodily harm when Hawkins claims injury.  The initial 
crop damage by the huntsman occurs in the name of his employer even if it is 
more a circumstance of negligence than premeditated harm.  The huntsman is a 
parallel figure to Gines who enforces the surveillance and capture of Caleb upon 
Falkland’s bidding; both figures are the dirty-doers of their masters’ evil 
biddings, the visible hands that enforce suppression through negligence, 
laziness, or deliberateness; and they are backed by the less visible but truer 
sources of unsympathetic domination.  Hawkins uses an eighteenth-century 
idiom to describe the “woundy passion” of the violent Squire Marlow, which 
means “excessive and extreme” (36, 354).  The farmer’s claims to rights—his legal 
right to an autonomous vote and the sanctity of his fruitful labor in crop—meet 
with extreme violence.  The powerful squires value customary deference over the 
word of the law, and they routinely use violence to enforce their control in 
defiance of the law.  In so doing, they violate the paternalist values of altruistic, 
moral, and socially cooperative patronage.   
The third oppressive squire is Tyrrel himself.  Despite Tyrrel’s admiration 
for Hawkins, he turns against the farmer for a similar act of moderate defiance.  
Just as the planter maintained his legal right to vote, he also maintains his liberal 
privilege of opportunity to assist his son to a more respectable profession.  Tyrrel 
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esteems Hawkins for his work ethic and frankness; the farmer quickly becomes a 
promoted and “favoured dependent;” and Tyrrel then offers Hawkins’s eldest 
son a job in “service” as “whipper-in to his hounds,” or huntsman’s assistant 
(38).  Hawkins declines Tyrrel’s offer with internal “mortification” but outward 
respect and “apology:” “I am main sorry to displease your worship, and I know 
very well that you can do me a great deal of mischief.  But I hope you will not be 
so hard hearted, as to ruin a father only for being fond of his child” (39-40).  The 
farmer speaks respectfully, aware of Tyrrel’s power over him, and staunchly 
resists the downwardly mobile job offer.  Hawkins intends his son become a 
“clergyman,” as his own father had been, a career that underscores his genuinely 
moral disposition (39).  The tenant farmer wants to maintain or perhaps gain 
social position, and his success through humble but hard work offers him the 
financial means to help his son to greater advantage.   
Meanwhile, Tyrrel resents the farmer’s modest hopes as pretentious 
overstepping, as personal affront, and as an imprudent breach of the “practices 
of this country allow a dependent to assume” (41).  The words “dependent” and 
“practices” do not refer to legal codes but rather to the socioeconomic patronage 
and deference system.  Hawkins in fact naively believes that the law, symbolized 
by his precious rental contract, will protect the liberty to his livelihood: “I have 
got a lease of my farm … I hope there is some law for rich folk, as well as for 
poor ones.”  Tyrrel scoffs.   No mere, formal legal code can surmount the more 
ubiquitous, informal tradition of the patronage system or its supportive ideology 
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of paternalism: “A pretty pass things are come to, if a lease can protect such 
fellows as you against the lord of a manor.”  Tyrrel is correct.  He has the fiscal 
means to stall the legal system, and the implicit collusion of his fellow gentry 
who occupy all judiciary seats. No fellow gentleman will prosecute his peer. 
Godwin calls attention to injustice as maldistribution through socioeconomic 
custom not directly enforced by legal codes precisely because the squires 
surrounding Hawkins routinely break or skirt the law; the “general policy of 
land owners … restrain[ed] … acts of open defiance” (41).  That policy is one of 
violence, eviction, and conspiracy.   
Tyrrel uses covert and overt means to uncompromisingly and 
omnipotently destroy Hawkins by depriving him of every possible resource of 
survival and recourse of law.  He first “engrosses” himself in deprivations of 
sustenance, livelihood, and safety.  Tyrrel “deprived” Hawkins “of his 
appointment of bailiff,” commanded his servants to “do [Hawkins] ill offices 
upon all occasions,” “laid the whole” of Hawkins’s “harvest” “under water,” 
pulled “away the fences” “to turn in his cattle to the utter destruction of the 
crop,” poisoned Hawkins’s “live stock,” and closed off the “private road” “so as 
to make Hawkins a sort of prisoner in his own domains” (42-43).  The cattle 
killing drives Hawkins to legal action.  He little hopes for a favorable judgment, 
but he also reasons that the annihilation of livestock “was so atrocious as to make 
it impossible that any rank could protect the culprit against the severity of 
justice” (42).  Through the first-person narration of Caleb, Godwin interprets for 
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the reader how things really are: “Wealth and despotism easily know how to 
engage those laws, which were perhaps at first intended [witless and miserable 
precaution!] for the safeguards of the poor, as the coadjutors of their oppression” 
(41-42).  Indeed, Tyrrel turns to “affidavits, motions, pleas, demurrers, flaws and 
appeals” to protract the case in order to “reduce” Hawkins “to beggary” (43). 
Godwin thus displays the disparity between the inferior’s small infractions in 
contrast to the superiors’ ferocious reactions that manifest as injustices of 
maldistribution.  The English village he portrays is founded on radically unequal 
power relations which the humble man or woman has no opportunity to change. 
To avoid further destitution, even death, the Hawkins family absconds.  Their 
escape serves plot and theme by allowing Godwin to place the terminal act of 
bloodshed of Hawkins and his cherished son upon the hands and conscience of 
the fourth and final despotic squire, Ferdinando Falkland.  Falkland allows the 
Hawkins men to hang for the murder of Tyrrel that he himself commits.  This 
event is the definitive verification of the paternalistic power that circumvents the 
letter of the law to the detriment of the inferior.  The presumed veracity, 
morality, and charity of the empowered social actor is so pervasive that the law 
slaughters innocents upon the honorable word of the socially dominant man of 
rank and fortune.  Like Emily, the Hawkins pursuit of liberty and a modicum of 
self-determination results in death. 
Godwin visibly displays valuable socioeconomic resources and relies on 
plot to figure a pattern of human misery bound to patronage and paternalism.  
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The resource of employment exhibits in several forms, from tenant farmer, 
huntsman, bailiff, clergyman, to an array of domestic service positions.  Basic 
subsistence resources appear across the entire landscape in the crops of corn and 
the game, the river and the dam, the livestock and the fields, the fences and the 
roads.  The rich detail of the agriculturally productive countryside suggests an 
abundance and ampleness of resources.  As a tenant farmer, much of these 
resources are quite literally the fruits of Hawkins’s labor.   Perhaps this is 
Godwin’s ironic suggestion when he paints a contrasting topographical picture 
of Hawkins entrapped and enclosed on all sides on his small farm.  This 
topographical entrapment pictorially replicates the socioeconomic limits 
enforced by the dubious collaboration between the squires of the community.   
 Godwin never forgets the human element that actualizes paternalistic 
ideology which he conveys through the cause-and-effect of plot:  the human 
“cause” of plot is always a powerful and unethical social actor, and the human 
“effect” of plot is the boundless human misery of his victim.  If rigid, the related 
system of patronage and deference is also not a formal legal institution. The law 
as written does not obligate inferiors to accept the dictates of more powerful 
social members, and English men,19  even of the lower orders, were not legally 
prohibited from socioeconomic advancement.  Indeed, Hawkins’s hope to 
advance his son points to this possibility as one that informs his work ethic in 
echo of the credo of liberty imagined in English national consciousness.   
                                                
19 If not women so much. 
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Unfortunately, that credo is only imaginary.  The squires enclosing Hawkins 
routinely circumvent formal law:  the “general policy of land owners … 
restrain[ed] … acts of open defiance” by their subordinates (41).  That policy is 
one of literal enclosure and eviction and figurative foreclosure and conspiracy.  
By conspiracy, I do not refer to the collection of individually motivated acts of 
violence against Hawkins, although these separate actions effectively collude in 
his destruction.  Rather, I refer to Godwin’s exhibition of the plotting that 
transpires in sequestered conversations strictly between “gentlemen.”20   Squire 
Underwood, for instance, privately admonishes Mr. Tyrrel for offering Hawkins 
a tenancy.  He argues that this “proceeding” is “contrary to the understood 
conventions of the country gentlemen” and “an end to all regulation, if tenants 
were to be encouraged in such inexcusable disobedience” (37).  The 
“disobedience” to which Underwood refers is Hawkins’s independent vote.  
Hawkins’s singular assertion of his legal right, if “established into a practice” 
would threaten the gentry’s “power of managing any election.”  The invisible act 
of power-management is Godwin’s subject here.  Empowered figures maintain 
their strength by counterfeit elections that offer modest property owners an 
illusion of liberty; to be more precise, empowered figures almost offer that 
illusion.  By “understood convention,” they “mandate” the votes of their 
subordinates.  Gentlemen manage elections for political control, but only by 
managing subordinates through either the distribution or denial of more basic 
                                                
20 At least, in the case of the Hawkins plot.  In the plot against Emily, the private 
conspiracy is one between men who are socially unequal, Tyrrel and Grimes.  
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resources first.  Constant threats to survival motivate most men to acquiesce their 
vote and other liberties to avoid misery.  These benevolent gentlemen, by 
“understood convention,” “regulate” social inferiors by calculated and 
coordinated management of indispensable resources to keep the lower orders 
“under” “subordination” and to foreclose their greater economic, moral, and 
civic independence (38).  The enclosure of Hawkins thus figures the foreclosure 
of liberty. 
Godwin visibly sets Caleb Williams within the socioeconomic conditions of 
the late-eighteenth century, and he highlights the themes of deprivation, 
displacement, and social disintegration through the topography of enclosure.  
The Hawkins plot most directly connects the shared theme of displacement 
between Godwin’s Caleb Williams and the British Enclosure Acts that wrested 
communal lands from the peasantry.  Wendy McElroy explains how “the 
peasantry had traditional and collective rights of access in order to pasture 
animals, harvest meadow grass, fish, collect firewood, or otherwise benefit. Rural 
laborers who lived on the margin depended on open fields and the wastes to 
fend off starvation” (1).  The Enclosure Acts “displaced” villagers of their 
traditional access to communal property to make that land available for private 
purchase by wealthy men, demonstrating how a growing capitalist economy 
does not necessarily improve the condition of the poor under villeinage.  Godwin 
perhaps echoes Goldsmith’s poem, the “The Deserted Village,” here in his 
troubled outlook during a transitional time between feudal paternalism and 
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expanding capitalism.  When Goldsmith refers to the land as “parent,” he alludes 
to paternalistic reciprocity.  The peasantry of the village, in “contented toil,” 
congenially labor for their trusted patron who betrays their trust and his social 
responsibility to preserve their liberal access to the community pastures upon 
which their survival depends.  The speaker of “The Deserted Village” 
sympathizes with the disabused and displaced peasantry, but the nostalgic 
disposition of this text is, in the end, stagnant.  The text progressively calls for the 
“redress” of wrongs but imagines that “redress” as the impossible reversal of 
time before trade and colonialism and conservatively by a return to an idealized 
agrarian paternalism. “The Deserted Village” is social commentary on historical 
land enclosure, figured as oppressive land-grabbing by the rising mercantile 
class, who turn to ruin the productive landscape, and who overturn agrarian 
paternalism.   
Goldsmith’s nostalgic pastoralism resonates in Godwin’s similar pastoral 
iconography of fruitful farms, humble occupations, modest cottages, innocent 
sports, virginal puppy-love, and “sturdy” peasants (38).  However, Godwin 
invokes the intrinsic nostalgia of these images and the topography of enclosure 
for more satirical and realistic social commentary.  Godwin and Goldsmith share 
an undeniable kinship in their compassion for human suffering.  But while 
Goldsmith idealizes a ruined agrarian economy and paternalist ethic, Godwin 
dismantles the artifice of that ethic.  He does so by contrasting empowered 
characters’ speeches on paternalistic benevolence to their hypocritical actions 
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and via plethoric plot parallelism to display the unremitting ruthlessness of 
Marlow, Underwood, Tyrrel, and Falkland, and the evil ingenuity in their 
manners of violence.  The squires who oppress Hawkins, Caleb, and Emily wield 
the formidable rights and privileges of propagation, property, patronage, and 
political participation.  By contrast, the humble characters claim the altogether 
more modest rights of survival, gainful employment, familial love, and safety 
from violence.  Far from an idyllic village life built upon reciprocal paternalistic 
cooperation, the lives of the farmer, servant, and female dependent are rife with 
terror and the real dangers of economic displacement, bodily defilement, moral 
devastation, and corporal death.  The controlling feature of Godwin’s setting is 
the intrinsically unequal “extra-institutional” doctrine of paternalism manifested 
in the informal institution of the patronage system replete with its coercive 
power and obligations of deference.  Maldistributive injustice is not just the 
defilement of the body, the deprivation of sustenance, the displacement of 
workers, the devastation of the fruits of labor, the destabilization of the family, or 
even the denial of civic participation.  Maldistributive injustice is encoded in the 
paternalistic framework that creates the conditions within which dominant social 
actors can habitually exploit their subordinates in the first place.  
Like current scholars of social injustice, Cugoano, Wollstonecraft, and 
Godwin understand the mutually reinforcing way in which injustice in the realm 
of exclusionary representation supplements injustice in the realm of resource 
maldistribution.  Indeed, Rawls suggests that “self-respect” is integrally 
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intertwined with social institutions since it is “the recognition of social 
institutions” that empowers individuals with “a sense of self-worth” to 
confidently assert their ideas, hopes, and goals within their social realms (59).  
The writers of this study would agree.  In response, all three authors complement 
their arguments against identity-deprecating discourses with protests against the 
unfair denial of the valuable resources of society. They argue that not only are all 
persons capable of reasonable and moral decisions, but all persons are equally 
deserving of the opportunities of liberty and other “primary goods,” like 
“freedom of movement,” “income and wealth,” that would empower them to be 
cooperative citizens (Rawls 58-60). Maldistributive injustice scrutinizes the 
systems by which communities allocate resources, commodities, and goods 
among members and how fairly that society apportions its limited resources. 
Wollstonecraft, Cugoano, and Godwin collectively object to various forms of 
injustice as maldistribution not limited to purely economic commodities.  They 
address inadequacies such as lack of subsistence, inaccessibility to professions, 
barriers from education and moral tutelage, and debarment from political 
enfranchisement.  They also protest the “great wrongs” and “grievous injustices” 
routinely suffered by women, workers, and slaves caused by unequal power 
dynamics between the sexes, within the family, in professional and labor 
relations, and through the international slave economy (Bufacchi 7).  Just these 
two brief catalogues reveal a range of resources the writers pinpoint which 
traverse across the realms of economy, civic participation, subsistence, and even 
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moral development.  Resources, as the authors comprehend them, consist of a 
great deal more than solely subsistence needs or economic opportunity.  All 
three authors in fact anticipate the work of current scholars, like Bufacchi, Rawls, 
and Sen, who also understand resources in broad terms of economic, cultural, 
and social goods and opportunities. Thus, the authors identify the stratal, adroit, 
and versatile composition of social injustice as maldistribution.  They dispute 
maldistributive injustice and the always life- altering and often life-threatening 

























 246  
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Anderson, Emily R. “‘I Will Unfold A Tale—!’: Narrative, Epistemology, and 
 Caleb  Williams.” Eighteenth Century Fiction 22:1, 2009, pp. 99-114.  
Andrews, William L.  “An Introduction to the Slave Narrative.” North American 
 Slave Narratives. http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/intro.html, 2004.   
Anolik, Ruth Bienstock and Douglas L. Howard. The Gothic Other: Racial and 
 Social  Constructions in the Literary Imagination. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland 
 & Co., 2004.   
Apetrei, S L. T. Women, Feminism and Religion in Early Enlightenment England. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Archer, John E. Social Unrest and Popular Protest in England: 1780-1840. 
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2 Nov. 2000. 
Armstrong, Nancy.  Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel.  
 New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.  
Austen, Jane, and Marilyn Butler. Northanger Abbey. New York, Penguin Group 
 (USA), 27 Mar. 2003. 
Bailey, Joanne. Unquiet Lives: Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-
 1800. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Bailey, Quentin. “Extraordinary and dangerous powers: Prisons, Police, and 
 Literature in Godwin’s Caleb Williams.” Eighteenth Century Fiction 22:3, 
 2010, pp. 525-548. 
Barker-Benfield, G. J.  “Mary Wollstonecraft: Eighteenth-Century 
 Commonwealthwoman.”  Journal of the History of Ideas 50, 1989, pp. 95-115.  
Barker, Gerard A. “The narrative mode of Caleb Williams: Problems and 
 resolutions.” Studies in the Novel 25:1, 1993, pp. 1-12.  
Barker, Hannah.  The Business of Women: Female Enterprise and Urban Development 
 in Northern England 1760-1830.  Oxford Univeristy Press, 2006. 
Baucom, Ian. Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of 
 History.  Durham:  Duke University Press, 2005.   
Bayertz, Kurt. Sanctity of Human Life and Human Dignity.  Dordrecht, Boston, 
 London:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.  
Becker, Marvin B. The Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century: A 
 Privileged Moment in the History of England, Scotland, and France. 
 Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.  
Bender, John B. Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in 
 Eighteenth-Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.  
Benezet, Anthony. Some historical account of Guinea, its situation, produce, and the 
 general disposition of its inhabitants. With an inquiry into the rise and 
 progress of the slave  trade, its nature, and lamentable effects. Also a 
 republication of the sentiments of several authors of note on this interesting 
 subject: particularly an extract of a treatise written by Granville Sharpe. By 
 Anthony Benezet. [London], MDCCLXXIII. [1772]. Eighteenth 
 Century Collections Online. Gale. University of Oregon. 27 Feb. 2017  





- - - . A Caution to Great Britain and Her Colonies, in a Short Representation of  the 
 Calamitous State of the Enslaved Negroes in the British Dominions. A New 
 Edition. London: Reprinted and sold by James Phillips, 1784.  Eighteenth 





Bhabha, Homi K.  The Location of Culture. London and New York:  Routledge, 
 1994.   
Binhammer, Katherine. The Seduction Narrative in Britain, 1747-1800. Cambridge, 
  UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Blackburn, Robin.  The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776-1848.  London:  Verso, 
 1988.    
Blackstone, Sir William. Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes 
 selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, 
 Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life 
 of the Author by George Sharswood. In Two Volumes. Philadelphia, J.B.   
 Lippincott Co., 1893.  2/11/2016. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2141. 
Bogel, Fredric V. The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and Reading from Jonson to 
 Byron. United States: Cornell University Press, 2000.  
Bogues, Anthony. Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals.  New 
 York:  Routledge, 2003.  
Bohls, Elizabeth A. Romantic Literature and Postcolonial Studies. Edinburgh 
 University Press, 2013.  
- - - .  Slavery and the Politics of Place: Representing the Colonial Caribbean, 1770-1833. 
 Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 23 Oct. 2014. 
Boswell, James, and Roger Ingpen. The Life of Samuel Johnson. 1791. Bath: G. 
 Bayntun, 1925.   
Boulukos, George.  The Grateful Slave: The Emergence of Race in Eighteenth-Century 
 British and American Culture.  Cambridge University Press, 2008.   
Boyd, Diane E, and Marta Kvande. Everyday Revolutions: Eighteenth-century 
 Women Transforming Public and Private. Newark: University of 
 Delaware Press, 2008. 
Brendon, Piers. The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997. New York: 
 Random House, 2010.  
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Philip Pettit. The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and 
 Political Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
Bromwich, David. Moral Imagination: Essays. United States: Princeton University 
 Press,  2014.  
 248  
Brown, Christopher Leslie. Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism. 
 United States, Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American 
 History and  Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North 
 Carolina Press, 15 Apr. 2006. 
Brown, Laura. Fables of Modernity: Literature and Culture in the English Eighteenth 
 Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.  
Bufacchi, Vittorio.  Social Injustice: Essays in Political Philosophy. New York: 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.  
Butler, Marilyn. "Godwin, Burke, and Caleb Williams." Essays in Criticism 32, 
 1982, pp. 237-257.  
Burke, Edmund.  A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
 and Beautiful. 1757. Ed. Adam Phillip. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 2008.  
- - - .  Reflections on the Revolution in France.  1790.  Ed. J.C.D. Clark.  Stanford:  
 Stanford University Press, 2001.  
Bryan, William Jennings.  The World’s Famous Orations, Vol. VI.  New York and 
 London: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1906.   
Byrd, Alexander X. Captives and Voyagers: Black Migrants Across the Eighteenth-
 Century British Atlantic World. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State  University 
 Press, 2008.  
Capp, Bernard.  When Gossips Meet: Women, Family, and Neighborhood in Early 
 Modern England. Oxford University Press, 2003 & 2004.  
Carey, Brycchan. British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, 
 Sentiment, and Slavery, 1760-1807. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
 2005.  
Carretta, Vincent. Unchained Voices: An Anthology of Black Authors in the English-
 Speaking World of the Eighteenth Century. Boulder, CO, United States: 
 The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.  
Carretta, Vincent and Philip Gould, Eds.  Genius in Bondage: Literature of the Early 
 Black Atlantic. United States, The University Press of Kentucky, 31 May 
 2001. 
Cayton, Andrew. Love in the Time of Revolution: Transatlantic Literary Radicalism 
 and Historical Change, 1793-1818. United States: The University of North 
  Carolina Press, 2013.  
Charlesworth, Andrew, et al. An Atlas of Industrial Protest in Britain, 1750-1990. 
 Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 24 Jan. 1996. 
-- - - . An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain 1548-1900. London & Canberra, Croom 
 Helm, 25 Nov. 1982. 
Cheah, Pheng. Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. 
 Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006.  
Christians, Clifford G, John P. Ferre ́, and Mark Fackler. Good News: Social Ethics 
 and the Press. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.  
Clarkson, Thomas. A Summary View of the Slave-Trade, and of the Probable 
 Consequences of Its Abolition. London,  M.DCC.LXXXVII. [1787]. Eighteenth 
 249  





Clemit, Pamela. The Godwinian Novel: The Rational Fictions of Godwin, Brockden 
 Brown, Mary Shelley. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 4 Mar. 1993. 
Collings, David. Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the Political 
 Uncanny, C. 1780-1848. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2009.  
Cook, Daniel and Amy Culley, Eds.  Women’s Life Writing, 1700-1850: Gender, 
 Genre and Authorship.. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.  
Coundouriotis, Eleni. Claiming History: Colonialism, Ethnography, and the Novel. 
  New  York:  Columbia University Press, 1999.  
Cox, Stephen D. “The Stranger Within Thee": Concepts of the Self in Late-Eighteenth-
 Century Literature. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980.  
Crow, Hugh C., and Captain Hugh Crow. Memoirs of the Late Captain Hugh Crow 
 of Liverpool: Comprising a Narrative of His Life Together with Descriptive 
 Sketches of the Western Coast of Africa, Particularly of Bonny, the 
 Manners and Customs of the  Inhabitants, the Production of the Soil and the. 
 London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1970.   
Cruttwell, Patrick. “On “Caleb Williams.”” The Hudson Review, vol. 11, no. 1, 
 1958, p. 87, 10.2307/3848176. 
Cugoano, Quobna Ottobah. Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery. Ed. 
 Vincent Carretta. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.  
Darwall, Stephen L. The British Moralists and the Internal “ought”, 1640-1740. 
 Cambridge,  Cambridge University Press, 26 May 1995. 
Dobash, Emerson R., and Russell P. Dobash. “Community Response to Violence 
 Against Wives: Charivari, Abstract Justice and Patriarchy.” Social 
 Problems, vol. 28, no. 5, June 1981, pp. 563–581, 
 10.1525/sp.1981.28.5.03a00140. 
- - - .  Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the  Patriarchy. 4th ed., New York, 
 Macmillan USA, 1 Nov. 1979. 
Donawerth, Jane and Adele Seeff, Eds. Crossing Boundaries: Attending to Early 
 Modern Women. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2000.   
Drescher, Seymour. The Mighty Experiment: Free Labor Vs. Slavery in British 
 Emancipation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
Dyer, George. The Complaints of the Poor People of England, 2nd ed. London: 
 Johnson, 1793.  
 - - -.  A Dissertation on the Theory and Practice of Benevolence. London: Johnson, 
 1795.   
Ellis, Markman. The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender, and Commerce in the 
 Sentimental Novel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
Erickson, Amy Louise. Women and Property: In Early Modern England. New York, 
 Routledge, 7 Sept. 1995. 
 250  
Equiano, Olaudah. The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano: or, 
 Gustavus Vassa the African.  1789.   Ed. Paul Edwards. London: 
 Dawsons, 1969.  
Falconbridge, Anna Maria, et al. Maiden Voyages and Infant Colonies: Two Women’s 
 Travel  Narratives of the 1790s. Ed. Deirdre Coleman. London: Continuum 
 International  Publishing Group, 1998.  
Fauré, Christine, Ed. Political and Historical Encyclopedia of Women. No. 52.  New 
 York:   Routledge, 2003.  
Ferguson, Moira. “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Problematic of Slavery.” Feminist 
 Review, vol. 42, no. 1, 1992, pp. 82–102, 10.1057/fr.1992.50. 
Fineman, Martha, and Estelle Zinsstag, eds. Feminist Perspectives on Transitional 
 Justice: From International and Criminal to Alternative Forms of Justice. 
 Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013.  
Fisch, Audrey A., Ed.  The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave 
 Narrative. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 31 May 2007.  
Fludernik, Monika. “William Godwin’s Caleb Williams: The Tarnishing of the 
 Sublime.” ELH, vol. 68, no. 4, 2001, pp. 857–896, 10.1353/elh.2001.0032. 
Ford, Lacy K. Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South. New 
 York, NY, Oxford University Press, 17 Sept. 2009. 
Ford, Thomas H.  “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Motherhood of Feminism.” 
 Women’s Studies Quarterly, 37:3&4, 2009, pp. 189-205.  
Foucault, Michel.  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.  New York: 
 Vintage Books, 1979.  
- - - .  The Order of Things:  An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.  New York: 
 Vintage Books, 1994.  
Foyster, Elizabeth. Marital Violence:  An English Family History, 1660-1857.  
 Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
Fox, Christopher. Psychology and Literature in the Eighteenth Century. New York, 
 N.Y:  AMS Press, 1987.  
Franklin, John Hope, and Loren Schweninger. Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the 
 Plantation, 1790-1860. New York, Oxford University Press, 1 Mar. 1999. 
Fraser, Nancy, and Richard Rorty. Adding Insult to Injury: Social Justice and the 
 Politics of Recognition. Edited by Kevin Olson, London, Verso Books, 1 
 Sept. 2008. 
Fraser, Nancy.  “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, 
 Recognition, and Participation.”  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. 
 Delivered at Stanford University, April 30-May 2, 1996.   
- - - . “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-
 Socialist’ Age.” New Left Review, 1995, I/212:68-93. 
Frazer, Michael L. The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments 
 in the  Eighteenth Century and Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 2010.  
Freeman, Michael. Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism. Basil 
 Blackwell, 1980.  
 251  
Freeman, Samuel, Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls., Cambridge, Cambridge 
 University Press, 11 Nov. 2002.  
Gaus, Gerald F.  and Fred D’Agostino, Eds.  The Routledge Companion to Social and 
 Political Philosophy. New York, Routledge, 29 Oct. 2012. 
Gilroy, Paul.   Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line.  
 Cambridge,  MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2000. Print. 
- - - .  Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race. London, Penguin 
 Books, 19 March 2001. 
- - - .   The Black Atlantic:  Modernity and Double Consciousness.  Cambridge, MA:  
 Harvard University Press, 1993.   
Godwin, William.  Things as They Are; or, the Adventures of Caleb Williams.  1794. 
 Ed. Pamela Clemit.  London and New York:  Oxford University Press, 
 2009. 
- - - . “Essay XV: Of Choice in Reading”. The Enquirer: Reflections on 
 Education, Manners  and Literature. Ed. J.E. Spingarn. London: G.G. and J. 
 Robinson, 1797, pp. 129-146.   
Gold, Alex. Rev. of The English Jacobin Novel 1780-1805 by Gary Kelly. In Studies 
 in British Romanticism. Vol. 16:4, 1977, pp. 610-614.  
Gordon, Lyndall. Vindication: A Life of Mary Wollstonecraft. New York: 
 HarperCollins Publishers, 2006.  
Gould, Philip. Barbaric Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century 
 Atlantic World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
Graham, Kenneth W. “The gothic unity of Godwin’s Caleb Williams”. Papers on 
 Language and Literature 20, 1984, pp. 47-59.  
Greer, Margaret Rich, Walter Mignolo, and Maureen Quilligan. Rereading the 
 Black  Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the 
 Renaissance Empires.  Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007.  
Grenby, M O. The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French 
 Revolution. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 6 Sept. 2001. 
Griswold Jr., Charles L.  Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment.  
 Cambridge:   The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1999.   
Grönebaum, Melissa. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Justice as Fairness. United 
 States, Grin Verlag Gmbh, 17 Feb. 2014. 
Gubar, Susan. “Feminist Misogyny: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Paradox of “it 
 takes  One to know One.”” Feminist Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, 1994, p. 452, 
 10.2307/3178182. 
Gruesser, John Cullen. Confluences: Postcolonialism, African American Literary 
 Studies, and  the Black Atlantic. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007.  
Guest, Harriet. Unbounded Attachment: Sentiment and Politics in the Age of the 
 French Revolution. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 
 2013.  
Gunn, Jeffrey.  “Creating a Paradox: Quobna Ottobah Cugoano and the Slave 
 Trade’s Violation of the Principles of Christianity, Reason, and Property 
 Ownership.”  Journal of World History.  Vol 21:4, Dec 2010, pp. 629-656.   
 252  
Haaken, Janice. Hard Knocks: Domestic Violence and the Psychology of Storytelling 
 (women and Psychology). New York, NY, Routledge, 28 Apr. 2010. 
Hazlitt, William.  “William Godwin” in The Spirit of the Age. Vol 9.  The Complete 
 Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P.P. Howe, 1932. Reprinted, New York:  AMS 
 Press, 1967.    
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.  Trans. 
 Thomas Burger. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991.   
Hanley, Kirstin Collins. Mary Wollstonecraft, Pedagogy, and the Practice of Feminism. 
 London: Taylor & Francis, 2013.  
Henry, Lauren. “‘Sunshine and Shady Groves’: What Blake’s ‘Little Black Boy’ 
 Learned from African Writers.”  Romanticism and Colonialism: Writing 
 and Empire, 1780-1830, edited by Timothy Fulford and Peter J. Kitson, 
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 13 Aug. 1998. 
Hewitt, John P, and David Shulman. Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist 
 Social  Psychology. 11th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2016.  
Heyck, Thomas William. The Peoples of the British Isles: A New History, from 1688 to 
 1870. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992.  
Hilliard, Raymond F. Ritual Violence and the Maternal in the British Novel, 1740-
 1820.  Chicago, IL, United States: Bucknell University Press,U.S., 2010.   
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848. London, 
 Littlehampton Book Services, Nov. 1962. 
Hodson, Jane. Language and Revolution in Burke, Wollstonecraft, Paine, and Godwin. 
 Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing, 30 July 2007. 
Hudson, Nicholas, and Aaron Santesso, eds. Swift’s Travels: Eighteenth-Century 
 Satire and Its Legacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
Hume, David.   A Treatise of Human Nature: a Critical Edition. 1740.  Eds.  David 
 Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton.  Oxford: Clarendon, 2007.   
Ishay, Micheline. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the 
 Globalization Era. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.  
Israel, Jonathan I. Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human 
 Rights  1750- 1790. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
Johnson, Claudia.  The Cambridge Companion to Mary Wollstonecraft. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2002.   
- - - .  Equivocal Beings:  Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s:  
 Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen.  Chicago:  University of 
 Chicago Press, 1995.   
- - - . "Mary Wollstonecraft : Styles of Radical Maternity." Inventing Maternity : 
 Politics, Science, and  Literature, 1650-1865.  Eds. Susan C. Greenfield  and 
 Carol Barash.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999, pp. 160-72.    
Jones, C B. Radical Sensibility: Literature and Ideas in the 1790s. London: Routledge, 
 1993.   
Jordan, Don, and Michael Walsh. White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain’s 
 White  Slaves in America. New York, NY, United States, New York 
 University Press, 1 Jan. 2007. 
 253  
Jump, Harriet Devine.  Mary Wollstonecraft and the Critics, 1788 - 2001. 
 London, Routledge, 1 Jan. 2003. 
Kaplan, Cora. Sea Changes: Essays on Culture and Feminism. London: Verso, 1986. 
Kaul, Suvir. Eighteenth-century British Literature and Postcolonial Studies. 
 Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.  
Keen, Paul. The Crisis of Literature in the 1790s: Print Culture and the Public Sphere. 
 New  York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
Kelly, Gary. The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805. Oxford, Oxford University 
 Press, 2 Dec. 1976. 
Kitson, Peter J.  “The Abolition Debate.” Slavery, Abolition, And Emancipation: 
 Writings in the British Romantic Period. Volume 2.  London: Pickering & 
 Chatto, 1999.  
 - - - .  Romantic Literature, Race, and Colonial Encounter. New York: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, 2007.  
- - -.  “Theories of Race.” Slavery, Abolition, And Emancipation: Writings in the 
 British Romantic Period.  Volume 8. London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999.   
Klausen, Jimmy Casas. Fugitive Rousseau: Slavery, Primitivism, and Political 
 Freedom. New York, NY, United States: Fordham University Press, 2014.  
Kraft, Elizabeth. Character & Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Comic Fiction. 
 Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.  
Kretzmer, David & Eckart Klein, Eds.  The Concept of Human Dignity in Human 
 Rights  Discourse.  The Hague, London, and New York:  Kluwer Law 
 International, 2002.  . 
Kriz, Kay Dian. Slavery, Sugar, and the Culture of Refinement: Picturing the British 
 West Indies, 1700-1840. New Haven: Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in 
 British Art, 2008.  
Kuiper, Edith.  “Adam Smith and his Feminist Contemporaries.” New Voices on 
 Adam Smith.  Eds. Leonidas Montes & Eric Schliesser.  London and New 
 York:   Routledge, 2006.   
Lacey, Nicola, and Nicola Lacey FBA. Women, Crime, and Character: From “Moll 
 Flanders” to “Tess of the d’Urbervilles.” New York: Oxford University  Press, 
 2008.  
Landes, Joan B. Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution. 
 Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
Landry, Donna.  The Muses of Resistance:  Laboring-class Women’s Poetry in Britain, 
 1739- 1796.   Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
Leaver, Kristen. “Pursuing Conversations: ‘Caleb Williams’ and the Romantic 
 Construction of Reader. Studies in Romanticism. 33:4, 1994, pp. 589-610. 
Legette, Casie.  “Remaking Caleb Williams in the Nineteenth Century.” 
 Romanticism. 18:2, 2012, pp. 143-154. 
Leo D’Anjou. Social Movements and Cultural Change: The First  Abolition Campaign 
 Revisited. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996.  
 254  
Levecq, Christine. Slavery and Sentiment: The Politics of Feeling in Black Atlantic 
 Antislavery Writing, 1770-1850. Durham, University of New Hampshire 
 Press, 31 Dec. 2008. 
Locke, John.  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  1690.  Ed. Peter 
 Nidditch.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1979.   
Locklin, Nancy. Women’s Work and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Brittany. 
 Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Group, 28 Oct. 2007. 
Long, Edward. “Negroes.” From History of Jamaica. Reprinted in Kitson, Peter J.   
 “Theories of Race.” Slavery, Abolition, And Emancipation: Writings in the 
 British Romantic Period.  Volume 8. London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999.  
Lynch, Deidre. The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of 
 Inner  Meaning.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.   
Mathias, Thomas James.  The Shade of Alexander Pope on the Banks of the Thames:  A 
 Satirical Poem with Notes (Price two British shillings).  Dublin, J Milliken, 
 32, Grafton-Street, 1799. 
 https://archive.org/stream/shadeofalexander00mathuoft#page/n3/mod
 e/2up 
Martin, Robert Montgomery. Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire in the 
 West Indies, South America, Asia Austral-Asia, Africa, and Europe 
 Comprising the Area,  Agriculture, Commerce, Manufactures, Shipping, Custom 
 Duties, Population, Education, Religion, Crime, Waste Land. London: W.H. 
 Allen, 1839.  
Marx-Aveling, Eleanor. “Shelley and Socialism.” Today.  April 1888.   
McGirr, Elaine M. Eighteenth-Century Characters: A Guide to the Literature of the 
 Age. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 25 Jan. 2007. 
McElroy, Wendy. “The Enclosure Acts and the Industrial Revolution - the Future 
 of Freedom Foundation.” Opinion, The Future of Freedom Foundation, 8 
 Mar. 2012, http://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/enclosure-acts-
 industrial-revolution/. Accessed 26 Sept. 2016. 
McKenzie, Alan T. Sent as a Gift: Eight Correspondences from the Eighteenth Century. 
 United States: University of Georgia Press, 1993.  
Meehan, Michael. Liberty and Poetics in Eighteenth Century England. London: 
 Croom Helm, 1985.  
Mendelson, Sara Heller and Patricia M. Crawford. Women in Early Modern 
 England. Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Millar, John. The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks , 4th ed.  Edinburgh and 
 London: John Murray, 1806.  
Miller, David. Principles of Social Justice.  Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.  
Miller, Jon and Rahul Kumar, Eds. Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries. New 
 York, Oxford University Press, 15 Feb. 2007. 
Mohanta, Satya P. Identity Politics Reconsidered. Edited by S. Mohanty Et al., New 
 York,  Palgrave Macmillan, 22 Feb. 2006. 
 
 255  
Myers, Mitzi.  "Impeccable Governesses, Rational Dames, and Moral Mothers: 
 Mary  Wollstonecraft and the Female Tradition in Georgian Children's 
 Books." Children's Literature 14 (1986) pp. 31-59.   
- - - .  “Reform or Ruin: ‘A Revolution in Female Manners.’” Studies in Eighteenth-
 Century Culture, 11, 1982, pp. 199-216.  
Myers, Norma. Reconstructing the Black Past: Blacks in Britain, C. 1780-1830. 
 London, England, Frank Cass Publishers, 31 July 1996.   
Nash, Julie. Servants and Paternalism in the Works of Maria Edgeworth and Elizabeth 
 Gaskell. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007.   
Nowatzki, Robert. Representing African Americans in Transatlantic Abolitionism and 
 Blackface Minstrelsy. United States: Louisiana State University Press, 2010.   
Nussbaum, Felicity and Laura Brown, Eds. The New Eighteenth Century: Theory, 
 Politics, English Literature.  New York: Methuen, 1987.   
Opotow, Susan. “Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction.” Journal of 
 Social  Issues, vol. 46, no. 1, Apr. 1990, pp. 1–20, 10.1111/j.1540-
 4560.1990.tb00268.x. 
Paine, Thomas. The Rights of Man, Ed. H. Collins. 1791. Harmondsworth:  
 Penguin, 1969.  
Pallotta-Chiarolli , Maria and Bob Pease, Eds. The Politics of Recognition and Social 
 Justice:  Transforming Subjectivities and New Forms of Resistance. New  York, 
 Routledge, 2014. 
Paulson, Ronald. Representations of Revolution 1789-1820.  New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 1983. 
Pawson, Eric. The Early Industrial Revolution: Britain in the Eighteenth Century. 
 New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979.  
Pennell, Elizabeth Robins.  Life of Mary Wollstonecraft. Boston, Roberts Brothers, 
 1884. < https://archive.org/details/lifeofmarywollst00penn> 
Plasa, Carl. Textual Politics from Slavery to Postcolonialism: Race and Identification. 
 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.  
Pogge, Thomas Winfried Menko W. World Poverty and Human Rights: 
 Cosmopolitan  Responsibilities and Reforms. Malden, MA, Polity Press, 6 Sept. 
 2002. 
Polwhele, Richard. “The unsex'd females; a poem, addressed to the author of The 
 pursuits of literature. By the Rev. Richard Polewhele. To which is added, a 
 sketch of the private and public character of P. Pindar. New-York, 1800. 





Poovey, Mary.  The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works 
 of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 1984.  
Porter, Roy.  English Society in the Eighteenth Century.  London:  Allen Lane, 1982.    
 256  
- - - . English Society in the Eighteenth Century, 2nd Edition.  London:  Allen Lane,   
 1990. 
Raboteau, Albert J. Slave Religion: The Invisible Institution in the Antebellum South. 
 Oxford, Oxford University Press, 21 Aug. 1980. 
Rajan, Tilottama. Romantic Narrative: Shelley, Hays, Godwin, Wollstonecraft. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.  
Ramsay, Reverend James. Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in 
 the British Sugar Colonies.  Dublin: T. Walker, C. Jenkin, R. Marchbank, 
 L. White, R.  Burton, and P. Byrne, 1784. Eighteenth Century Collections 





Randall, Adrian. Before the Luddites: Custom, Community and Machinery in the 
 English Woollen Industry, 1776-1809. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
 Press, 7 Mar.  1991. 
Randall, Adrian and Andrew Charlesworth, Eds.  Markets, Market Culture and 
 Popular Protest in Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland. Liverpool, 
 Liverpool University Press, 1 Apr. 1996. 
Raphael, D. D. The Impartial Spectator.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.    
Rauschenbusch-Clough, Emma.  A Study of Mary Wollstonecraft and the Rights of 
 Woman, 1898. 
Rawls, John, and Erin. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Edited by Erin Kelly, 3rd 
 ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1 June 2001. 
Rawls, John, and J Rawls. A Rawls: Theory of Justice (cloth). Cambridge, MA, 
 Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 July 1974. 
Rawson, Claude, ed. Politics and Literature in the Age of Swift: English and Irish 
 Perspectives. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
 2014.   
Rectenwald, Michael. “What’s Wrong with Identity Politics (and Intersectionality 
 Theory)? A Response to Mark Fisher’s “Exiting the vampire Castle” (and 
 Its Critics).” Community, The North Star, 2 Dec. 2013, 
 http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=11411. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017. 
Reiss, Timothy J.  “Wollstonecraft, Women, and Reason.”  Gender and Theory.  Ed. 
 Linda Kauffman. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 
Rousseau, G. S., and Roy Porter, eds. Exoticism in the Enlightenment. Manchester: 
 Manchester University Press, 1989.  
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.  Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.  1784.  Eds. Roger 
 D. Masters and Christopher Kelly.  Trans. Judith R. Bush, et al.  
 Hanover, NH:  Published for Dartmouth College by University Press 
 of New England, 1992.     
- - - .  The Social Contract: or, Principles of Political Right.  Trans. And Ed. Charles 
 M. Sherover.  New York:  New American Library, 1974.  
 257  
Rudé, George, and George Rude. The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular 
 Disturbances in France and England 1730-1848. New York, John Wiley & 
 Sons, May 1965. 
Ryan, Alan. The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. 2nd ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
 Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987.  
Sancho, Ignatius. Letters of the Late Ignatius Sancho, an African. To which are 
 prefixed, memoirs of his life, 3rd Edition.  Dublin, MDCCLXXXIV [1784] 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. University of Oregon.  12 





Sandiford, Keith A. Measuring the Moment: Strategies of Protest in Eighteenth-
 Century Afro- English Writing. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 
 1988.  
Sapiro, Virginia. A Vindication of Political Virtue. University of Chicago Press, 
 1992.  
Sen, Amartya K. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard 
 University Press, 8 Sept. 2009.   
Sharp, Granville.  A representation of the injustice and dangerous tendency of 
 tolerating slavery; Or of admitting the least claim of private property in the 
 persons of men, in England. In four parts. Containing, I. Remarks on an 
 opinion given in the year 1729, by the (then) attorney general and sollicitor 
 general, concerning the case of slaves in Great Britain. II. The answer to an 
 objection, which has been made to the foregoing remarks. III. An examination of 
 the advantages and disadvantages of tolerating slavery in England. The latter are 
 illustrated by some remarks on the spirit of the plantations laws, occasionally 
 introduced in notes, which demonstrate the cruel oppression, not only of slaves, 
 but of free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians, and even of Christian White servants 
 in the British colonies. IV. Some remarks on the ancient villenage, shewing, that 
 the obsolete laws and customs, which favoured that horrid oppression, cannot 
 justify the admission of the modern West Indian slavery into this Kingdom, not 
 the leaf claim of property, or right of service, deducible therefrom. London, 
 MDCCLXIX.  1769.   Eighteenth Century Collections Online.   Gale.   





Siskin, Clifford. The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain, 1700-
 1830.  Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 14 Jan. 1998.  
Skedd, Susan.  “Women Teachers and the Expansion of Girls’ Schooling in 
 England c. 1760-1820.” Gender in Eighteenth-Century England: Roles, 
 258  
 Representations and  Responsibilities. Eds. Hannah Barker and Elaine 
 Chalus.  London, Longman, 10 June 1997. 
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 1759. Eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. 
 MacFie. Indianapolis:  Liberty Fund, 1982.  Web. 
Smith, David Livingstone. Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and 
 Exterminate  Others. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 24 Mar. 2011. 
Storch, Rudolf F. “Metaphors of Private Guilt and Social Rebellion in Godwin’s 
 Caleb  Williams.” ELH, vol. 34, no. 2, June 1967, p. 188, 10.2307/2872234. 
Taylor, Barbara, and James Ch. Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination 
 (Cambridge Studies in Romanticism Series #56). Edited by Marilyn Butler, 
 3rd ed., Cambridge, U.K, Cambridge University Press, 13 Mar. 2003.  
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, 
 Mass:  Harvard University Press, 1989.  
Taylor, Eric Robert. If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic 
 Slave Trade. Baton Rouge, Louisiana state university press, 29 Nov. 2006.  
Thomas, Helen. Romanticism and Slave Narratives: Transatlantic Testimonies. 
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 5 Aug. 2004. 
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class (Penguin History). 
 London, United Kingdom, Penguin Books, 26 Sept. 1991.  
Tobin, James. Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay’s “Essay [ . . . ] 
 Colonies.”  London: G. and T. Wilkie, 1785.  Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online.  University of Oregon.  12 Nov 2016.  
Todd, Janet M. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life. New York, Columbia 
 University Press, 25 July 2000. 
Torrance, Alan J., and Nicholas P. Wolterstorff. The Politics of Past Evil: Religion,  
 Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice. Ed. Daniel Philpott. 
 United States: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.  
Turnbull, Gordon.  An Apology for Negro Slavery or the West-India Planters 
 Vindicated from the Charges of Inhumanity.   2nd Edition.   London:  J. 
 Stevenson, 1786.   Eighteenth Century Collections Online. University of 
 Oregon. 12 Nov 2016.  
Valenza, Robin. Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in 
 Britain, 1680-1820. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 24 Sept. 
 2009. 
von Sneidern, Maja-Lisa, and Maja-Lisa Sneidern. Savage Indignation: Colonial 
 Discourse from Milton to Swift. Newark, DE, University of Delaware Press, 
 1 Jan. 2005. 
Wallace, Miriam L., Ed.  Enlightening Romanticism, Romancing the Enlightenment: 
 British Novels from 1750 to 1832. Farnham, England, Ashgate Publishing, 1 
 July 2009. 
Walvin, James. Crossings: Africa, the Americas and the Atlantic Slave Trade. London: 
 Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2013.  
- - - .  The Zong: A Massacre, the Law, and the End of Slavery. New Haven and 
 London: Yale University Press, 2011.  
 259  
Weale, Albert. Democratic Justice and the Social Contract. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2013.  
Wedderburn, Robert. Horrors of Slavery and Other Writings. 1824. Ed. Iain 
 McCalman. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1991.  
Wesley, John.  Thoughts Upon Slavery: The Second Edition.  London: R. Hawes, 
 1774.  Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  Gale. University of Oregon.  





Wheeler, Roxann.  “‘Betrayed by Some of My Own Complexion:’ Cugoano, 
 Abolition, and the Contemporary Language of Racialism.” Genius in 
 Bondage: Literature of the Early Black Atlantic.  Eds. Vincent Carretta and 
 Philip Gould. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001.  
- - - . The Complexion of Race:  Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British 
 Culture.  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2000.   
Wilson, Kathleen. The Island Race: Englishness, Empire, and Gender in the Eighteenth 
 Century. New York, Taylor & Francis, 3 Oct. 2002. 
Wiskin, Christine. “Urban Businesswomen in Eighteenth-Century England.”  
 Women and Urban Life in Eighteenth-Century England.  Eds. Rosemary Sweet 
 and Penelope Lane. Routledge, 2017.  
Wollstonecraft, Mary. The Vindication of the Rights of Men; A Vindication of the 
 Rights of Woman; An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution. 
 Oxford World Classics. Ed. Janet Todd.  Oxford University press, 1999. 
Wood, Marcus. Radical Satire and Print Culture, 1790-1822. New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 1994.  
Woodward, Helena.  African-British Writings in the Eighteenth-Century: The Politics 
 of Race and Reason.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1999.  
Woolf, Virginia, and Woolf Virginia. The Second Common Reader. New York, 
 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt P, 1 Sept. 1956. 
Zaw, Susan Khin.  “The Reasonable Heart:  Mary Wollstonecraft’s View of the 
 Relation Between Reason and Feeling in Morality, Moral Psychology, and 
  Moral Development.”  Hypatia. Vol. 13. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 78-117.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
